501.BC Indonesia/3–1048: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
195. Gocus No. 174. In discussion with US Delegate March 8, Vredenburch and Riphagen brought up following matters:
Vredenburch has complete instructions from Hague for political settlement. Netherlands delegation this week prepared draft to submit Steering Committee which will assign various agenda items four main committees. This may be done as early as March 12. Agreement will include conditions under which Republic may enter interim government as well as way in which political principles will be put into [Page 116] practice. Tentatively, Vredenburch believes Republic commitments regarding Union may be handled by exchange of letters. Vredenburch will show US Delegation and Belgian Delegation copies of draft when prepared and will receive our comments before submitting it formally. Riphagen will work with Scott on draft outlining sequence plebiscite, free elections and constitutional convention provisions.
Vredenburch made clear installation provisional pre-federal govt today not to be regarded as interim govt contemplated Renville Agreement. Interim govt will not come into being until signing of political agreement unless, after reasonable period 3 to 4 months, it should become evident Republicans employing delaying tactics. Today’s ceremony amounts simply to handing over certain offices in NEI Govt to Indonesian officials.
Although Vredenburch says he now believes political agreement can be signed in two to four months, his personal opinion chances lasting settlement appears pessimistic as ever. Still considers plebiscite will not be held under democratic conditions since he quite sure Republic will endeavor intimidate voters. We said we felt possibility intimidation could be largely neutralized prior holding plebiscite, particularly if, as we assumed would be case, gradual demobilization had begun and agreement had been reached on USI military force which would replace TNI. While admitting this theoretically true, he maintained opinion he was “traitor to his country” for having recommended acceptance of plebiscite provision. He also appears still adamant on subject GOC’s making suggestions and on general competence GOC and SC. Said he had asked Van Kleffens refrain from raising question of competence in SC only after learning Riphagen had received assurance regarding continuation US Delegation’s practices reported Gocus 165, February 27.1
Vredenburch’s attitude toward AusDel remains the same. Apparently endeavored in Hague provide against Van Zeeland’s return through efforts insure appointment Ryckmans, former Governor Belgian Congo, as Van Zeeland’s replacement.
He did not mention question continuation services GOC beyond signing political agreement. Earlier in day, however, Riphagen brought matter up again in conversation with Scott who told him he believed there was no better way invite failure than raising the question GOC termination with Republics at this time, that GOC would doubtless be as useful to Netherlands as to Republic in period following political agreement. This connection, it was argued some method would have to be found for settling disputes regarding interpretation political agreement and that Linggadjati type arbitral clause obviously undesirable since any important question regarding interpretation [Page 117] would probably be political in nature and not conducive to settlement by arbitration. Riphagen was reminded Vredenburch had originally suggested semi-permanent GOC for this purpose back in November (Congentel 455, November 132).
Vredenburch concluded with statement that his instructions were now precise on point that Netherlands Delegation alone was authorized to speak for Hague and by implication, we could not depend on Neher’s or Van Mook’s views. Added in so many words that he was “Voice of The Hague”.
Department pass Hague.3