895.01/6–848: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State
433. Cite Zpol 829. 1. Have conferred with ComGen and others familiar with Top Secret planning with respect to future US policy on Korea as referred to in Deptel 167, June 2.
2. The one thought that comes foremost and recurrently to mind in attempting to express views and recommendations on question of early or delayed recognition of anticipated Korean Government is that it is well nigh impossible to express ourselves intelligently and realistically [Page 1217] until we know first, kind of government Assembly will form; secondly, UNTCOK’s attitude, at least in general way, toward that government and three, specific matters mentioned in paragraph 4 of UN resolution 2, November 14, last year; and, finally, general attitude of government so formed toward basic problems and liabilities involved in transfer of authority and toward necessary arrangements for future aid and assistance.
3. Second most recurring thought is that US recognition of government before consideration of Korea problem by General Assembly would almost certainly lead immediately to formal recognition by USSR of Peoples Committee Government of North Korea with spirited accusation (which many Koreans would accept) that precipitate action by US had prevented unification of Korea. Possibly Department’s policy planners no longer care about this aspect, accepting as a fact that Korea is already divided and will remain so for rather long indefinite period. We are not sure however that UNTCOK and possibly General Assembly will view matter in that light. If therefore US accords immediate recognition to new government when formed, it might find itself alone with a very difficult new state without support from UN.
4. Accordingly for moment and until there is some indication of what answers may be to questions posed in paragraph 2 above, we incline to view that it is not desirable to make a firm decision now on question of recognition. We are dealing with inexperienced Korean leaders of rather volatile temperaments which makes it desirable to proceed with more than usual caution.
5. Delay in de jure recognition need not prevent US (unless new government adopted a virulent anti-foreign attitude and policy) from extending de facto recognition by dispatching here a special representative of President with ambassadorial rank to negotiate matters pending consideration of the Korean problem by General Assembly or other developments.
6. If by chance everything turns out to be favorable at time government is formed, we feel that advantages of early recognition would outweigh disadvantages.