Under date of May 19, 1949, the Secretary of Defense transmitted to the
Secretary a study entitled “Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Military
Rights in Foreign Territories”.1
Mr. Johnson stated that the National Military Establishment believes that
prompt action should be taken to acquire military rights that are urgently
required and measures should be initiated to obtain the other rights which
are required as well as those considered desirable. He urged that the
Department of State make a thorough study of the JCS views; he suggested that after the Department had had an
opportunity to study the JCS recommendations
the Secretary of State may desire to define the general principles and to
outline a course of procedure to be followed in the acquisition of military
rights for the United States; and he stated that arrangements were being
made in his office for the handling of matters connected with these
requirements, including such review and revision as may become necessary,
and for the performance of whatever functions need to be performed by the
Military Establishment in connection with a course of action which might be
outlined by the Department.
The Acting Secretary of State designated the Policy Planning Staff to
coordinate the Department’s study of the JCS
document; and in a letter dated May 31, 19492 informed the Secretary of Defense that the
Department’s study of the JCS paper had been
initiated and that when the analysis had been completed he would communicate
further regarding the suggestion that the Department of State outline a
course of action for the further handling of this matter.
[Annex]
Study Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Summary of Preliminary Analysis of the Views of
the
JCS
on Military Rights in Foreign Territories
(Paragraph numbers correspond to those in the JCS paper)
5. a. Greenland: When U.S. long-term rights in
Greenland were discussed with the Danes a few months ago, the Danes were
unwilling to give the U.S. permanent rights through a new bilateral
agreement, but indicated that so long as the world crisis continues the
1941 Defense of Greenland Agreement5 will
remain in effect. It should be possible to make a more permanent and
precise arrangement through the defense organization set up under the
North Atlantic Treaty.
5. b. Airfield at Abu Sueir, Suez Canal Zone:
Bilateral conversations with the British were held about two months ago.
Shortly thereafter orders were issued by the British to proceed with
work on the
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airfield. The
British have suggested that the U.S. should be prepared to assume at
least one-third of the cost for this field.
5. b. Medium Bomber Rights at Khor Mahsar, Aden:
The Department is not aware of any negotiations on this question. It is
believed that the rights in question could be more advantageously
negotiated with the British on a bilateral basis rather than on any
collective basis. It is believed that the British would welcome a
development of this bomber base.
5. b. Air Bases in the UK: Specific bases already
have been agreed upon between the U.S. and UK. It is expected that
negotiations will continue, both on a bilateral basis and on a joint
basis within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. The problem is
a current one which is mainly financial in nature and which is under
active consideration.
5. c. Unlimited Landing Rights at Port Lyautey,
Morocco: These rights at present are limited by the top secret
agreement of September 15, 1947 between the U.S. and French Governments
concerning the use of the air base at Port Lyautey by American armed
forces.6 It is
believed that these rights could be extended in the manner required more
advantageously on a collective basis arranged with the French but within
the spirit and for the general purposes of mutual defense outlined in
the Atlantic Pact.
5. d and 5. e. Naval Air Bases
and Amphibious Training Base in French North Africa: There have
been no negotiations since the termination of the wartime Clark–Darlan
Agreement,7 but it is the Department’s
understanding that there have been top secret and most informal talks
between opposite numbers in the French and American navies. The
Department believes that conversations on negotiations should be pursued
on a collective basis, dealing with the French but within the spirit and
for the general purposes of mutual defense under the North Atlantic
Treaty.
5. c, d and e. Acquisition by
the United States of Urgently Required Military Rights in French
North Africa: It is pointed out that the exact scope and nature
of military rights in French North Africa are of great importance in
determining whether or not the French reply would be favorable. The
French Government will be obliged to justify the granting of such rights
before the French Parliament and French public opinion. It is believed
that the French Government would have to be in a position to make clear
that sovereignty, jurisdiction and operational control over the bases in
question would remain French. The timing of our request to the French
will be of great importance,
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particularly with reference to the North Atlantic Treaty and the
Military Aid Program.
5. f. Azores: The existing agreement of February
2, 1949 [1948] with the Portuguese
Government8
provides for U.S. use of the Lagens airfield. The State Department
understands that the Air Force will not be ready to proceed until 1951
with respect to additional space and communication facilities at the
Lagens airfield.
5. g. U.S. Air Force and Navy Communications Facilities
in Ceylon: The U.S. Ambassador at Colombo initiated discussions
on January 5, 1949 with the Prime Minister of Ceylon regarding Navy
communications facilities. The Prime Minister stated that he did not
feel able to give his assent in this matter until clarification and more
specific definition had been given to the terms of the Defense Agreement
of November 11, 1947 between the U.K. and Ceylon. The Department
currently is studying an additional statement to be presented to the
Prime Minister within the next few weeks. The Department is of the
opinion that if we try to apply pressure for an early grant of the
privileges we seek, we would probably encounter resentment on the part
of the Government of Ceylon and lay ourselves open to vigorous attack
from the anti-Western elements in Parliament.
5. h. Long-Term Rights in Saudi Arabia: There have
been extensive negotiations during the past five months between the
American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, the Commanding Officer of the
Dhahran Airbase, and the Government of Saudi Arabia in regard to landing
and other rights on the Dhahran Airbase. A new one-year agreement was
filed on June 23.9 The Saudi Arabian Government was unwilling to
sign an agreement for a longer period at this time. It is possible that
in exchange for a continuation of the present rights the Government of
Saudi Arabia may request defense guarantees and assistance from the
U.S.
5. i. Security and Defense Planning with the Dutch
Colonial Authorities in the Dutch West Indies: An exchange of
military liaison officers between the Governor of the Netherlands West
Indies and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Caribbean Command was completed
in December 1948. The Netherlands Ambassador in Washington was
approached on November 30, 1948 concerning the initiation of military
planning talks regarding Caribbean defenses. The Netherlands Government
has not yet replied, probably due to the resentment felt by the
Netherlands of the part played by the United States in the Indonesian
affair.10 The Department,
however, is willing to raise the matter again
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with the Dutch if the Department of National
Defense so desires. Any such arrangements may merge into joint planning
by the Defense Committee to be established under Article 9 of the North
Atlantic Treaty.
5. j. Air Force Communication Facilities at Aden:
The Department is not aware of any negotiations regarding this question.
A bilateral arrangement with the British should be acceptable to the
latter.
6. a. Military Installations and Facilities in
Greenland: Comment under paragraph 5 a
also is applicable to 6 a. Approval by the Danish
Government probably will be dependent upon the passage of MAP and the transfer by the U.S. of
substantially the arms already requested.
6. a. Military Installations and Facilities in
Iceland: In October 1945 the U.S. began negotiations with
Iceland for a long-term lease of two air bases and one naval base which
had been constructed by the occupying forces. The proposal was made
public in April 1946, when the Icelandic Prime Minister announced that
Iceland could not consider such an arrangement. On October 7, 1946, the
U.S.-Icelandic Airport Agreement11 was signed
whereby the 1941 Defense Agreement was terminated, Keflavik Airport was
transferred to the Government of Iceland, and the U.S. was granted
landing rights there. In May 1949 there was a further exchange of
notes12 implementing
the agreement of October 7, 1946. Icelandic relations with the U.S. are
significantly influenced by Iceland’s jealous regard for its absolute
independence and sovereignty which gives rise to a fear of
“Americanization”, and a determination not to become a military base of
the U.S. Reciprocal requests by Iceland that might be made in connection
with efforts to obtain additional U.S. rights will be conditioned by
Iceland’s status as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty. Bilateral
negotiations for additional rights beyond those now being enjoyed are
almost certain to be self-defeating as well as to have unfortunate
effects upon public opinion in the island and upon its relations with
the U.S.
6. a. Military Installations and Facilities in the
Azores: See comment under paragraph 5 f.
The Department believes that the most orderly and expeditious procedure
for obtaining additional rights would be through negotiations in the
Defense Committee to be established under Article 9 of the North
Atlantic Treaty.
6. b. Canada—Various Base Bights and Communication
Facilities: As a result of past negotiations, we already are
enjoying on an informal basis most of the facilities for which formal
rights now are desired. Canada will have to consider its joint
responsibilities to other
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members of the North Atlantic Treaty as well as to ourselves and the
U.K. Subject to this, there should be no difficulty in carrying on
bilateral negotiations with the Canadians. As conditions for granting
rights to the U.S., Canada will wish to have a general review and
revision of the basis of existing rights under the 99-year agreement of
1941.
6. c. Communication Facilities at Asmara, Eritrea:
The Department believes that the U.S. will be able to obtain the
necessary rights; although in view of the delicate and complicated
nature of the problems involved in the disposition of the former Italian
Colonies, negotiations should not begin until the area in question
actually has been ceded to Ethiopia.
6. d. Airfield and Military Base at Tripoli: In
1947, before the Air Force had completely deactivated the wartime
airfield at Tripoli, an informal agreement was obtained from the British
Government for the U.S. to continue to use the base as long as the
British administration continued. Tripolitania, however, is one of the
former Italian Colonies whose ultimate disposition still is pending.
Until that question is disposed of, it is impossible to give any
definite answers to questions regarding negotiations for long-term base
rights.
6. e. Airfield and Other Rights in the U.K. and the
Bahama Islands: Substantially all of the rights required are
being enjoyed now on a current basis and presumably will continue to be
available in the future, as circumstances may require, both on the basis
of bilateral arrangements and on the basis of joint planning under the
North Atlantic Treaty. The British do not wish to make formal public
arrangements to give a foreign power “permanent” military rights in the
U.K. It would be difficult to obtain broad and general rights from the
British without specifying individual projects. Economic and financial
problems are probably more important than problems of military rights as
such. It is recommended that any further formalization of military
arrangements be considered initially in the Defense Committee under
Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
6. f. Military Base, Air Transit Rights, and
Stockpiling in French North Africa: The comment made under
paragraphs 5 c, d and e is
pertinent. In general, it is believed that these rights can best be
dealt with in connection with the Defense Committee under the North
Atlantic Treaty.
6. g. Stockpiling in Ceylon: The U.S. Ambassador
reported in March 1949 that arrangements had been worked out with the
British Admiralty, subject to Ceylon’s approval, for U.S. Navy tankers
to unload fuel oil into the Royal Navy storage tanks. It was agreed that
this operation would be carried on without the use of U.S. Navy
personnel on shore. The Navy is operating under this informal
arrangement and has advised us that this arrangement is adequate for the
[Page 374]
time being. No mention has
been made of the storage of avgas under this arrangement. The Navy has
never requested nor has the Department ever negotiated for the right to
maintain stockpiles of material and ammunition at Trincomelee.
6. g. Stockpiling in Greenland, Iceland, Italy,
Labrador, Azores, U.K., Malta, Gibraltar and Algeria:
Negotiations for this right in the areas named have not been initiated,
except in the case of the underscored sites.13 Each
of these areas is within the territory of signatories of the North
Atlantic Treaty. It is recommended that negotiations for these rights be
initiated in the Defense Committee to be established under Article 9 of
the North Atlantic Treaty.
6. g. Stockpiling at Massawa–Eritrea: Facilities
established under wartime agreements have continued. If the area in
question is granted to Ethiopia, in connection with the disposition of
the former Italian Colonies, negotiations will have to be conducted on a
bilateral basis with the Ethiopians. Oral assurances with regard to the
right to continue these facilities have been given by the Emperor of
Ethiopia. Negotiations should not be commenced until and unless Eritrea
actually is ceded to Ethiopia.
6. g. Stockpiling in Tunisia.: Comment under 6 f and g is pertinent. It
is believed that negotiations should be conducted in connection with the
Defense Committee under the North Atlantic Treaty.
6. g. Stockpiling in Saudi Arabia: See comment
under paragraph 5 h.
6. g. Stockpiling in the Suez Canal Zone: The
Department is not aware that any peace time rights have been granted to
the U.S. for such stockpiling. This matter would most probably be
bilaterally negotiated with Great Britain. Negotiation of the rights
would be affected by the problem of military relations between Great
Britain and Egypt.
6. g. Stockpiling in Aden: The Department is not
aware of any negotiations regarding these rights. The rights probably
could be negotiated bilaterally with the British.
6. h. Stockpiling and Troop Maintenance in Saudi
Arabia: Comment under paragraph 5 h is
pertinent.
6. i. Rights in the Alexandria Harbor–Cairo–Suez
areas: There are no current negotiations on the question of
these rights. The rights in question could be negotiated more
advantageously on a collective (U.S., U.K., Egypt) than a bilateral
basis. Egypt has not been too favorably inclined toward the U.S. because
of the latter’s support of Israel for admission into the United Nations.
The Egyptians also are quite nationalistic in their viewpoint and are
currently opposed to subjecting their sovereignty to any major power on
a bilateral basis.
[Page 375]
It is
anticipated that the Egyptians would make many requests in exchange for
the granting of these rights.
6. i. Air Transit and Other Rights in the Suez Canal
Zone: Air transit and technical stop rights granted to the U.S.
by the Egyptian Government terminated on June 15, 1948. Additional
renewals were unobtainable owing to Egyptian resentment over our
Palestine policy. Our Embassy at Cairo is under instructions to renew
the request for blanket military air rights whenever it considers that
there is a reasonable chance of its being granted. The rights in
question could probably be negotiated more advantageously on a
collective rather than on a bilateral basis. Egyptian requests in
exchange for these rights probably would be substantial.
6. j. Rights in Belgium, Luxembourg, Metropolitan
France and Netherlands in Connection with our Occupation Forces in
Germany and Austria: No new negotiations have been initiated.
The rights probably should be negotiated through the Defense Committee
to be established under the North Atlantic Treaty.
6. k. Air Transit Rights in India: An agreement
between the U.S. and India providing for continuation on a long-term
basis of air landing and transit rights was concluded by an exchange of
notes at New Delhi on July 4, 1949.14
6. k. Air Transit Rights in Pakistan: Our military
air landing and transit right agreement with Pakistan expired on July 5,
1949 and was extended for one month by the Pakistan Government. A draft
of a new agreement15 on
a long-term basis was presented to the Pakistan Government on June 6,
1949 and was provisionally approved by the Secretary of Defense.
However, formal action by the Pakistan Government has not been
completed. It is believed that there is a good prospect for early
approval of the draft by Pakistan.
6. k. Air Transit Rights in Iraq and Trans Jordan:
There would appear to be no serious obstacle to securing military air
transit rights from the British or Jordanian Governments. In Iraq,
nationalist feeling and lingering resentment of U.S. Palestine policy
may create some difficulties. A more serious consideration, however, may
be some form of Iraqi desire for a military or strategic quid pro quo.
6. k. Air Transit and Landing Rights in Burma: Air
transit and landing rights in Burma granted prior to Burma’s achievement
of independence were terminated on March 1, 1948. On April 15, 1948 the
U.S. Ambassador at Rangoon left with the Foreign Minister a draft15 consisting of a series
of paragraphs which represented an understanding rather than a formal
agreement, and which recognized the Burmese Government’s authority over
its own air. The Embassy’s efforts
[Page 376]
to obtain further action have been unsuccessful.
Pressure for the extension of these rights to the United States under
present circumstances would probably put a strain on our relations with
Burma and would increase the antagonism of left wing Socialists and
Communists toward the U.S.
6. k. Air Landing and Transit Bights in Ceylon:
The Department has supplied the U.S. Ambassador at Colombo with details
concerning military air landing and transit rights which we desire in
Ceylon, but it has not been considered advisable thus far to initiate
negotiations with the Government of Ceylon on these matters. Comment
under paragraph 5 g is pertinent.
6. l. Continuation of Present Bights in Nationalist
China: So far as the Department knows these rights are still
available in so far as the contracting territory of the Nationalist
Government is concerned. There would appear to be no need to
re-negotiate these rights or otherwise to discuss the subject with the
Nationalist Government in Canton.
6. m. Air Bases and Other Bights in Italy:
Negotiations have not yet been initiated. It is believed that they could
be undertaken either directly through diplomatic channels or in the
Defense Committee to be established under the North Atlantic Treaty.
6. o. [sic] Military Bights in Greece: The Department
believes that no rights in addition to those now being enjoyed in Greece
are necessary in connection with the Military Aid Program, and no
request for additional rights is contemplated. Bilateral negotiations
could be conducted should reason therefor arise.
6. o. Military Bights in Turkey: The Agreement on
Aid to Turkey was concluded July 12, 1947.16 It defines
the duties, immunities and privileges of the American Mission for Aid to
Turkey. The Agreement continues in force until terminated by mutual
consent. The NSC has decided that it
would be unwise at this time to seek an arrangement with the Turkish
Government to accord rights for the construction of airfields and
stockpiling of aviation gasoline in Turkey, and for an aerial mapping
survey of Turkey.17
6. p. Transit Bights in Central America:
Diplomatic permission must be obtained from Panama with the exception of
the area adjacent to the Canal Zone airspace before the flight of a U.S.
military aircraft into the interior of Panama. In the other Central
American countries, the privileges granted to the U.S. for transit and
technical stop of its military aircraft are at present considered valid;
although the privileges granted are temporary and the duration is
uncertain. It is believed that long-term rights could best be negotiated
on a multilateral
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basis.
However, if the multilateral plan should not succeed the rights should
be acquired through bilateral arrangements.
6. p. Long-Term Military Bights in Brazil: There
are the secret agreements of May 27, 194218 and June 14, 194419 covering military and air
base rights. Both agreements are effective. The 1942 agreement has no
fixed term and the 1944 agreement is effective for ten years.
6. p. Security and Defense Planning with
Venezuela: There have been no negotiations since the end of
World War II with a view to planning military operations with Venezuela.
In connection with the safety of the strategic petroleum installations
in Venezuela, the U.S. Ambassador stated in reply to a Department
communication: “It is, in my opinion, virtually certain that the
Venezuelan Government would, at this time, reject any suggestion that
the United States, in the event of an emergency furnish military
assistance in protecting strategic Venezuelan oil installations. It is
too much to expect that the Administration’s political party would so
far depart from its emphasis on nationalism, sovereignty and
independence as to concede in advance its inability to settle its own
problems without foreign aid.” The possibility of initiating discussions
with the Venezuelan authorities has been mentioned to the Ambassador
informally since the exchange of correspondence referred to but the
Ambassador did not feel that the time for such negotiations had
arrived.
