501.BB Korea/3–1248: Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State

confidential
priority

146. Cite Zpol 306. 1. On March 9 Jackson presented following note to UNTCOK chairman: “Since the announcement of the opinion of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly on or about 26 February 1948, the political situation in South Korea has deteriorated considerably.

A number of parties which have maintained that freedom of election is not possible, have now announced that they will not take part in the elections. It appears that the elections are now under the control of a single party.

The Commanding General of the United States Army forces in Korea has announced that elections will be held in South Korea on 9 May 1948.

Under the circumstances, the Commission may decide that the free atmosphere for elections recommended by the Interim Committee cannot be secured, that the terms of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly cannot be fulfilled, and that, in consequence, it cannot observe the elections.

To meet this situation, I wish to place an alternative plan before the members of the Commission.

In developing this plan, I have kept in mind five basic considerations:

(1)
The United Nations General Assembly should not be drawn into a position where it may be held responsible for decisions in South Korea which do not contribute directly towards the establishment of a national government for all Korea.
(2)
The Commission should guard against any action which might exclude the north from participation in a national government.
(3)
Though they may not cooperate at present, the USSR authorities in North Korea should be treated as subject to the control of the United Nations General Assembly.
(4)
The people of Korea must be given the best possible opportunity to gain control of their country with a minimum of disorder.
(5)
Subject to the above considerations, the United States authorities in South Korea should be strongly supported in whatever action they may take to create conditions which will enable the Commission to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly of 14 November 1947.

I submit the following resolution to be included in the agenda of the next meeting of the Commission:

The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, having examined the situation in Korea, finds:

1.
That the responsible authorities in that portion of Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel are not at present prepared to cooperate with the Commission, thus rendering it impossible for the time being to proceed under the terms of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly with the observation of elections which may be held there.
Resolves:
(1)
That the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea report to the United Nations General Assembly in the light of developments and its observations and consultations in Korea;
(2)
That the Commission hold itself available for consultation with the responsible authorities in both North and South Korea;
(3)
That the Commission make such recommendations as it considers appropriate to the responsible authorities in both North and South Korea;
(4)
That the Commission withdraw from Korea by 15 April 1948 leaving a small liaison group in Seoul;
(5)
That the Commission return to Seoul during August 1948 to reexamine the situation and, if advisable, to carry out its task in the terms of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.”
2.
As requested proposal was first item on agenda tenth. Jackson’s pleading for its acceptance is summarized in Seoul PolAd number 147, March 12.1
3.
Jackson’s main theme was that conditions have developed presenting observation of any election in South Korea. These conditions were (1) that Kim Koo and Kimm Kiusic will not support election and that election will be an exclusive Rhee-Hankook Party show. (2) That 12 out of 15 men appointed to general election board by military government are Hankook Party members. (3) That 4 out of 5 Communists invited to consult with UNTCOK “appear” to be unwilling to accept invitation because of lack of confidence in official assurances of immunity from police. (4) That police arrested 3 Koreans attempting [Page 1152] to visit UNTCOK and confiscated their petition to UNTCOK. (5) That a UNTCOK party visiting a village was told a major rightist youth organization would appoint its candidate for county representative for it in the election.
4.
Paul-Boncour (returned from Shanghai 7th) led attack against Jackson’s proposed resolution. He said resolution was based on Jackson’s credulity in Korean politicians statements and that UNTCOK should not be influenced by tactics and shifting positions taken by these men. Menon brought meeting to close in order to give consideration to electoral law. (Recommendation subcommittee 3 concerning electoral law was passed, with minor changes, at afternoon session.) Later Paul-Boncour mentioned that secretariat had cheerfully worked late into night to mimeograph Jackson’s presentation of his note so it could be flown to UN headquarters soonest, inferring this was all done to propitiate Sobolev.2 Boncour further said that in debate Patterson asked Menon if US had used pressure in Interim Committee. Menon said yes citing case of his own External Affairs Department which had received note from US Ambassador asking India to vote for US resolution, whereupon Patterson let out a satisfied “ah”. Menon outside of meeting expressed opinion to Weckerling that Patterson and Jackson would be voted down and said elections would go on and he would stay in Korea perhaps another week (now scheduled to leave 14th) until matter of election is settled.
5.
Jackson’s bombshell seemed to be of his own making and to be related to his own personal views and emotions on South Korean conditions. The recent developments cited to prove his case are not new. It is unfortunate that Kim Koo and Kimm Kiusic elements now profess they will keep aloof from elections but it means only few more groups boycotting election in addition to numerically far more important Communist-led elements that from very beginning declared they would boycott elections. In any event it is still by no means final that Kim Koo and Doctor Kimm will not cooperate with UNTCOK program. Other arguments are based on isolated incidents or on conditions that can be and are in process of being corrected. In any event it would seem unfair to throw up one’s hands as Jackson is doing before event. Jackson’s course definitely seems out of line with letter and spirit of Australian delegation statement in New York on February 27 (USUN 219 to Department same date3).
6.
It is certain China, Philippines, France and Salvador are on our side. Menon speaks to please and conciliate his listeners and therefore his assurances mentioned above cannot be wholly relied upon. Syrian alternate delegate seems earnest about insisting on free election but [Page 1153] to have no idea of having no election at all. Thus at least 5 votes in favor of some Korean election can reasonably be counted on.

Langdon
  1. Not printed.
  2. Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of UN Security Council Affairs.
  3. Not printed.