Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BB Korea/7–2048: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

New York, July 20, 1948—8 p. m.

925. Reference telegram 540, July 11, from Seoul, Department circular telegram, July 10 and telephone conversation Wainhouse to Noyes and Hyde,² USUN which is concerned with possible reference to IC as suggested in London’s 3147, July 13, and 3268, July 19 and with inevitable debate on Korea in GA, submits following views for Department’s consideration:

1. Two major elements which were fully recognized when IC first began consideration of Korean case are still present. First, US does not wish to prolong its occupation; second, other governments including China and UK would like to have US remain in Korea.

2. IC proceedings were designed to facilitate US withdrawal from Korea under UN plan as embodied in GA resolution of 14 November 1947.

3. US having submitted Korean matter to UN cannot properly act except through UN procedures and channels and in accordance with GA resolution. This difficulty would not be avoided by obtaining concurrence of two or more other powers in granting formal recognition.

4. GA resolution 14 November 1947, in paragraph 4 contemplated that UNTCOK should be consulted on all steps taken subsequent to election National Assembly. These steps include formation of national Korean security force and taking over functions from military commands and mutual withdrawal armed forces of US and USSR.

5. US would be in weakest position in GA if at this stage it took any of these steps without UNTCOK or other UN approval or acquiescence.

6. Problem as we see it is to stay within UN framework without discouraging Koreans, without playing into Soviet hands and without delaying US plans any more than necessary.

7. Most desirable procedure to solve this problem in our opinion would be to have a public letter sent by Hodge to UNTCOK along following lines: letter would quote from GA resolution of 14 November 1947 the steps to be taken “immediately upon the establishment of a national government”. It would refer to UNTCOK’s resolution regarding elections as reported in 503 from Seoul, June 28, and letter from UNTCOK to Rhee as reported in 502 from Seoul, June 28.³ It would then refer to Korean plans for setting up Korean national government. Hodge’s letter might continue by pointing to fact that US Government as occupying power has special responsibilities in connection with the anticipated consultations between UNTCOK and National Assembly or national government in regard to points A, B, and C listed in paragraph 4, GA resolution of 14 November. UNTCOK will recognize that the constitution of a national security force for Korea in accordance with paragraph 4(A) of GA resolution would necessarily depend upon cooperation US forces. US accordingly contemplates, in spirit of cooperation with UN, and UNTCOK, to assist Koreans along this line. Point B of paragraph 4 of GA resolution is similarly a matter involving arrangements between US occupying forces and Koreans and US is prepared to carry out its part as soon as Korean national government provided for by Korean National Assembly is established as expected on August 15. US is prepared to fulfill its obligations under point C of paragraph 4 of GA resolution at the appropriate time. It recognizes that GA contemplated that withdrawal of armed forces should take place within 90 days after formation of national government. Since 3rd GA session will no doubt consider report of UNTCOK prior to expiration of this period, US recognizes that UNTCOK may contemplate receiving further instructions from GA on this point, before final arrangements made.

However, suggested action on points A and B would not appear to require previous GA action. Letter might conclude by requesting expression of UNTCOK’s views upon foregoing.

If such a letter were sent, diplomatic representations would presumably be made in states of which members of UNTCOK are nationals. The approach suggested leaves formal issue of recognition to GA, US relations with Koreans being nominally continued in our capacity as occupying power. We believe governments represented in UNTCOK would be relieved not to face recognition issue now and we might secure Indian and Syrian approval along with France, China, Salvador and Philippines.

8. Assuming UNTCOK does not express disagreement with US suggestions it would seem possible for US to send representatives to continue negotiations with Korean national government on informal basis without becoming involved in question of recognition. Obviously lack of formal recognition would be blow to Koreans and would need to be explained in terms of US compliance with UN action, presumably to be taken at the GA. In this connection, representation of Korean national government at Paris should be encouraged as contemplated in Seoul’s 542 of July 12 and 567 of July 17.⁴

9. If UNTCOK expresses disagreement with US suggestions or gives clear indication it is unwilling to acquiesce in the US suggestions, we would favor putting heavy pressure on UNTCOK to request urgent advice from the IC. We feel we would be in a strong position to urge on the British Commonwealth nations that if they are unwilling to take a stand themselves now they must at least in fairness to us give us an opportunity to take the case to the full membership of the UN.

10. With regard to announced Soviet plans for election of government in Northern Korea, we suggest strong statement regarding Russian non-compliance with GA resolution should be issued from Washington not from Seoul. Such a statement should be framed as a basis for US position in GA.

11. In connection with foregoing suggested program we believe there would be no serious objection by other governments to IC consideration of Korean question if initiative came from UNTCOK in form of request for further consultation with IC regarding proposals of US occupying authorities as suggested above. If such a move seems desirable, preparatory diplomatic work with governments represented on UNTCOK would clearly be necessary. On other hand it is doubtful whether two-thirds majority could be mustered in IC to take up Korean question under paragraph 2(B) of GA resolution 111 of 13 November 1947. General temper of IC is one desiring rapid conclusion of business and winding up of IC to allow delegates to go home before GA. We suggest that first step might be consultation by USUN with Chinese representatives at UN. If Chinese reaction to suggested UNTCOK request were favorable they might be induced to take initiative with other members of UNTCOK.

12. In conclusion, USUN feels strongly that any formal US step involving recognition of Korean national government as such without prior UN support would seriously compromise US case in GA, having in mind views of those states which desire to delay US departure from Korea and views of various other delegations who do not wish to be involved in midst of US-USSR controversies.

Jessup

1. Repeated by the Department in 250, July 21, 2 p. m., to Seoul, with request for “urgent comment”. Marginal notation by Mr. Bond: “Views set forth in this tel. discussed with USUN in N.Y. July 23/48.” In a memorandum of July 29, Mr. Bond added “that from those conversations there emerged a substantial meeting of minds, which was not apparent at the time” of the telegram under discussion, “with respect to the course of action to be followed by the U.S. in Korea between now and the time the General Assembly convenes in September” at Paris. (501.BB Korea/7–2048)
2. David W. Wainhouse, Associate Chief, Division of International Security Affairs; Charles P. Noyes and James N. Hyde, members of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.
3. Neither printed, but see telegram Zgcg 967, June 28, from General Hodge, p. 1229.
4. Neither printed.