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The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

confidential

215. Cite Zpol 436. While the siren call “of Pyongyang for conference has South Korean leftists and middle roaders agog with preparations for that conference, this shifting of their interest from forthcoming South Korea elections has left vacuum in South Korean political area which is producing repercussions in rightist camp. As rightists, at least for moment, have clear field, their own differences are now causing cracks to appear in their hitherto united front. Both Rhee and Kim Seung Soo appear to have lost some control of their groups, the Society For Rapid Realization of Independence and Hankook Democratic Party, respectively.

As regards Kim Seung Soo, he is having difficulty in maintaining party discipline, especially with respect to candidates which his group will nominate. Thus Kim wants one candidate, the youth section another, labor section still another for a given voting area. Kim himself in his own district declined to be candidate in order to find place for Yi Yun Yung, head of a strong rightist group of North Korean exiles in South Korea (also head of Chosen Democratic Party of North Korea) but Kim cannot put that across in his own district. Another fundamental difficulty arises (and this is also true in case of Rhee’s group) from fact that a struggle is now beginning between conservative and liberal elements of rightists, former consisting of older and wealthy members and latter of younger generation who are more socialistically inclined though not Communists.

As regards Rhee and his group, we know that he has issued public statement that various people have been claiming to represent him and to speak for him whereas he has only two secretaries who have such authority, namely, Lee Ki Poong and Yun Suk Oh.

We also know that Rhee recently told newspaper correspondents enjoying his confidence that he did not want any more lambasting of State Department and General Hodge as he was going to need all help he could get. Rhee has also hitherto declined to be candidate for Constituent Assembly, his reason being that he fully expected sufficient number of his own followers to be elected to. Constituent Assembly and from there offer him presidency. In view however of ferment going on among rightist group he seems to have some misgiving about that development and he is now considering announcing himself as a candidate.

Another reason which moves Rhee to consider announcing himself as candidate arises from growing divergencies of views among rightist [Page 1176] group as to form of government which will be set up when assembly convenes. Hitherto, Rhee has anticipated that provisional constitution which Skila attempted adopt would be approved by Constituent Assembly but it now appears that there are two other constitutions in offing. Sentiment seems to be crystallizing into two groups: One that would establish a democracy in which strong powers would be vested in hands of President, the plan which Rhee and conservative group favor, and second that which would establish a democracy in which power would be centralized in Prime Minister and his Cabinet with a weak Chief of State, the plan favored by rightist liberals. Rhee fears that if Constituent Assembly should adopt second plan he, Rhee, would become figurehead President with power in hands of Prime Minister (probably Kim Seung Soo) and Cabinet Rightist police chief Chough is said to be pursuing middle course between Rhee and Kim Seung Soo’s factions, hoping thereby to enhance his own ambitions in event of major collision between those two groups.

The ferment in rightist ranks is of great importance to us and will be watched with care. If leftist and middle roaders continue boycott election, it will become more acute as time goes on. If on other hand middle roaders, or even leftists as it is still possible that they may do, participate in elections, this inevitable struggle among rightists will be postponed to some later date.

Jacobs