840.20/7–2949
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Senator Dulles1 called at his request. He said that he wished to talk about MAP and that he was reflecting Senator Vandenberg’s views as well as his own.2
[Page 362]He thought that in order to put MAP through at this session it would be necessary for the Administration to accept what he called an interim program on a less ambitious basis. He divided his views into two main parts: One the practical or political considerations; the other the merits of the program.
As to the first, he thought that the Administration did not have a sufficiently reliable Democratic majority to put the bill through in its present form. He thought that the Republicans would be almost solidly against it and there would be many Democratic defections. Such a result, he thought, would be disastrous in its farreaching implications as breaking up the non-partisan approach to foreign policy. It would be hard to reconstruct the non-partisan group on future issues. He conceded that many members of the Senate had made up their minds on the bill without a hearing, on account of the debate on the Treaty.
He thought that from the political point of view, in addition to opposition on the merits which grew out of many factors—(a) the isolationists’ dislike of assisting European countries, (b) the argument that it was futile any way, (c) the argument that we ought to go into the Pact machinery, (d) the amount—there was another tactical obstacle. This was that we were in a bad position to argue that there was great urgency or an emergency situation; because, although the President had discussed the matter of arms for Europe, since his Inaugural Message3 one measure after another had been put before the MAP legislation, and the matter was now coming before the House in its closing months, so that the charge would be made that, while the Executive Branch could take plenty of time to consider the matter, the Legislative Branch was not permitted to do so.
On this branch of the argument he thought it highly desirable that some common ground should be found on which the non-partisan group and the Administration could meet.
The second part of the argument had to do with the merits of the bill. Here he thought that in order to build up over a period of time arms strength in Western Europe it was quite as important to start right as to start quickly. By “starting right” he meant that we should use to the fullest extent possible the North Atlantic machinery. A little delay in time, he thought, would pay dividends in the end by getting [Page 363] more constant support for a program which would, he was sure, have to last over several years.
He, therefore, thought that the program should contain the funds required for the non-Atlantic Pact countries, as already provided. In regard to the Atlantic Pact countries, we should have sufficient funds to get the program in operation and to keep it operating until, say, February or March, 1950, at which time it should be possible to have recommendations from the Atlantic Pact machinery on which Congress could take definitive action. From this point of view he thought that the bill could include the surplus and the $77,000,000 required for its rehabilitation, such amounts as were necessary to provide the immediate need for electronic warning equipment and the equipment for mining the Skagerrak, etc., and possibly some funds for placing orders for other materials which needed to be started at once or which could be delivered before or soon after the beginning of 1950.
He said that he was fully aware of the attitude of our European allies, was sympathetic to it, and was most anxious not to disturb them. He thought that his suggestions would have a minimum effect in this direction.
I said to the Senator that I appreciated that he and Senator Vandenberg were not opposed to the program, but were advising me on their sincere conviction about the soundest way to proceed. I wanted to give their advice most careful study and to cooperate with them in every way possible.
Those who had worked on the program believed that it was exactly the sort of program which Senator Dulles outlined—it was an interim program, and, while the amount seemed large, it was because of the fact that the cost of comparatively small assistance was large in this field. The program was devised, as General Bradley would explain at the hearings, in accordance with the strategic concept which fitted into the concept of the North Atlantic Treaty and which had been worked out after close consultation with our European allies. I went over the various major items and explained why I thought they fell into the sort of a program which Senator Dulles approved.
The Senator said that he was not taking a final attitude on the amount and, as the result of evidence, might considerably increase his present ideas as to what would be proper. He had mentioned to me the sum of $300,000,000, in addition to the non-Atlantic Pact countries, plus the surplus material.
The Senator then agreed to the necessity of proceeding with the bill as drafted and with the hearings as planned. He said that he asked only for an open mind on our part as the bill progressed through the Congress. I assured him that we would maintain an open mind and urged that he and Senator Vandenberg should not make their position [Page 364] more rigid, but should leave the matter with what they had already said until the testimony developed further. I understood from him that they were inclined to do this. He assured me that he and Senator Vandenberg would be available and glad to consult with us at all times as the bill proceeded.
- John Foster Dulles, Senator from New York.↩
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This discussion occurred against the background of the following developments. On May 12, President Truman approved the suggestion of Secretary Acheson that the Military Assistance Program should not be presented to Congress until the North Atlantic Treaty had been ratified. The memorandum recommending the course of action approved by the President is printed in vol. iv, p. 298. On July 25, President Truman ratified the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate having given its consent on July 21. Also on the 25th, the President transmitted legislation to Congress authorizing the Military Assistance Program. For the text of the President’s letter of transmittal, see the Department of State Bulletin, August 8, 1949, pp. 186–189.
The Administration’s proposal, H.R. 5748, contained authority for the President to provide $1,450,000,000 in military assistance to foreign nations. For the text of the bill, see The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives (81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 1–5. The original proposal of the Executive Branch is described in Department of State Publication 3563, The Military Assistance Program (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), released on July 25.
↩ - For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 112–116.↩