Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Minutes of a Meeting at the United States Mission at the United Nations, New York, December 5, 1949, 9:30 a. m.

New York, December 5, 1949, 9:30 a.m.

secret

Present:	Ambassador Gross1
	Mr. Noyes2	}	during part of the meeting
	Mr. J. Hyde3
	Mr. Maffitt4
	Mr. B. H. Brown5
	Lt.-General W. D. Crittenberger—USA
	Lt.-General H.E. Harmon—USAF
	Vim Admiral B. H. Bieri6—USN
	Brig.-General Robert M. Bathurst7—USA

Ambassador Gross opened the meeting by explaining that Ambassador Austin on Friday had asked him to review the history of developments under Article 43 and to prepare a Mission position on General McNaughton’s suggestion that this question be reviewed during his presidency of the Security Council in December. Ambassador Gross said the meeting had been called to discuss the problem in the light of Ambassador Austin’s view that the U.S. Government should be receptive to any developments which promised progress in this field. Ambassador Gross had spent the weekend diligently reviewing the file on the subject but felt that he still had much to do in the way of preparation. He had noted a May, 1948, SANACC memorandum⁸ indicating that the Military establishment at that time had considered unsound a State Department proposal that the possibility be explored of the United States making an offer under Article 43. The point was made that as long as Russia was in a position to veto decisions in the Security Council, there could be little use in making forces available to the Council. It was also felt that, due to commitments undertaken by the United States to allocate forces for other purposes, the furnishing of troops under Article 43 might be difficult.

Ambassador Gross went on to say that the most recent policy statement by the, State Department seemed to be in Deptel No. 6 [5], January 6, 1949, 7:00 p. m., stating that there was serious reservation as to whether it would be advantageous to press for implementation of Article 43 at that time, and whether the United States could in fact make armed forces available. The telegram concluded that under these circumstances, Security Council discussions were definitely undesirable.

More recently, Ambassador Gross continued, General McNaughton had raised the question of possible discussions during his presidency in December. The Department, in reply to the Mission’s query, had stated in Deptel 621, November 29, 6:00 p. m.⁹ that the U.S. position with respect to Article 43 forces was now under review. The telegram expressed the thought that while the United States might welcome conversations as suggested by General McNaughton, it appeared unlikely that we would be prepared to discuss the problem during the Canadian presidency.

Ambassador Gross concluded his introductory remarks by stating that he hoped to have a brief general discussion of the problem to ascertain the present position in the light of all relevant factors. He wondered whether General Crittenberger might take up the matter from there.

General Crittenberger said he also understood that we remained under the guidance of Deptel No. 6 [5] of January 6. He thought there might have been changes since that time, but nevertheless the instructions stood. General Crittenberger had spent the past week with General Bradley,¹⁰ who had, remarked that if, from a political standpoint, it was desirable to discuss Article 43 in the Security Council, the safest course would be to confine the discussions to general principles, which the Council had had under discussion for some time. General Crittenberger personally was of the opinion that the Military position was sound. The North Atlantic Treaty represented a large commitment and made it questionable whether forces could be made available under Article 43. If it proved to be politically desirable to undertake discussions with other members of the Council, General Crittenberger saw no harm in doing so, if the conversations were private and not public, but he could not express optimism that anything realistic would be accomplished.

Admiral Bieri, agreeing with General Crittenberger, remarked that when one thought of the purposes for which Article 43 forces would be used, it was plain that nothing could be gained by establishing such forces as long as the Soviet Union remained in a position to veto their use. He agreed that implementation of Article 43 had been made exceedingly difficult in view of the military commitments of the United States under the North Atlantic Treaty.

General Harmon also concurred in the above analysis. He thought that to reopen the question at this time would merely stir up acrimonious debate.

Ambassador Gross asked the representatives of the Military Staff what they thought might be behind General McNaughton’s suggestion. General Crittenberger replied that in his estimation General McNaughton was a sincere man acting from high motives. Something like fifty-five members of the GA had supported a declaration in favor of world peace, and in General McNaughton’s mind, one of the means of making good this declaration was implementation of Article 43. General Crittenberger thought General McNaughton sincerely desired to exhaust all possibilities in this connection. General Crittenberger recalled that during the Canadian presidency in January, 1949, the question had been raised, and indeed it was that which had prompted the statement of policy in Deptel No. 6 of January, 1949.

Ambassador Gross said he wanted also to get an expression of opinion on the relationship between the work of the CCA, the AEC and efforts to implement Article 43. He wondered whether any general analysis or synthesis had been made putting these various elements in their proper relationship one to the other. Specifically, he wondered what consideration had been given to implementation of Article 43 in terms of the U.S. positions in the CCA and AEC.

Mr. Noyes remarked that the majority of the CCA had agreed on the principle that no further progress could be made toward the control of conventional armaments until the Five Powers found it possible to move forward under Article 43. The CCA had made this statement of principle at the suggestion of the United States. Unfortunately, the USSR thus was able to claim that the United States was setting up barriers which it knew in advance were insuperable. In other words, they claimed we made progress in the CCA conditional on implementation of Article 43, and at the same time we had abandoned efforts to fulfill this condition. The USSR argued that the majority should drop this stipulation in the CCA or get on with business in the MSG and Security Council with a view toward implementation of Article 43. Mr. Noyes recalled that the MSC had got two-thirds of the way through its consideration of general principles and that during this phase it was the Russians who were holding things up. Since that time, however, the effort to complete agreement on general principles had been dropped, and the Russians were asking why. Mr. Noyes said the difficulty plagued us in many ways. For example, in working out a substitute for the Soviet Peace Pact Proposal,¹¹ it had been necessary to avoid reference to the implementation of Article 43, although many other instances were mentioned where the cooperation of the Great Powers might advance the cause of peace. Mr. Noyes said his point was that if the United States left a record which could be interpreted as preventing implementation of Article 43, we would not leave as good a picture as we might. He thought that if the United States went ahead and got a nine-to-two vote on general principles and then stopped, the position would be a sound one. As it was, failure to complete the effort to get agreement on general principles created an embarrassing situation which was hard to justify.

General Crittenberger agreed that from a propaganda standpoint this might be unfortunate. He observed, however, that the fact remained it was the Russians who had really blocked progress in getting full agreement on general principles.

Mr. Hyde said he had heard that a group of New York lawyers had been corresponding with Congressional leaders, urging that a string be attached to money appropriated under the North Atlantic defense arrangements so that forces supplied from these funds might be made available to the Security Council in carrying out its responsibilities under the Charter. Judging from the response they had received, the group felt that this possibility was not foreclosed.

General Harmon said he thought it was necessary to review some of the more basic questions which underlay all policy considerations with respect to implementation of Article 43. In his own personal opinion, General Harmon thought it had been a mistake to incorporate Article 43 in the Charter. He felt that implementation of this Article might conceivably create a false sense of security in the public mind. At the same time, if the Five Powers could really agree, there would be no need for an international force. General Harmon was unable to see how such an international force could have been used in any of the situations with which the Security Council had dealt, including Palestine and Indonesia. He thought the practical difficulties of organizing such an international force were well-nigh insurmountable. He wondered whether at the present time it was in the best interests of the United States to continue efforts to implement Article 43 or whether it would not be better to play it down and, instead, advance the idea that implementation was no longer necessary. General Harmon himself favored the latter course and felt that the ground should be prepared so that thought and opinion would be ready to accept this idea.

Ambassador Gross recalled that the idea of implementing Article 43 had been reaffirmed time and again by United States representatives at the very highest level. He was interested in getting a concensus on this question: Would it be advantageous or disadvantageous to discuss with the United Kingdom and France the question of general principles at this time? In other words, would there be tactical and propaganda advantages (or, on the other hand, disadvantages from the military standpoint) if the three Powers were to discuss their differences of opinion with respect to general principles?

General Crittenberger said there might be political advantages and that so far as he could see there would be no military disadvantages, so long as the conversations were restricted to the Three Powers named.

Ambassador Gross said he had been struck by the thought that the signature of the Atlantic Treaty might have important implications with respect to implementation of Article 43. He wondered whether the North Atlantic Treaty arrangement, with its implied integration of armed forces, might not affect the position with respect to Article 43 in the sense that forces could now be made available on a regional basis. Under the Atlantic Pact, the armed forces of the signatories would presumably be arranged in such a way as to be able to respond to a quick call by the Council under the Treaty. Similarly, might not these pooled forces—or at least those of France, the United Kingdom and United States as the three members of the MSC who have signed the Atlantic Treaty—be made available under Article 43, if the necessary prior agreements could be reached?

Admiral Bieri said he did not see how the signature of the Atlantic Pact altered the situation. As long as Russia remained the real threat to peace, there was really no use in endeavoring to set up armed forces in company with hers.

Ambassador Gross said he had in mind how the Atlantic Treaty arrangements might affect our dealings with the United Kingdom and France. He wondered if we did not have a different problem now with respect to these two Powers and if, together with them, we might not advance a common front on Article 43 in the light of the new treaty relationship. After all, the Atlantic Pact forces would have responsibility for policing the North Atlantic area. This suggested the possibility that forces might conceivably be made available to the Security Council from this regional group. Ambassador Gross said he had not yet gone very far in his study of Article 43; he simply threw out this suggestion for discussion, wondering if it might not have something in it. He thought possibly it was an item for consideration by the Defense Committee or Council under Article 9 of the Atlantic Treaty.

General Bathurst recalled that he had raised the question some months ago with his military, colleagues and it had seemed at that time impractical from a military standpoint to alter our approach to Article 43 as long as the veto existed. It was generally felt that there would be no profit in exploring this question further, and the proposal got nowhere. Perhaps this had been the wrong answer, but it was the answer arrived at at the time.

Ambassador Gross said he did not mean to suggest that this was the wrong answer. His thinking was tentative. He merely raised the question, on what basis should the US, the UK and France approach the question of Article 43 implementation? He wondered whether it was not important that the three Powers reach a solid front on general principles with respect to Article 43. He thought this was the point which Mr. Noyes had made before leaving the meeting, and he wished to invite discussion of it.

General Crittenberger asked whether the idea was to stimulate discussion in the Security Council or to promote private discussion among the three Powers. Ambassador Gross said he would judge that Deptel 621 ruled out discussion in the Security Council at the present time. The next question in his mind was, would it be of value to get a tripartite position in discussions with the UK and France—in other words, to form a common front on the question of general principles.

General Crittenberger repeated that there might be political advantages in this course and that he personally could see no corresponding military disadvantage. He asked what the other MSC representatives thought.

Admiral Bieri stated that in his opinion there would be no objection to discussion along these lines so long as it did not go beyond the three Powers named. Actually, the US, UK and France were not far apart on general principles. It might also be useful to ascertain the attitude of these powers toward the idea which General Harmon had expressed that it would be unwise, under present circumstances, to proceed with efforts to implement Article 43.

Mr. Maffitt said that so far as he could recall there were only three out of some forty-odd principles which had not yet been agreed by the US, UK and France.

Ambassador Gross said it was General Harmon’s idea which had prompted him to raise the possibility of discussion with the UK and France. His question derived, in fact, from the point General Harmon had raised. He had in mind that we might sound out these two Powers as to their general attitude, from a military standpoint, on the implementation of Article 43.

General Crittenberger said it was the hard lot of the Military representatives always to carry a heavy bucket on each shoulder. One was the commitment of the United States to support the United Nations and all its works; the other was the military security of the United States. He questioned whether such a discussion as Ambassador Gross had suggested could, with propriety, be initiated in this small group or whether it was not properly a matter for the President and Congress, who might not be disposed to recede from the position so frequently taken in public on Article 43.

Ambassador Gross said he wanted to make it clear that he could not agree or disagree at present with the ideas advanced by General Harmon. Frankly, he was not sufficiently familiar with the matter to take a position. He had noted, however, that since 1946, when the matter had first arisen, the Mission and the Department in turn had from time to time tentatively put a foot in the water and, upon finding it too cold, had withdrawn. He referred to Deptel No. 381, August 29, 1947, to Embassy, London.¹² It was here stated that in pursuit of the U.S. objective of getting forces allocated to the Security Council as soon as possible, consideration was being given to proposing that the General Assembly, at its regular 1947 Session, consider accelerating the implementation of Article 43, and, specifically, that the Assembly recommend (1) to GA Members that they tender offers of forces before March 31, 1948, and (2) to the Security Council that it accept such offers as agreements, thus effectuating a provisional implementation of Article 43, pending completion of SC consideration of general principles. This suggestion had been discussed with the British Foreign Office, and Ambassador Gross understood that they had turned it down cold. Again, in 1948, the Department in Deptel No. 384, June 11, 1948, to USUN¹³ had stated it was considering whether or not some action in the Article 43 field should be taken in the SC prior to the 1948 Session of the General Assembly. Judging from these cables, it seemed that it had been the Department of State which wished to stimulate activity in this sphere. However, Deptel 166 [5], January 6, 1949, seemed to indicate otherwise.

General Harmon said he wanted to have it understood that nothing in his previous remarks should be taken to indicate that he represented a subversive element in the meeting. He conceded that the policy question of whether or not to implement Article 43 was a matter for the President, the Secretary of State and Congressional leaders. It would have to be decided at the highest level, and not in an informal meeting such as the present one. In General Harmon’s personal opinion, however, a good deal of altruistic thinking had gone into the writing of the Charter. In response to a question by Mr. Maffitt, General Harmon said he did not feel that altruistic ideas were necessarily impractical ideas. He was not a student of diplomacy, but he recalled that in the days of the League of Nations these same questions had been discussed and that many people had the mistaken idea that the League had failed because it had not been possible to supply an international force. Actually, he thought the failure of the League lay in other causes altogether.

Admiral Bieri said he personally was inclined to agree with General Harmon. He had found no indication that the authors of Article 43 had given any serious thought to the important question, who was expected to upset the peace? In considering a military program, it was necessary to make certain assumptions. One always asked: from what quarter is trouble to be anticipated? If no assumption were made, the military aspects of the problem could be considered only in the abstract and not realistically.

Ambassador Gross said that without having made any historical investigation to find out what was in the minds of the authors, he thought it was pretty certain, in view of subsequent statements and developments, that there never had been any intention to use forces contemplated under Article 43 outside or beyond the veto system. The main difficulty in his mind was the relationship between Article 43 and the general question of the control of armaments. One policy statement after another had underscored the fact that in the U.S. view no control of armaments could be achieved without prior progress in implementing Article 43. Secretary Marshall, in his opening address at the 1947 GA,¹⁴ had used the word “presuppose”, saying that the regulation of armaments “presupposed” the implementation of Article 43. Ambassador Gross said he thought General Harmon’s comment should be considered in relation to this pronouncement by the Secretary of State and similar statements by other government leaders. If U.S. policy with respect to Article 43 were reviewed and if the conclusion suggested by General Harmon were adopted, would it then be necessary to discard all hopes of armament control?

General Crittenberger asked whether the purpose of the present meeting was not to determine the attitude the United States should take in the Security Council in December on the question of Article 43 forces. The question was to talk or not to talk. If it were felt politically advisable to enter into the discussions suggested by General McNaughton, that was one thing. Senator Austin had said we would be receptive to any ideas General McNaughton or others might advance. This was a political question. From a military point of view, General Crittenberger could see no advantage in such discussions.

Ambassador Gross said the Department’s November 29 telegram seemed to indicate that there would be no discussion of Article 43 in the Security Council in December. He thought it put a stopper on that. He believed it was a correct interpretation of Senator Austin’s view to say that we should keep an open mind, but not plunge precipitously. Ambassador Gross felt there was much of value in having a frank and open discussion of this nature by those concerned with the problem in the U.S. Mission and in the U.S. Military Staff.

Mr. Maffitt said the British apparently had told the Canadians that they did not wish to discuss the question in the Security Council at the present time. The French, he understood, were consulting their Foreign Office and did not yet have instructions.

General Crittenberger said he did not wish to take exception to Senator Austin’s statement that the United States should be “receptive”. He fully agreed that we should have an open mind on these questions and often had said this to Ambassador Austin. At the same time, the broader aspects of the problem should not be forgotten. It was important to know in what way Article 43 forces were to be employed. So far as he could see, there was no way to employ them to any effect as long as decisions were subject to veto. As General Harmon had observed, it was inconceivable that Security Council forces, had they been available, would have been used in Palestine or Indonesia. General Crittenberger wondered whether the United States would be willing to have SC forces employed in the Caribbean. Would the UK be willing to have them in the Mediterranean or the North Sea? Would the USSR allow them in the China Sea? These were admittedly difficult questions, but General Crittenberger wondered if Ambassador Gross had any thoughts regarding them.

Ambassador Gross said he fully realized the difficulties pointed out by General Crittenberger and that he had no thoughts to offer. In his view the question at hand was tactical and psychological. Ambassador Gross recalled that during the past week, at the Department’s request, he had chaired a meeting in Washington of private citizens who were asked to come in as consultants and give their views on World Federalism and related topics and on the possibilities of amending the Charter. Hamilton Fish Armstrong,¹⁵ Justice Roberts,¹⁶ Harold Urey¹⁷ and Robert Hutchins,¹⁸ among others, had attended. It was clear from these discussions that the idea of World Federalism was gaining. A hundred and ten members of the House of Representatives had indicated their support of the principle. In this connection, the question of implementing Article 43 always came up. It was a question on which public opinion was highly sensitive. At the next session of the Congress, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee would start hearings in connection with the resolutions before the two Houses. The Department of State had already been asked to be ready to present its views. All in all, there would have to be discussion as to where Article 43 fitted in with the general question of world government and of the sacrifice of national sovereignty. Ambassador Gross hoped that a series of meetings such as the present one would help to clarify everyone’s thinking, and he hoped such a suggestion would not be considered out of order.

General Crittenberger said the suggestion was not at all out of order. The MSG representatives had thought about these matters and would welcome an opportunity to discuss them with the political representatives.

Ambassador Gross said he was interested in the matter on two counts. In the first place, Ambassador Austin had asked him to handle the question of Article 43 forces if, as, and when it came up in the SC. He was also assisting the Department in formulating a position on World Federalism and related suggestions.

Mr. Maffitt asked whether it was agreed that USUN Political Advisers might discuss the question of Article 43 privately with the British, French and Canadians. General Crittenberger said he did not see how such discussions could be avoided. Ambassador Gross said that, not being familiar with procedures generally followed in New York, he wished to know whether it would not be in order for representatives of the Military Staff to accompany political officers when these conversation were conducted.

General Crittenberger said he thought each case should be decided on its own merits. The Military Staff representatives were always available. He had consistently taken the position, however, that he and his colleagues represented the military point of view and that it might not be understood by other Delegations if they stepped out of bounds to discuss political questions. For this reason, he had opposed the suggestion, which had been made at one time, that Military representatives should be used as political liaison officers.

Ambassador Gross said that this was a matter of procedure in connection with which the established pattern should be followed. He agreed with General Crittenberger that each case should be decided on its own merits.

General Bathurst said he wanted to clarify the situation by pointing out that while these questions had a political aspect which should be handled primarily by the political experts, the Military Staff representatives realized that there was a military side too and that since the dividing line was not always clear, the Military representatives were more than glad to be consulted when it was felt that their advice would be useful.

Mr. Maffitt said he took the consensus to be that the question of deciding whether or not to discuss Article 43 questions with the UK and France should be decided by USUN political officers, as well as the question whether it would be necessary to get prior Departmental clearance. It was so agreed.

General Harmon, reviewing what had been said concerning the relationship between US policy in the CCA and in the MSC, remarked that in his opinion it was important and urgent to consider whether, if the effort to form Article 43 forces were abandoned, some progress toward control of armaments might not nevertheless be made.

Ambassador Gross said that, although U.S. policy had heretofore been based on the idea that progress in the CCA presupposed progress under Article 43, he could not conceive that this formula would be applied so literally as to block all possibility of control of armament, in the event that our position on Article 43 were revised. He could not imagine that a way would not be found to continue efforts in the field of armament control. He said, however, that General Harmon’s warning note was appreciated and had been noted.

General Crittenberger said he had been told that Mr. Nash on Saturday, December 3, had expressed the opinion that the U.S. Delegation should meet with the UK and France to discuss whether or not to take up the question of Article 43 forces in the month of December.

Ambassador Gross said he thought this matter was of general concern in the Mission and in the Department and that everyone involved should get in on the act in an appropriate way. In reviewing the U.S. position, Washington, in Ambassador Gross’ estimation, should take into account the views expressed by those who were handling this and related matters in New York.

At the close of the meeting, General Crittenberger said he had particularly welcomed the opportunity to participate in the discussion, since on Thursday, December 8, the MSC would convene under his chairmanship and it would be helpful to him to be apprised of all developments. He said he would be grateful if he could be kept informed of any new developments that might occur before the MSC meeting.

B. H. Brown

1. Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations.
2. Charles P. Noyes, Deputy United States Representative to the Interim Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.
3. James N. Hyde, Adviser, United States Mission at the United Nations.
4. Edward P. Maffitt, Adviser, United States Mission at the United Nations.
5. Benjamin H. Brown, Chief of the Reporting and Documentation Division, United States Mission at the United Nations.
6. Vice Adm. B. H. Bieri, United States Naval Representative to the United Nations Military Staff Committee.
7. Brig. Gen. R. M. Bathurst, Deputy United States Army Representative to the United Nations Military Staff Committee.
8. The memorandum under reference has not been specifically identified; for documentation on the question of forces to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations Security Council, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol, i, Part 1, pp. 311 ff.
9. Not printed.
10. General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
11. For documentation on the “Essentials for Peace” Resolution, see vol. ii, pp. 72 ff.
12. For the text of the telegram under reference which was sent to the Embassy in the United Kingdom as 3762 and repeated to the United States Mission in New York, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. i, p. 623.
13. Not printed.
14. For the text of Secretary Marshall’s speech at the 82nd Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, September 17, 1947, during the general debate phase of the 2nd Regular Session, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session Plenary Meetings, vol. i, pp. 19–27.
15. Director of the Council on Foreign Relations.
16. Owen J. Roberts, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
17. Dr. Harold C. Urey, Professor of Chemistry and Member of the Staff of the Institute for Nuclear Studies, University of Chicago.
18. Chancellor of the University of Chicago.