In strict confidence we were informed that the Chinese Government about two
weeks ago, or since this incident arose, has taken advantage of the
provisions of the Sino-Soviet air agreement to denounce it so that it will
cease to be in effect September 9, 1949. A copy of the agreement has been
obtained in confidence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and forms the
subject of the Embassy’s telegram No. 1489, August 12.18
As matters now stand, and unless we are directed by the Department to pursue
the matter further, no American planes will henceforth be allowed to proceed
west of Lanchow on official flights of this Mission. We are reluctant at
this stage to suggest that we be instructed to pursue the matter further in
view of the fact that the Chinese, from the Generalissimo19 down, have intimated so clearly to us from time to time
that China is just not prepared to take a strong stand in respect of the
Soviet Union until it has a reasonable expectation of firm, effective and
continued support from the United States.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Minister-Counselor of Embassy in
China (Clark)
General Soule in his report No. R–576–48, July 31, 1948, seems to have
covered rather well the background of my unsuccessful effort to visit
Tihwa, so I shall outline below only those things of which I have
personal cognizance and which are not included in General Soule’s
report.
In the telegram which I despatched from Lanchow to the Ambassador on
Monday, July 26, I mentioned our information to the effect that our
plane had been grounded under instructions from the Minister of National
Defense himself and requested the Ambassador to intervene with General
Ho Ying-chin to obtain permission for us to continue our journey.
At the dinner given by General Chang Chih-chung, but at which he was not
present that evening, I gathered the distinct impression that it was
General Chang who was holding up our flight because he had not been
previously notified of our plans. Accordingly, the following morning I
arranged to go pay my respects to the General at Hsi Lun Shan, about 65
miles outside Lanchow. General Chang supplied the transportation. When
we arrived, he was most pleasant; did seem a little bit put out that he
had not been notified in advance of our arrival, but showed every
willingness to be helpful and promised to send a telegram to Nanking
urging that we be permitted to continue our journey. He later
telephoned: into Lanchow saying he had actually despatched the
telegram.
Immediately upon my return to Nanking, and after consultation with the
Ambassador, I sought an interview with the Foreign Minister20
[Page 736]
to find out why I had been
stopped. He was in Mokanshan, but immediately upon his return he gave me
an appointment and I saw him on Saturday morning, July 31. With some
heat or severity I told him of the cavalier manner in which I had been
treated in Lanchow and insisted that in order to restore my prestige in
my official position it was necessary that I return via Lanchow to Tihwa
in the same airplane. He seemed much surprised that the plane had been
Stopped after prior permission had been granted and promised to look
into the matter and let me know. He endeavored to deny that there was
any Soviet aspect of the problem, saying no Soviet protest had been made
to the Foreign Office.
The following Tuesday Dr. Tung Lin, Director of the American Section of
the Foreign Office, told me the Minister had asked him to see me
regarding my flight to Tihwa. Dr. Tung said that he had been instructed
to offer to send me to Tihwa in a plane supplied by the Chinese
Government. After insisting for some time that my prestige could only be
re-established by returning in the same plane, and pointing out that the
four-motored plane had been specifically provided for the Embassy for
such trips, and remarking that I was unwilling to risk my life over the
mountains in less than a four-motored plane, I finally, under Dr. Tung’s
insistence, agreed to consider the possibility of accepting passage in a
four-motored plane to be supplied by the Chinese Government. (So far as
I knew, and I mentioned it to Dr. Tung, the only suitable four-motored
plane in the possession of the Chinese Government was the Gimo’s
Skymaster.) I made the reservation, however, that I would have to obtain
the Ambassador’s approval before accepting such transportation as the
Ambassador felt rather strongly I should return in the same plane.
On August 9 Dr. Tung telephoned to say that he had been able to arrange
for a DC–4 plane to take me to Tihwa, wait for me and bring me back on
my revised schedule or at any time convenient. Further inquiry revealed
that under instructions from the Prime Minister,21 the Chinese Government was
preparing to divert from its regular Trun a CNAC Skymaster to take me to
Tihwa and return at an estimated cost of around US$24,000. I immediately
told Dr. Tung that I could not accept this arrangement until I had
spoken to the Ambassador, particularly as it seemed to me a crime for
the Chinese Government, short as it is of U. S. dollars, to be spending
$24,000 just to prevent me from going to Tihwa in our own Embassy plane.
I discussed this problem with the Ambassador who was seeing the Gimo
that afternoon and promised to take the matter up with him. The
Ambassador planned to suggest to the Gimo that the Chinese Government
[Page 737]
go informally to the
Soviet Embassy and explain that the plane carried no armament
whatsoever, was engaged in a peaceful mission, and could in no way be a
threat to the Soviet Union. This he did, and the Gimo replied that it
would be much better, he believed, for us as well as for China, if we
would let the matter drop. The Russians had made no specific protest and
he didn’t believe they would get themselves into the position of making
a protest. There was some sort of an agreement, he said, between the
Soviets and the Chinese which had been forced on the Chinese in a weak
moment, under the terms of which the Chinese had agreed that no planes
other than Soviet or Chinese planes would be allowed to fly in the
Sinkiang area. He wasn’t sure whether the agreement was still in effect,
but it didn’t make much difference as the Soviets considered it still to
be in effect and if the Chinese continued to let our planes fly to
Tihwa, the Soviets would not protest, but by various means they would
make the life of the local officials in the Northwest so miserable that
it really wouldn’t be worthwhile. He felt that he owed it to the local
officials in the Northwest not to subject them to such indignities. He
hoped, therefore, that we would consent to use only Chinese aircraft in
flying personnel or supplies to Tihwa and suggested that I use the plane
which was being put at my disposal under his instructions.
With this information I called at the Foreign Office on August 10 and saw
Dr. Tung. I told him flatly that, having consulted with the Ambassador,
we were unwilling to let the Chinese Government spend US$24,000 to get
me to Tihwa and that, accordingly, he could cancel his plans for the
charter of the CNAC plane. I then recounted to Mm what the Gimo had said
to the Ambassador, and said I would try to forget the indignity to me if
he would let me have a copy of the agreement to which the Gimo had
referred. Dr. Tung promised to endeavor to secure a copy of the
agreement for me and he telephoned later to say that he had checked with
the Foreign Minister and there had, in fact, been an agreement back in
the early days of the war with Japan, signed by the Minister of
Communications with the Soviets. It was a Sino-Soviet air agreement
dealing with the services of a single Soviet line between Hami, Tihwa
and the Soviet Union. The term of the agreement was for ten (10) years
and it was subject to cancellation on one year’s notice. Dr. Tung told
me in confidence that a couple of weeks ago the Chinese had served
notice on the Soviet Government that they would terminate that agreement
in one year. On my insistence that he get me a copy of the agreement, he
promised to see what he could do.
