740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–1248: Telegram
The Special Representative in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
priority
197. Cite Zpol 1884. Subject is estimate future prospects Korean Government.
[1.] Remytel 180, November 3,1 reporting psychological attitude Korean people and government, time has come for making balance sheet favorable and unfavorable trends Korea as basis estimate ability Korean Republic maintain independent existence. Believe consideration timely in view disorders South Korea and reopening question retention occupation troops United Nations.
2. Few favorable aspects situation are mostly of economic nature.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Military intelligence estimates of North Korean armed strength conclude north capable victory if civil war breaks out. This more certain if Korean units Chinese Communist Army made available supplement North Koreans which probably more likely now in view [Page 1326] Chinese Communists’ Manchurian successes. Fear North Korean invasion South Korea increasing with reports North Korean troops concentrating area between 38 and 39 parallel. Some rumors intimate invasion regardless occupation United States troops South Korea on theory American will not interfere. Others indicate invasion when American withdrawal (now hardly secret) completed. Possible however invasion may await spring weather and may take form rescuing “democratic elements” South Korea after Communists attempt instigate nationwide uprisings. Any event, invasion is logical step after withdrawal Soviet troops, after ostensible end Soviet responsibility, arid after repeated brazen assertions over Pyongyang radio of authority “Democratic People’s Republic” over whole nation and of intention exercise same.
6. Net conclusion is that immediate situation presents grave picture. Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 indicate incompetent government without strong public support and adequate security forces faced with prepared rebellious Communist internal elements and superior hostile external military force. Paragraph 2 indicates long-term factors on which relatively stable economy might be built and which might provide, given period peace, incentives for development stable independent government. Very fact that this possible suggests Soviets may attempt eliminate Korean Republic before ameliorating factors have chance be felt. It seems clear therefore that only continued presence United States occupation troops can give Korean Government period of grace improve internal condition. It understood here long term retention US Army no panacea Korean trouble. However, believe under existing conditions only army presence guarantees minimum Korean external and internal security which is indispensable for any attack basic policy and economic problems and for success economic rehabilitation program.
7. Foregoing is not intended indicate permanent presence United States Army necessary preservation Korean Republic. Believe rather that completion US troop withdrawal as presently scheduled would come at inopportune time when situation still very much in state flux. Postponement final troop evacuation several months would allow appraisal following:
- A.
- Actions, strength, and intentions North Korean regime and South Korean Communists following final Soviet troops withdrawal.
- B.
- Better preparation South Korean forces to assume responsibility for internal and external security.
- C.
- Adjustment American and Korean Governments to whatever decision results from United Nations discussions.
- D.
- Korean sentiment for drastic shake up present government South Korea has been growing ever since appointment initial Cabinet and is overwhelming since recent rebellion. Only Assembly reluctance take [Page 1327] action before Korean question considered United Nations has delayed consideration constitutional amendments which would clip President’s power and set up responsible Cabinet system. If present soul-searching and stock-taking following weaknesses revealed by Yosu revolt culminate in beneficial government changes combined with cessation feuding among non-Communist factions, and with appreciation need work together to prevent Communists from destroying them piecemeal, government may pull through. Cooperation [against] Communists is more essential than more armament, more troops and retention US Army, frenzied appeals for which have been received from President and Prime Minister since Yosu revolt. It is probable foregoing government changes will be unfolding about time of scheduled troop withdrawal. Postponement this action will allow further time push changes, appraise political and economic trends, and get ECA program underway.
8. Foregoing estimate of situation submitted for Department’s information and consideration in light imminent UNGA discussion Korea problem in particular and in light present world situation in general. Coulter with whom have discussed foregoing is also submitting his comments.2