856d.00/2–1048
Memorandum to the Secretary of State1
Subject: Proposed Meeting Between the Secretary and the Netherlands Ambassador Relating to the Indonesian Case
Background
The Good Offices Committee of the Security Council has succeeded, after spending three months in Indonesia, in bringing about a truce agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands Government. As an integral part of the agreement, both parties have accepted unconditionally as a basis for the permanent political settlement in Indonesia, six principles proposed to them by the Good Offices Committee. These principles include:
- (1)
- Recognition of Netherlands sovereignty throughout Indonesia for a stated interval, after which the Netherlands agrees to transfer sovereignty to a United States of Indonesia which will be in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian union. The Republic of Indonesia will be a component state within the United States of Indonesia.
- (2)
- Within not less than six months or more than a year after signing the permanent agreement, plebiscites, or other methods of free elections mutually agreed upon, will be held to determine whether the territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra, the area over which the Dutch recognized the de facto authority of the Republic under the Linggadjati Agreement, will form a part of the Republic of Indonesia or become a part of some other state within the United States of Indonesia.
- (3)
- During negotiations for the political settlement and the holding of the plebiscite, either party may request the assistance of the Good Offices Committee. Both parties have agreed that in neither case will the other party interpose objection to such request.
- (4)
- After the plebiscite, a constitutional convention will be convened to draft a constitution for the USI.
These principles were conceived in large part by the United States member of the Good Offices Committee, Dr. Frank Graham, and were submitted to the parties after their unanimous adoption by the Good Offices Committee.
The agreement reached represents an important achievement by the Security Council in a difficult and, until now, rapidly deteriorating situation. Without the Good Offices Committee, it seems highly unlikely that the parties would have succeeded in reaching a truce agreement, or any political settlement; indeed, it is not unlikely that the Republic of Indonesia would soon have been eliminated as a political factor in the Netherlands East Indies. The settlement, however, may be said to be largely favorable to the Dutch and as such represents several important compromises on the part of the Indonesian Republic. The Republic accepted a demarcation line which recognizes Dutch military advances after the Security Council cease-fire order of August 1, 1947. It also accepted as a fait accompli the creation of new states in territories formerly under the jurisdiction of the Republic which were established under Dutch auspices while the negotiations with the Good Offices Committee were in progress.
While these provisions were accepted by the Republic reluctantly, they did so largely because the agreement provided for plebiscites to determine the permanent status of the territories in question. Dr. Graham was instrumental in obtaining the unconditional acceptance of the Republic. The representatives of the Republic have in fact cooperated fully with the Good Offices Committee from the time of its arrival in Indonesia. Representatives of the Department of State informed the Netherlands Embassy of our hope that the Netherlands would interpose no objection or conditions to the agreement, and emphasized United States interest in a prompt and lasting settlement of the dispute. The Netherlands Government thereupon accepted unconditionally the principles proposed by the Good Offices Committee. While the agreement that has been reached represents the necessary first step in a lasting settlement, it will be fully effective only with the maximum cooperation by both parties. It is therefore essential that negotiations for the permanent agreement be entered into at once before any opportunity arises for exacerbation of the feelings of the parties. The negotiations should be concluded as quickly as possible and agreement signed within six weeks at the most. The Netherlands representatives in particular must show a degree of patience commensurate [Page 93] with the gravity of the situation and the superior bargaining position of the Dutch.
Both sides have begun to make charges and counter-charges of violations of the truce agreement. Instances of Indonesian violation as charged by the Dutch, are numerous but for the purposes of this memorandum are not here enumerated. Recent telegrams from The Hague and Batavia have reported, however, Dutch actions which are not calculated to produce the maximum degree of harmony in the coming negotiations and if continued could have serious consequences for the outcome of the settlement. Batavia telegram #108 of February 5 (Tab l)2 indicates reports from The Hague that suggest the Department may not be fully behind Dr. Graham. Such reports might have the effect of undermining the influence of the United States Delegation in Indonesia. The Dutch, moreover, have shown reluctance to have additional British and Australian military observers in Indonesia. These observers are needed to assist in implementing the truce agreement. More serious, however, is the report of the United States military observers in Indonesia that Dutch forces have been engaged in large-scale killings at Rawagedeh (Batavia telegram #28, January 8, Tab 2) and the more recent report still unconfirmed (Batavia telegram #107, February 5, Tab 3) that Dutch forces have taken reprisals for the sabotage of railways by machine gunning the inhabitants of two villages.
Batavia telegram #112 of February 6 (Tab 4) reports a “constant stream of complaints, accusations, and vilifications of the Good Offices Committee by Netherlands official sources and press [which]3 can only have the effect of seriously decreasing the chances of effectuating the truce”.
Recommendations
(1) That the Netherlands Ambassador be requested to call upon the Secretary, at which time the Secretary would emphasize the heavy responsibility already assumed by the United States in helping to settle the Indonesian dispute and the importance this Government attaches to immediate adoption of a permanent agreement. He would further emphasize that this Government is seriously concerned that the Netherlands and the Republic make every effort to accomplish this end without delay, within six weeks at the most, and without any substantial departure from the spirit of the principles proposed by the Good Offices Committee.
(2) That the Secretary emphasize that the principles agreed upon by the parties are in keeping with the policies of this Government, both individually and as a member of the United Nations, that the settlement [Page 94] thus far achieved through United Nations machinery will be supported wholeheartedly by this Government in the Security Council, and that this Government would like to see the Netherlands also support it before the Security Council as a United Nations achievement. In standing behind this agreement, the United States Government considers it essential for a lasting settlement that the Republic remain as an entity in the United States of Indonesia.
(3) That the Secretary point out to the Ambassador that because of their superior tactical position the Dutch can make a very strong appeal to world opinion by showing more than average restraint in their dealings with the Republic and that in fact a far greater than halfway effort by the Dutch will be required if a successful settlement is to be reached and is to endure. As one of the original Members of the United Nations and as one of the leading democratic nations of the world, such efforts are not too much to expect of the Netherlands.