740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–348: Telegram
The Special Representative in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
priority
21. Cite Zpol 1397. Remytel number 17, September 2, transmitting text of letter from Rhee to President of United States.1
Department will undoubtedly have noted certain changes were made by Rhee in draft submitted to him. Major changes relate to deletion of term “advisory personnel” and substitution of word “equipment”, and deletion of paragraph reading “assistance of American technical personnel to assure the effective utilization of economic aid provided to the Government of the Republic of Korea by Government of the United States of America”.
From conversation with Rhee and particularly a conversation held on August 31, between Rhee and Allen Loren, financial adviser, Rhee’s present position on American advisory personnel is about as follows:
Rhee perceives need for American technicians to insure that any aid program is effectively carried out. He has no objection to spending aid funds on projects approved by United States, but he cannot give appearance of being “rubber stamp”. “Adviser[s],” in the general sense of the word, have, according to Rhee, come to be deeply resented by Korean people because “action of military government advisers have far exceeded the common understanding of the term”. (Word acquired special derogatory connotation during Japanese occupation.) It is Rhee’s view that it would be desirable for United States Government to “lend” advisers to Korea. If such an arrangement could be effected, Rhee then would not have to hire advisers and pay them from aid funds granted Korea. Rhee is emphatically of view US advisers should be few in number. In this relation Rhee desires individual personal [Page 1290] advisers in each major field to whom he can turn for information and advice. In conversation with Loren, Rhee stressed repeatedly his concept that he must avoid outward appearance of being dependent on US advice., Otherwise, it was his feeling that Communists and “middle of road” groups would be in position to wage effective propaganda campaign charging his government with being “dominated” by US advisers.
I feel that Knee’s concept of advisers, as set forth above, is largely responsible for deletions and substitutions made in his message to President. This sensitivity will call for certain editorial changes in wording of the aid agreement. It is also my view that it would be preferable to have all US aid personnel—operational, consultant and technical—in one category. In this general connection Rhee will undoubtedly wish to personally have a hand in selecting certain US personnel which are to act in an advisory capacity. Indeed, he has already approached me informally with regard to the appointment of Paul F. Douglas, President, American University, Washington, to serve as adviser on educational problems.
The foregoing is submitted at this time for background information of Department.