Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

895.00/4–948: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

secret

Seoul, April 9, 1948.

230. Cite Zpol 451. Following are comments on Deptel 101, April 5:

1. In view of urgency created by rumors (Seoul PolAd 220, April 8¹) which were causing increasing bewilderment among Koreans, General Hodge and I decided that it was desirable that I issue a statement which we prepared along lines indicated in Deptel 101 even though General Hodge had released his statement of April 5 only few days previous (Seoul PolAd number 214, April 6). Text my statement was transmitted in Seoul PolAd 225, April 9.¹

2. After careful consideration of how we might make further efforts to persuade Kim Koo and Kimm Kiusic to be reasonable about Pyongyang conference, General Hodge and I reached conclusion that little can be done. Both Kims are stubborn men and having made up their minds there is little we can say or do, except through our public statements, to dissuade them or to suggest what they might suggest as counter proposals when they arrive in Pyongyang. Kimm Kiusic seems to be going through very “anti-American” phase only partially revealed in translation of his remarks communicated in Seoul PolAd 226, April 9.¹ While on surface, hue and cry of both Kims is “unification of Korea”, in reality basic cause of their proposal for north-south conference and acceptance of Pyongyang invitation is realization that they have no real following (insufficient at least to ensure their election or appointment to high office) and they “don’t want to play ball”. They prefer to seek better prospects elsewhere. Communism flourishes upon such dissidents. However both Kims are also trying keep toehold in South Korea in case things do not turn out well at Pyongyang. We have had reports for several days that Kimm Kiusic has secretly (because he is openly boycotting election) told his friends to nominate candidates and campaign for them in hope of getting few at least of his supporters in national assembly.

3. As indication of how little support Kim Koo and Kimm Kiusic and leftists have in South Korea, results of registration are revelation. About 85 percent of eligible voters have registered to date. Assuming that leftists and moderates have boycotted election and failed to register (we can so assume on basis of their public statements), it is apparent that leftist and moderate strength may be as low as 10 to 15 percent of all eligible voters. Last summer, we estimated it to be from 30 to 35 percent. Thus leftist and moderate strength has dropped considerably or they are registering [in] spite of their public boycott.

4. At one time Patterson, Jackson and Djabi favored and even fostered north-south conference but idea was not approved by other delegates. At present time, insofar as can be ascertained, none of delegates are particularly interested although indicated in Seoul PolAd number 204, April 3,² Patterson, Jackson and Mughir conferred with Kim Koo on subject and may secretly favor it. It has been suggested that these three may raise question after election May 10.

5. Insofar as can be ascertained no delegate is talking at present of referring Korea problem to special session General Assembly. All seem to be pleased with registration results and for once are not agitating anything, apparently happy or resigned, depending upon their views, to observation of election May 10.³

Jacobs

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3. Telegram 243, April 16, from Seoul, reported final figures of registration results as 8,771,126 eligible voters (8,055,295 registering or 91.7%) (895.00/4–1648).