S/S–NSC
Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 45 Series1
Report by the National Security
Council to President Truman
top secret
[Washington,] April 15, 1949.
NSC 45/1
Airfield Construction in the United Kingdom and the
Cairo–Suez Area
note by the executive secretary
The National Security Council has considered and adopted the enclosed report
on the subject.2
The National Security Council recommends that the President approve the
recommendation contained in paragraph 3 of the enclosed report.3
It is requested that this matter be handled with special security
precautions.
[Enclosure]
Report by the National Security Council
top secret
[Washington,] April 15, 1949.
NSC 45/1
Airfield Construction in the United Kingdom and the
Cairo–Suez Area
- 1.
- The National Security Council has considered the enclosed
memorandum on the subject from the Secretary of Defense, dated
March 17, 1949, together with the views of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff thereon contained in the attached memorandum dated March
26, 1949.
- 2.
- The National Security Council has agreed that the development
of adequate airfields in the United Kingdom and in the
Cairo-Suez area, required for emergency war plans, is in the
interests of national security.
- 3.
- The Council accordingly recommends that the President direct
the Secretary of State to undertake negotiations with the
British Government, on the highest levels necessary, regarding
the provision of funds required for the construction of the
airfields envisaged in the enclosed memoranda.
[Page 286]
[Subenclosure 1]
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Souers)4
top secret
Washington, 17 March
1949.
Subject: Airfield Construction in the United Kingdom and
the Cairo–Suez Area
- 1.
- I wish to submit the following problem for consideration by
the National Security Council at its next meeting. It relates to
discussions between the United States and British Governments
regarding airfield construction in the United Kingdom and the
Cairo–Suez area.
- 2.
- As you know, current emergency war plans require the delivery
of a powerful strategic air offensive as soon as possible after
hostilities commence. Current plans envisage the utilization of
air bases in the United Kingdom and in the Cairo-Suez area in
connection with the strategic air offensive. Air bases in the
United Kingdom presently suitable for this purpose are situated
in East Anglia, and are extremely vulnerable to successful
attack by low-flying aircraft. The Abu Sueir airfield in Egypt
is presently unsuitable for bomber operations. There is, in
fact, no airfield in Egypt suitable for bomber
operations.
- 3.
- Joint study by the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.F. revealed that in
the United Kingdom, at least four more air bases of medium
bomber standard were required. To avoid the vulnerability of the
East Anglia locations, it was determined that the four
additional air bases should be sited . . . . The Air Ministry
agreed to initiate development of these bases as soon as funds
were secured.
- 4.
- In the case of Abu Sueir, the development needed has been
agreed upon between the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.F., and
arrangements have been made with the Egyptian Government for the
necessary materials. In this instance, also, the initiation of
work will immediately follow the securing of funds.
- 5.
- The funds, during Fiscal Year 1950, which are needed for the
development work on the four . . . air bases is 1,000,000
pounds, according to R.A.F. estimates. For the Abu Sueir air
base 800,000 pounds is needed. The total ultimate cost of these
developments is estimated to be 7,717,000 pounds, or
$31,000,000.
- 6.
- Efforts have been made without success to secure the use of
Economic Cooperation Administration funds for the air base
development required. Alternatively, the Air Ministry proposed
to the British Treasury that 1,800,000 pounds be included in the
British
[Page 287]
budget for the
forthcoming fiscal year with which to finance the subject air
base development. This the British Treasury declined to do, on
the grounds that it could not support an appropriation of funds
for U.S.A.F. requirements without agreement between the
Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom as to
the source of funds, i.e., whether the funds would come from
U.S. Air Force, E.C.A., or U.K. sources.
- 7.
- Advices received from Ambassador Douglas and from General
Johnson, Air Force Commander in the United Kingdom,5 are to the effect
that no favorable action may be expected from the British
Government, either in respect to E.C.A. funds or their own
budget, without pressure from high quarters in the United
States.
- 8.
- I wish to request, therefore, that this problem should be
considered by the National Security Council at its next meeting
with a view to determining whether the development of four
airfields in the United Kingdom and one in the Cairo–Suez area
is in the national interest, and, if so, whether the Department
of State should be authorized to undertake negotiations with the
British Foreign Office regarding the provision of required
funds.
- 9.
- It is requested that this matter be handled with special
security precautions.
[Subenclosure 2]
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Souers)
top secret
Washington, 26 March
1949.
Subject: Airfield Construction (NSC 45)
In reply to your memorandum of 23 March 1949,*
requesting, pursuant to NSC Action 197,
the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 45, I wish to inform you that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff agree that the development of the four airfields in the
United Kingdom and the one airfield in the Cairo–Suez area is in the
national interest.
