501.BB/2–949: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

confidential

67. For Austin. Dept is of opinion that your remarks in SC re the Soviet proposal constitutes an excellent and thorough reply to the [Page 31] Soviet resolution, which appears to include nothing new of substance.1 Prompt referral of the General Assembly resolution, therefore, is in order.

You might wish to consider the advisability of a further short statement especially in the event of further Slav statements. The following points might be helpful in the preparation of such a statement:

(a)
The US has fully considered the resolution.
(b)
It was clearly understood in the GA that it is useless to have members report their armed forces and conventional armaments as long as it is clear that the Soviet Union is unwilling to open up its country to the extent necessary for verification of this information.
(c)
It is for this reason that the GA called upon the CCA to devote its first attention to formulating proposals for the receipt, checking and publication of information to be supplied by member states of their effectives and their conventional armaments. If the Soviet Union desires to move forward in this respect, it must present an earnest of such desire through cooperation with the other members of the CCA in the development of proposals in respect to the Mandate of the GA.
(d)
The Soviet position on the prohibition of atomic weapons has been debated at great length at the recent session of the GA. In adopting the plan of the AEC for the international control of atomic energy and elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons the GA expressed deep concern that unanimous agreement had not been reached. Only the Soviet Union and 5 other states within its orbit prevented such unanimity. If the Soviet Union desires control of atomic energy and elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments the GA has clearly pointed the way—acceptance of the UN plan of control.

Subject of course to the situation, you might wish to consider advisibility of working with other friendly delegations in an effort to obtain prompt SC reference of the GA resolution to CCA thus obviating the necessity for extended discussion of substance of question in SC.

SC should take no action which could be interpreted as any degree of support for the Soviet resolution. It should not of course, be referred by SC to CCA, in whole or in part.2

[Page 32]

Further statement re North Atlantic Pact should await further advice.3

Acheson
  1. See editorial note, supra.
  2. At its 408th Meeting, February 10, the Security Council adopted a United States proposal that General Assembly Resolution 192(III) be transmitted to the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The vote was nine to zero with two abstentions (the Soviet Union and the Ukraine). At the same meeting, the Soviet Union proposed that its draft resolution, S/1246/Rev. 1, be transmitted to the CCA. In support of this proposition, the Soviet Representative presented a lengthy exposition with a view to establishing that the United States had embarked on a policy of warmongering and aggression. The motion for transmittal was rejected by a vote of three in favor (the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and Egypt), none against, with eight abstentions. The substantive Soviet resolution itself was also rejected, two votes (the Soviet Union and the Ukraine) to none, with nine abstentions. For the record of the 408th Meeting, see SC, 4th yr., No. 11.

    The CCA considered Resolution 192(III) at its 16th and 17th Meetings, February 15 and 23. At the 17th Meeting, the Commission approved a United States proposal (S/C.3/37—adopted as S/C.3/39) transmitting Resolution 192(III) to the Working Committee of the CCA for implementation of that resolution’s sixth paragraph in which the General Assembly expressed confidence that the CCA would devote its first attention to formulating proposals for the receipt, verification, and publication of information to be supplied by member states with regard to their effectives and conventional armaments. The United States proposal was adopted nine votes to two (the Soviet Union and the Ukraine); for text, see GA (IV), Suppl. No. 2, p. 76. The Working Committee did not begin its consideration of the matter until May 26.

  3. For documentation on Soviet attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty at the United Nations, see vol. ii, pp. 72 ff. For documentation on the negotiation and implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, see vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.