895.00/5–1948
The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 31.]
Sir: I have the honor to present to the Department five copies of a statement issued by the Directorate of the South Korea Interim Government1 on the “North-South Conference” held at Pyongyang April 19–28, 1948. The statement was released through the Department of Public Information May 7, 1948.
Terming the South Korean leaders who attended the conference as “unsuccessful but ambitious” the Directorate issued a five-pronged argument against the conference: (1) The conference supported the trusteeship which was opposed by all the Korean people; (2) The conference gave wholehearted support to Russia which in reality is opposed to democracy and seeks to use Korea for her own military and political ends; (3) Opposition to the so-called “unilateral” election is a blind to cover up Russia’s opposition to any expression of popular will in Korea; (4) Russia’s offer to withdraw her forces is based on the knowledge that she has three hundred thousand trained Communist “stooges” to leave behind; (5) The reports that the problems of electricity and irrigation between North and South have been settled are [Page 1202] nothing but clumsy propaganda coming from Communists who do not hesitate to say yes and no at the same time.
The statement of the Directorate is a summation of the major criticisms of the Conference which, despite any idealistic motives held by South Koreans attending it, was obviously a propaganda vehicle to be used against the elections in the South.
Every reference to Russia is cast in opprobrious or caustic terms, e.g., “Russians who are trying to enforce the Communistic domination of all the world”; “They (North Koreans) adopted ‘Russian justice’”; “Russia disclosed its ambition to make Korea one of its satellites”; “Russia hated the independence of Korea like poison almost up to the end of the war because of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Agreement”; “Russia …2 fought (Japan) one long week”; etc. While no one would question the truth of these observations, sober-minded persons might well doubt the statesmanship and discretion of Korean officials publicly insulting their powerful, unforgetting and unforgiving neighbor. It is, however, characteristic of the historical protegee psychology of the Korean official, who is insecure in his office and condition and must cling to the skirts of the strong power which he determines will dominate the situation. In the case of Koreans, this psychology in the past and today unfortunately finds expression in egging on the protector against the rival so he will destroy the latter. It would be obtuse to deny that this Korean psychology has not entered into and obstructed a settlement of the Korean question or influenced local Soviet and American objectivity.
Respectfully yours,