856e.00/3–248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

secret

138. Continuing contacts with Vredenburch and Foreign Office officials lead Embassy to following conclusions:

1.
Vredenburch in present frame of mind entirely lacks faith Republic leaders. He describes Republic as immoral totalitarian state. He aims at creation large number small states loosely federated in use with political center gravity in states and Republic confined relatively small area considering this as means avoid tyranny (and presumably maintain Dutch influence). He believes Republic already embarking campaign ruthless intimidation preparatory plebiscites which he believes can only be of value if carried on through traditional village organization. He is pessimistic as to immediate political future Indonesia in any event.
2.
Other Netherlands Government officials by no means all convinced soundness Vredenburch’s views re Republic. There is desire among dominant Catholic-Labor leaders for successful construction good faith new political structure. They have hopes that Neher will play important part though Vredenburch gives impression Neher has been sidetracked. (Batavia telegrams most interesting this connection.)
3.
Vredenburch pushing his views hard here. He is able, persuasive, influential. Strong instructions to Van Kleffens re amendments Canadian resolution SC probably due him.
4.
While Embassy believes Vredenburch, who is extremely able, will loyally carry out his government’s instructions when final decision reached, Embassy believes that Embassy, in cooperation Department, can usefully informally express points of view and make tactful suggestions designed promote execution Renville Agreements in line our concepts. Present indications from Foreign Office are that Vredenburch may leave here this week.

Department may wish authorize Embassy informally express to Foreign Office concern at fact that while Netherlands negotiating or about negotiate both with Republics and non-Republics with views creation pre-federal government and eventually USI in accordance agreed principles impression persists ultimate aims Netherlands and Republic almost diametrically opposite. Achievements both sides in implementing truce and in agreeing political principles warrant different impression. Netherlands initiative in direction restoration confidence would be most useful. Following specific actions could be suggested to Netherlands Government as helpful in immediate future:

1.
Statement recognizing continuing efficacy of truce implementation recognizing Republic contribution thereto.
2.
Statement perhaps at time Vredenburch’s return Batavia with instructions or at time renewal political talks stressing Netherlands sense political achievements today to which Republics as well as other areas have contributed, emphasizing common objectives interests Netherlands and Indonesian peoples and stating Netherlands during plebiscite period while Netherlands retains sovereignty determined guarantee exercise political liberties and combat intimidation coercion from whatever source. It might be added that Netherlands hopes for effective cooperation Republic leaders in preferred government as soon as possible and is highly aware demonstrated talents certain of these leaders.

Above suggestions of course limited to possibilities of action by government here. Embassy recognizes that Netherlands-Republic relations depend primarily activities Batavia-Djocja but feels Hague Government can also under present circumstances play constructive role and that constant reiteration expressed Netherlands Government policy may have restraining effect certain officials. Embassy has done some preliminary informal work along these lines.

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Finally, if discussions possible US financial aid reconstruction Indonesia could be brought to more concrete state, fact such aid must obviously be predicated on creation new responsible political organization could have constructive effect on progress political discussions.1

Department, please pass Batavia.2

Baruch
  1. Telegram 93, March 8, 7 p. m., to The Hague, stated the Department’s agreement with the Embassy’s appraisal of the Indonesian situation and “approves informal approach suggested your points 1 and 2”.
  2. This was done the same evening.