Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rusk)

top secret

[Washington,] September 7, 1949.

The following are my objections to the draft entitled “Report by the NSC Staff on Suggestions for Policy Integration to Assist in Achieving U.S. Objectives with Respect to the U.S.S.R.”¹

I. General

A. The basic assumption apparently underlying this paper: namely, that it is possible to describe in a few pages a program designed to achieve U.S. objectives with respect to the U.S.S.R., gives a misleading impression of the nature of our foreign policy problems. In particular, it implies that the problem of resistance to Soviet policies is a static problem, the answer to which is susceptible of determination all at one time and all in one piece. This is of course not the case. The Russian question will never be entirely solved. Our approach to it must be determined currently, and be subject to constant alteration and revision in the light of our major objectives and of world developments.

B. The paper is not specific in its allotment of responsibilities, and contains numbers of statements which are only vague generalities or statements of unattainable ideal conditions. For this reason, most of the paper, as now drafted, will have no practical effect on the conduct of the U.S. Government. To my mind it is wrong in principle for the NSC to produce papers of this sort.

C. Many of the “measures” enumerated in this paper are conflicting. In these cases our problem is really one of priorities; yet this problem is not treated in the paper at all.

D. While the paper is addressed only to “The Achievement of U.S. Objectives with Respect to the U.S.S.R.”, the matters of which it treats are so broad—with respect to both domestic and foreign policy—that it appears by implication that the achievement of our objectives with respect to the U.S.S.R. is of overwhelming importance in both our foreign and domestic programs—so important, in fact, that other factors need not be taken into consideration at all. The paper contains recommendations affecting our relations with non-communist countries; development of industrial facilities and essential utilities within our own country; encouragement of scientific research and technological improvements; development of transportation and communication facilities; dispersion of industries, services, governmental and military activities; stock piling; public health; manpower mobilization; housing; wartime reorganization plans for the Executive Branch; controls on entry of persons into the U.S.; export controls on certain items; domestic counter espionage; domestic physical security; civil defense; plans for wartime controls over individuals and censorship; economic assistance to foreign nations; strengthening and using the U.N.; securing of bases; domestic information programs; etc. Obviously what is done in many of these fields must be affected by many considerations other than just relations with Russia.

While the threat imposed by the Kremlin is of course enormous and of outstanding importance as a direct danger to our society, the countering of it is not the sum-total of either foreign or domestic policy. The paper should at least contain a reservation to the effect that while these are measures called for by the requirements of an adequate policy with respect to the Soviet Union, there are many other considerations which bear upon them and which may in some cases be conflicting.

Again, if such a reservation were to be included, to be really useful the paper ought to distinguish these conflicts, reduce them to concrete form, and to allot priorities. But in this case, the report would be expanded into an attempt to define in a single document the total policy of the U.S. Government, which is an impossible project.

II. Specific

A. The description of the tasks of our armed forces includes the insurance of the integrity of the Western Hemisphere, but not of the U.K. or any western European countries.

I should think our military authorities would wish to question whether it is useful to attempt to describe the tasks of our armed establishment in terms of the “insurance of the integrity” of given areas.

But even if this is considered to be useful, I would question whether there are not areas of western Europe more important to our security than parts of South America below the bulge of Brazil.

B. What is meant by “other air offensive operations” in point 2a(4) on page 2? Is this going to commit the State Department to the atomic or other strategic bombing of civilian residence or occupational areas? If so, there should be a searching inquiry and discussion in this Department before we go any farther along these lines. There is a question as to whether we should sanction in advance any shedding of civilian blood by our forces which would not be substantially justified by letter and spirit of the Hague Convention, except possibly by way of retaliation. For this reason, we may question whether we ought even to undertake strategic bombing of Soviet industrial targets except after due warning to Soviet civilians; and I am not at all sure that we should inaugurate use of atomic bombs, in particular, on any targets, unless due warning can be given to civilians and the loss of civilian life kept to very small figures.

C. In point 2a(5) on page 2, I question the use of the phrase “national war objectives”. Would it not be better just to say “national objectives”?

D. Section 3, beginning on page 3, contains a number of examples of dicta which will be meaningless without further definition in concrete terms, without a definite assignment of responsibility within the Executive Branch of the Government, and without a firm allotment of priorities. Take point c, page 4, for example: what priority should be allotted as between the encouragement of scientific research suggested in this paragraph and the later recommendations on page 6 that we strengthen internal security controls? Most of these controls have the tendency to cripple freedom of scientific research in this country.

E. I cannot quite envisage the practical implication of point d, on page 4. How does the Federal Government proceed to develop reserves of transportation facilities for estimated war requirements or to eliminate present bottlenecks?

F. Paragraph 4, page 5 (“Intelligence”), seems to me to be purely redundant. Is it the implication that if it were not for the necessity of achieving our objectives with respect to Russia, U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence activities would not need to be increased and improved, and that the activities at home and abroad would not need to be coordinated?

G. Has the section (paragraph 5) on “Internal Security” been entirely thought through? Of what importance is it to the Soviets to be able to introduce individuals into this country? They have the tens of thousands of members of the communist party and the further thousands who are not party members but effective communist agents in the labor movement and many other key activities in this country. With this enormous fund of largely native-trained and resident agents what need is there for them to try to introduce into our midst for espionage or subversive purposes individual foreigners, obviously less qualified by training, speech and experience to conduct such work here. And could our controls be made really effective without the establishment of something resembling the Soviet iron curtain? The Soviet Government has, for purposes of infiltration of individuals into foreign countries, not only unlimited funds at its disposal but also the services of other foreign communist parties, plus extensive penetration of the seamen’s unions all over the world, plus a counterfeiting center in Moscow which is surely capable of reproducing any foreign identification document with sufficient plausibility to pass the average border controls. How much more restrictive would our controls have to be to be effective?

H. The same applies to controls of imports and exports. Our customs formalities are already more burdensome and irritating than those of most European countries. In what way do we suggest that they should be made still tighter? How are we to prevent the removal from the U.S. of information in view of the freedom of the mails alone, to say nothing of the stand we have taken in international organizations on freedom of information?

I. With respect to point 6b, on page 7, about economic assistance, is there a recognition in the NSC Staff that existing approaches and measures will be quite insufficient to solve the British problem and that in order to develop trade credit and exchange relations sufficiently favorable for this purpose we would have to take many measures quite contrary to our own traditions and the apparent present temper of Congress?

J. In paragraph 7, on page 9, is the National Military Establishment aware of the relationship between the recommendation that we try to drive a wedge between the Soviet Government and satellite governments, on the one hand, and the question of the blooming mill for Yugoslavia, on the other?²

K. In paragraph 8, “Foreign information program”, the list of matters to be taken into account in this connection, which appears on page 11, should be headed, I think, by an item along the following lines:

“Endeavor to communicate to the Soviet orbit countries the impression that the United States is a strong and formidable country, capable of acting with firmness and ruthlessness—a country which it is dangerous to provoke and which must be treated with respect and caution.”

L. The wording at the foot of page 13, namely: “… the level at which fiscal and monetary measures, selective voluntary allocation and standby mandatory allocations meet the needs …”, is some sort of governmentese which would be obscure to the average person. I question whether such language should be included in an NSC paper.

My conclusion, based on the foregoing comment, is that we should uphold the decision of Mr. Webb’s staff committee that this measures paper should be dropped from the NSC agenda. The paper in its present form is neither realistic nor helpful. I will be glad to discuss with you what type of paper the Department might prepare as political policy guidance to the NME to supplement the papers on the U.S.S.R. that were prepared in S/P.

George F. Kennan

1. The subject paper, an undated revision of the NSC staff draft report of March 30 (p. 271), is not printed.
2. For documentation on this subject, see vol. v, pp. 854 ff.