893.00/2–2048: Telegram
The Consul General at Mukden (Ward) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 22—2:56 a. m.]
89. Following given in strictest confidence by Wei Li-huang. Disclosure will prove very embarrassing. Wei states situation critical although not hopeless but must have outside assistance or NE will be lost within 2 to 3 months. Two phases possible capitulation NE. One is complete domination all areas excluding cities by Communists and second capitulation Mukden which is citadel NE. Without immediate assistance, Wei feels Communists can accomplish first phase within 1 month’s time and second phase can probably be accomplished within 2 months and in maximum 3. When first phase accomplished [he does?] not believe military force will be required accomplish second phase. Wei states both Hsiung and Chen assured Generalissimo they had sufficient power already in NE-held area. Wei states this incorrect and perhaps Generalissimo fails realize seriousness situation. [Page 104] No time for indecision or inactivity. If Government expects hold NE, must start reinforcements moving now.
Wei confident that if three strong Government armies sent will be able not only maintain present Government position but can retake major portion Communist-held south Manchuria and Jehol. Wei states has numerical strength hold Mukden and Fushun several months but does not have strength hold these cities in addition waging counteroffensive southwards open communication lines to sea. Failing receive these armies, he will have to remain Mukden–Fushun area conserving his troops and scanty ammunition and food supplies for retreat to coast when situation no longer tenable. Wei’s ammunition for American weapons in critical short supply and is in immediate need following: 30 caliber rifle 10,000,000 rounds, 30 caliber heavy machine gun 2,300,000 rounds, 303 light machine gun 6,725,000 rounds, 7.92 light machine gun 4,625,000 rounds, 60 MM mortar 155,000 shells.
This ammunition must be brought into Mukden by plane. His acute ammunition shortage is guarded as secret by Wei to extent even majority staff officers do not realize acuteness shortage. Shortage precluding Wei waging any type counteroffensive or even relieving besieged garrisons such as that presently engaged defense Anshan. Successful defense Mukden dependent receipt this ammunition. Wei primarily basing estimate time he can hold Mukden on assumption Communists not aware his ammunition shortage and they will consequently refrain from making any large-scale offensive against Mukden at present because high cost to them. Wei states has approximately one week’s supply American ammunition available Mukden under siege conditions.
Wei states unless assistance in form 3 strong Government armies fully equipped, supplied and composed of 40,000 men each, are sent to NE immediately to open supply routes from Yingkou to Mukden and Hulutao to Mukden Government will be forced abandon NE within 3 months.
Wei further states if these 3 armies are sent (he suggests 2 arrive in Hulutao and 1 in Yingkou) and he knows they are to south protecting his rear, he in turn will be able wage counteroffensive northwards from Mukden and is confident that such counteroffensive properly planned and directed would succeed in reopening major portions of south Manchuria to Government.
For purposes planning in event he is able wage counteroffensive Wei has divided Manchuria into 3 zones. The north zone includes Changchun and Kirin, south zone includes Mukden, Fushun, Anshan and Yingkou and southwest zone includes Chinchow, Peiping, Hulutao and Fuhsin.
Wei states south and southwest zones are most important for Government purposes and situation in these zones must be completely stabilized [Page 105] before any effort made stabilize or restore overland communications with northern zone. Government desires hold Changchun and Kirin but no supplies or troops needed south and southwest zones will be diverted north zone in attempt hold latter. Wei has received no instructions from Generalissimo whether Hsienfengman hydroelectric station near Kirin is to be destroyed should its capture by Communists become imminent.
Wei plans use locally recruited Northeastern troops assist him in his counteroffensive north Mukden should Government send 3 armies to Yingkou and Hulutao to open incoming supply lines. He is confident he will have backing Northeastern leaders in this attempt and will rely primarily on such leaders as Ma Chan-shan to organize these units. He believes 20 divisions Northeasterners can be organized and trained within 2 months provided necessary equipment furnished. To equip these units he must have minimum of: 50,000 M–1 rifles 1918–19; 5,000 each carbines and light machine guns; 1,000 each heavy machine guns and 60 MM mortars; plus ammunition therefor. He requests USA furnish these weapons and ammunition. Wei states weapons and ammunition must be moved to Mukden by air immediately if his training program to be successful. Past attempts create such organization have failed because absence effective plans and equipment and consequently little enthusiasm heretofore shown. Wei states does not believe Chinese presently have sufficient cargo planes airlift this quantity supplies but adds that if US places 200 transport planes at his disposal Chinese could accomplish such airlift from China coast or Taiwan or other equidistant points.
Wei does not give impression being pessimist or of seeking a way save face should Communists occupy entire NE. He frankly, and I feel honestly, states he has come NE too late to hold it with present troops and equipment. He states his position made more difficult by mismanagement and poor leadership Chen during whose regime inadequate stockpile supplies, ammunition or foodstuffs secured and whose poor military management resulted lossage 12 Government divisions to Communists during past several months and has now given Communists superiority 2 to 1 in fighting manpower.
He urgently appeals for aid and is under impression needed equipment come from American sources only. He solicits Embassy assistance making clear to Nanking need for reinforcements. Discussed situation without reserve and solicits American advice all problems whether pertaining to civil or military matters. I have tendered no advice.
Contact with Wei and informed civil sources leaves little doubt that if Wei not supplied with requested aid it is not improbable 3 months hence will bring about completely Communist dominated NE.
[Page 106]Inasmuch non-Communist Manchuria means much to US trade and our position in Pacific, I sincerely hope will prove practicable make available above listed needed ordnance ammunition and planes without delay.55
Sent Embassy; repeated Department as 89.