740.00119 PW/11–1048
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman)
This afternoon Mr. Draper, Mr. Norton1 and I appeared, at our request, before the Maritime Commission. The following individuals of the Maritime Commission were present: Commissioners Smith, McKeough and Carson; Mr. Williams, the Secretary, Mr. Morse, Special Assistant to the Commissioners; Mr. MacDonald and Mr. McCandless.
The purpose of our appearance was to describe to the Commission the development of this Government’s position with respect to Japanese reparations, with special reference to Japanese ship-building capacity. I explained that in addressing itself to the problem of how much industrial capacity should be removed from Japan as reparations, the Departments of State and Army have adhered to the principle that this Government should not agree to the removal of an amount of industrial capacity which would obstruct the recovery of Japanese economy as soon as practicable to a point where a reasonable degree of self support will be achieved. I pointed out that there are two very important reasons why such a degree of self support must be realized as soon as possible: (1) Without such self support Japan cannot survive as an independent democratic nation and will fall prey to communism or some form of totalitarian government with resultant trouble for the United States and other nations of the world; and (2) self support must be gained as soon as possible in order that the present huge expense of the United States, now in order of a total of approximately one billion dollars a year may be reduced and eliminated. These [Page 1045] principles apply to our policy in regard to the removal for reparations of Japanese ship building capacity and it is our view that not more than approximately 300,000 tons of annual ship building capacity out of the present total of approximately 800,000 tons should be permitted to be removed from Japan, lest the effect of further removals impede the necessary Japanese economic recovery as described above. I pointed out that this policy has to do only with the amount of such capacity which may be removed as reparations and does not deal with any specific total amount of Japanese shipping which may be developed in future. I also explained that in considering this problem the security aspects had not been overlooked but that it is believed that in view of the total disarmament and demilitarization of Japan and the prohibition of army, navy and stir force, the mere existence of a merchant fleet would not present a security hazard to this country.
In the discussion which followed, the Commissioners brought out the fact that any extensive construction of large or fast ships by the Japanese would present undesirable competition from the standpoint of American shipping and ship building interests, particularly in view of the anticipated surplus of world shipping. It was suggested by representatives of the Commission that perhaps this point might be considerably mitigated if during a period of the next few years a limitation should be put on the size and speed of ships to be constructed by the Japanese. It appeared to be the sense of the Commission that this problem of size and speed was a more serious one from the standpoint of American shipping than the total quantity of ship building capacity which might be permitted to remain in Japan.
Mr. Draper offered to obtain from General MacArthur specific figures with respect to present Japanese shipping and rate of shipping construction and to invite General MacArthur’s comments on the suggestion which had been advanced that limitations be placed on the size and speed of ships to be constructed.
- Garrison Norton, Assistant Secretary of State for Transport and Communications.↩