893.00/2–2048: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 22—3:14 a. m.]
88. It is to be noted that 4 Manchurian leaders, Ma Chan-shan, Wan Fu-lin, Chang Tso-hsiang and Tsou Tso-hua, were evidently all invited proceed Nanking instead of proposing to do so on their own initiative (reContels 83, 19th and 86, 20th56). It is therefore to be presumed project of greater importance would be that of National Government, not any formulated by those leaders jointly or severally.
Ma Chan-shan in conversations today did not disclose any concrete proposition that he might have evolved for presentation Nanking. Dwelling still on necessity of arming native Manchurians instead of relying upon armies brought in from distant provinces, and admitting gravity of present situation in Manchuria, he held that it was still not too late if National Government would take decisive action (including dispatch reinforcements) to hold base for operations but emphasized that people could not carry out self-defense measures with bare hands. His position appeared to be that initiative toward more effective action must come from National Government.
Ma stated that Tsou Tso-hua departed for Nanking today to take up post as Councilor of Ministry National Defense. Three others to proceed on 22d.
Informed Chinese source gave opinion that Government had initiated present move in order meet popular demand (as from Mo Tehhui57) for more effective action, it being felt necessary by all means to mollify and soothe all potentially clamorous sources influential political opinion at this particular juncture prior to elections March 28.
This source observed that all three first named generals were of old time warlord type, and that although warlords were all right for fighting warlords they were useless for combating Communists. He believed that in particular there was nothing those three persons [Page 107] could do by joint or individual action to bring about amelioration situation Manchuria, and sole purpose Government this regard was political as stated.
Superficial appearances might indicate Government faced with, collapse Manchuria front, might (1) endeavor make quick shift of at least partial responsibility to native leaders, or (2) offer them “opportunity” organize Manchurian people who are now and might be later in Communist areas into “Nationalist resistance groups”. Since (1) leaders in question are too cagey to take charge of hopeless situation, and (2) Ma Chan-shan’s strategy of creating armed underground in Communist areas was discarded as impractical last year when situation was much more favorable with Nationalists in much better position to lend support neither alternative would seem framed to win acceptance.
Sent Department as 86 [88]; repeated Nanking as 141, and Tientsin.