Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BB Korea/7–2448: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

Seoul, July 24, 1948.

594. Cite Zpol 1134. Reference Deptel 250, July 21,¹ my comments on USUN proposals correlated with information contained in Deptels 251,² 252,³ 253⁴ and 254⁵ July 21, are as follows:

1. While suggestions of USUN have merit and might possibly have been tried if made several weeks ago, they are now too late. Weakest point in these suggestions is that they fail to take into account disastrous position in which we should find ourselves if, as seems inevitable, they did not produce desired results. Present is no time for vacillation or any other sign of weakness. Rhee and his “government” will be ready for business next week, they will notify UNTCOK and Commanding General of its formation, and they expect start receiving substance of power on August 15th. After several false starts during past 3 years they and South Korean people are so enthusiastic over prospects on early attainment of long frustrated desire to have their own government that any attempt postpone realization of that desire at this late hour would be disastrous. Moreover news from North Korea reveals that people there are restive under rule of Soviet stooges and happy over results in South Korea. Rhee has received smuggled letter from Cho Man Sic under house arrest in Pyongyang congratulating Rhee and urging him to carry on without regard to developments in North Korea. Even Kim Koo and Kimm Kiusic are somewhat repentant since constitution was proclaimed in North Korea and election ordered there. (Seoul PolAd’s 585, July 22⁶.)

2. Accordingly, we must go on with policy and plans we have had in contemplation for so many months. I feel we can do so in manner that should not be or become offensive to those powers whose support we are seeking, at UN, at least if I understand Department’s plans right. We may not be able persuade British Government take parallel action but that would not be fatal blow. We can accomplish our purposes by exchanging tabs “a” and “b” sometime next week and shortly before August 15,⁷ or even at time aforementioned tabs are exchanged, issue statement referred to in paragraph 6 of Depcirtel June [July] 10, 1 a.m., modified somewhat as follows (following is only intended as summary longer statement which would, recite how we arrived at present situation):

“The Government of the United States regards the new government recently formed in Korea as result of an election held on May 10th, 1948, under the observation of the UNTCOK, as representative of the express wishes of the 20,000,000 Koreans in South Korea, who constitute two-thirds of all the Korean race. Accordingly, pending consideration by the General Assembly, under the provisions of whose resolutions this government was formed, of such problems as remain unsolved as a result of the inability, due to the boycott attitude of the USSR, of the UNTCOK to carry out its functions in North Korea, the President of the United States is sending a special representative, Mr. John J. Muccio, with ambassadorial rank, to Korea to negotiate, in consultation with the aforementioned commission, concerning the transfer to the new government of governmental functions now performed by the US Military Government in Korea and concerning the implementation of further provisions of the resolutions of the General Assembly of November 14th, 1947 and of the resolution of the interim committee of February 27th, 1948.”

3. It seems to me that the aforementioned qualified recognition of the authority of new government should satisfy objections of British Government (London’s 3188, July 15, 6 p. m. to Department⁸), especially if we stress fact that we are doing no more than USSR has already done in North Korea (i.e., transferred governmental functions to local authorities. See this connection Moscow’s 1319, July 14), This should also satisfy India—see Deptel 252, July 21. China and Syria would be on our side—prepared to agree even if we accorded greater degree of recognition. (Deptels 253 and 254, July 21.) While I am not certain of attitude of France, I believe France would approve our action and I am certain that Philippines and Salvador will approve. Therefore of 9 powers most directly concerned there remain only Australia and Canada and I have feeling that even Canada might go along. As regards Australia, I am afraid it will remain recalcitrant to the end. If foregoing represents true picture of attitudes of nine governments most concerned (other of course than Russia), I believe we can expect favorable two-thirds majority in General Assembly on Korea question.

4. Only part of our planning which will need to be changed if suggestion in paragraph two above is adopted is that date contemplated for initiation of troop withdrawal will have to be postponed some date after final decision of General Assembly becomes known. This would probably be sometime in October or early November, unless we can have Korea placed on agenda for early hearing.

5. I believe that Rhee and his government can be persuaded go along with policy and plan outlined in two above especially if whole matter is made clear to him. See Rhee on recognition eighth paragraph his inaugural address transmitted PolAd’s 593, July 24th.⁸ Possible in circumstances outlined herein he may wish go to Paris to head his delegation and there assist in pleading Korea’s cause in person.

6. In submitting these comments, I wish to add that I am not unmindful of dangers inherent in proceeding with policy as we have planned but there is, in my opinion, far less danger in pursuing that course at this juncture than trying something else.

7. In view rapidity with which developments are crystallizing here, Department’s instructions soonest are becoming imperative. In this connection we suggest that General Hodge and I be directed confer immediately with Rhee and UNTCOK in order give them gist of our plans and solicit their cooperation.⁹

8. General Hodge concurs in views stated herein and adds that in his opinion any material back-tracking in our policy decisions will render our position here untenable.

Jacobs

1. See footnote 1, p. 1249.
2. See footnote 1, p. 1247.
3. See footnote 1, p. 1246.
4. See footnote 1, p. 1243.
5. See footnote 1, p. 1242.
6. Not printed.
7. For “tab ‘A’ “see text quoted in telegram 635, August 9, p. 1268. For “tab ‘B’”, see text quoted in telegram 644, August 10, p. 1271.
8. Not printed.
8. Not printed.
9. Marginal notation by Mr. Bond: “Aug 6—Mr. Jacobs told by phone to go ahead.”