893.00/2–1948
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Consulate General’s despatch no. 19 of February 11, 1948, setting forth certain Soviet reactions to American policies in Europe and Asia, and to enclose as of possible interest in this general connection (having particular reference to the relationship of the Soviet Union to events in China) a copy of a memorandum of conversation of February 14, 1948,52 between Dr. Philip Fugh (secretary to Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart) and myself in regard to Chinese politics. The two points of importance covered in the conversation were (1) the existing military situation in Manchuria, and (2) the attitude of the Soviet Union with reference to the Chinese civil war.
Dr. Fugh, who undoubtedly had had various conversations regarding the military situation in Manchuria with leading local Chinese military men during the course of his stay in Peiping, described the situation in that area as being difficult and said that it was feared that the Nationalists would eventually have to withdraw. It was Dr. Fugh’s observation that the Communists were continuing to strengthen their forces in Manchuria. This is at a time when the Nationalists are facing serious difficulties in respect to the maintenance of the service of supply for their own troops in that area. It is of interest to note in this general connection that Dr. Fugh said further, with respect to current reports that the Communists were prepared under certain conditions to negotiate for peace, that there were about 200 Kuomintang officials whom the Communists had listed as unacceptable to them in a reorganized government. In as much as those 200 Kuomintang officials undoubtedly include most of the more powerful personalities in the present National Government, it can readily be seen from where is derived much of the reluctance of [Page 101] Nanking authorities to admit the feasibility of effecting a settlement by renewed discussions with the revolutionaries.
It is of more than usual interest to note against that particular background that, according to Dr. Fugh, the departing Soviet Military Attaché, Colonel Roschin, had requested General Chang Chih-chung to inform Sun Fo,53 Shao Li-tsu, and Wu T’ieh-ch’eng that if the Nationalists would call a halt to the civil war the Soviet Union would render assistance in that connection and that he could vouch that the Chinese Communists would also cease fighting; and that. General Chang, instead of going to the three indicated officials, conveyed that information to the Generalissimo, who turned the proposition down as being “a device to drive a wedge between the United States and China”.
The motives and bona fides of Colonel Roschin would of course be open to some question, it appearing clear on the basis of the Chinese Communist propaganda particularly, as well as in view of the evidence offered by their actions, that they are determined to carry the revolution forward to its logical conclusion. The ultimate conclusion, in their minds, would undoubtedly be a “communized” Chinese state. That such an ultimate hypothetical communized China would be a polity different from either democratic states or the Soviet Union is hardly open to doubt in view of existing current conditions, but that the radical tendencies would be roughly parallel to those in the Soviet Union seems likewise nearly certain. It is, however, unnecessary to consider at this point the practical form that theoretical political organization might take if the Chinese Communists had their way. It is apparent likewise from their propaganda, as pointed out in this Consulate General’s reference despatch of February 11, that their immediate aims are much more limited, those limitations being imposed upon them by the existing economic and political factors operative in the Chinese scene. Their aim truly seems to be at this time to effect an interim “coalition government” from which the leading Kuomintang figures of the present day shall have been eliminated and in which they, the Communists, will play an important role. I venture to reiterate that it is logically to be presumed that this political attitude may reflect current thinking in Moscow.
In the present circumstances, if this analysis be accepted as correct, the United States Government would seem logically to be confronted with three alternative lines of action: (1) support of the Nationalist Government as it is at present constituted; (2) the sympathetic support of movements envisaging the fundamental reorganization of the National Government with the inclusion of important non-Kuomintang [Page 102] democratic elements, with a political and economic reorientation which would make that government strong enough and popular enough either to meet the threat of Communism by use of both political and military force or to deal with it on a level of at least temporary equality; and (3) perhaps as a move undertaken parallel to the implementation of either of the two above-mentioned policies, a discussion with the Soviet Government regarding the situation in China, with a view to ascertaining in more detail its present attitude in respect to the course of events in China and in Asia generally.
The announced policy of the National Government is to carry the civil war to its ultimate military conclusion. The character and capacities for performance of that Government stand clear by the record of its 20 years of rule. The evidence indicates that support of its political and economic programs in the form it is willing to implement them would mean in essence the abandonment of hopes for reorganization of the Chinese governmental structure on a broader basis leading to political and economic rehabilitation. With reference to the second alternative, it is to be noted that there are many non-Communist elements in China which, antipathetic though they may be to Communism, can find no room for honest and effective action in the tight Kuomintang combine. The elections as thus far carried out have given non-Kuomintang groups no fair chance of self-expression, and the completion of the elections will in all probability still see the Kuomintang machine in control. It seems hardly likely that relatively liberal elements inside and outside the Kuomintang (but omitting from consideration the Communists) would be able to come into power unless and until Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his immediate lieutenants were forced from power, for it appears to be an ingrained trait of the present Chinese ruling group to give too little and too late. Granted that a succession group in power in Nanking would face tremendous difficulties in respect to economic and political rehabilitation, it seems nevertheless at least possible that various dissident but non-Communist elements in China would be able to combine their strength and, with a reorientation of social policies and perhaps aided by some help from abroad, in due course be able to offer some opposition to the extension of Communism—although they would have to meet the challenge of the Communist economic program. Such a “coalition government” for only a part of China, and not that envisaged by the Communists for the whole of the country, would appear to offer a chance of introducing some stability into the situation.
In respect to the third (or subsidiary) alternative, it would appear as suggested by Vice Consul Allen C. Siebens* and as would appear [Page 103] indicated by the information given in Peiping’s despatch of February 11 and in the enclosed memorandum, that the Soviet authorities may feel that the revolution in China is reaching a critical stage which calls for some reorientation in either a more or a less radical direction, depending upon the course of events. Reference to events in Korea would seem to indicate that possibly the Soviet political leaders are prepared to embark upon a more radical line of action in respect to China in the event that a compromise settlement in China, giving substantial authority to the Chinese Communists within clearly established limits, proves infeasible. It is respectfully submitted that in those circumstances a confidential discussion of the China situation with Soviet authorities on a high level could hardly be otherwise than profitable in view of the probability that the Department would thus obtain valuable information in regard to current Soviet attitudes with respect to the matter in point.54 Granted that very possibly the Soviets would continue along a line of policy already determined, the suggested démarche would seem to offer possibilities of ascertaining the line of that Soviet policy and could possibly also thus contribute to determination of the form of any moves by the American Government as might seem requisite either within the United Nations Organization or in independent action, to meet anticipated Soviet actions.
Respectfully yours,