501.BC Indonesia/1–3148: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State
92. Usdel No. 126.1 Several critical points discussed in private talk we had with Riphagen, Vredenburch’s adviser, January 27.
Riphagen called to protest statement by editor Merdeka that, in accordance GOC clarification, status Republic would remain as at present and therefore Republic would have own army, finance and foreign relations, which Aneta commented could be considered official standpoint Republic Government, according authoritative Republic sources. Riphagen contended this meant that despite paper agreement of Republic to 6 principles, actually there is no agreement on all important first principle and repeated Netherlands delegation’s view GOC had seriously misled Republic by statement that acceptance principles would in no way change or modify status parties. In reply, we expressed view that (1) Netherlands no less than Republic would undoubtedly agree status Republic same after signing agreement as before, particularly since there no question Netherlands sovereign in NEI before as after agreement; (2) recognition that Republic has “status” in no way conflicts with recognition Netherlands sovereignty; (3) meaning first of 6 principles perfectly plain with respect sovereignty NEI and (4) if Republic considered its pre-Renville status characterized by degree of international identity, this misconception not surprising in view such definitely misleading phrases Linggadjati as “recognition of Republic of Indonesia” which not fault GOC. Riphagen held to opinion, however, that GOC had confirmed misconception on part Republic, which he stated still considered itself entitled foreign representation. We agreed January 13 Kaliurang meeting may have had misleading effect on Republic Government, but we informed Riphagen that in personal conversation January 25 we had pointed out to Sukarno that Netherlands sovereignty NEI universally recognized and had given opinion Republic hence not entitled foreign representation and further that Sukarno appeared recognize fact and to be agreeable to suggestion that situation created by Republic’s present representatives overseas be dealt with on reasonable basis. We reiterated [Page 87] to Riphagen that Netherlands Delegation would be well advised display tact and patience and recommended it give GOC time work out some arrangement instead of forcing issue. Riphagen replied this all very well but position Netherlands Delegation respect Hague most awkward since it appeared basic issue Netherlands-Republic dispute still unsettled. In return, we called attention awkward aspects GOC position, suggesting particularly it would be helpful if Netherlands Foreign Office would not base on press reports its conceptions of what US representative had said. We refrained from pointing out that in recent charges of irregularities GOC conduct Kaliurang, Netherlands officials and press had conveniently forgotten GOC had arrived Kaliurang faced without time limit giving Republic 48 hours in which accept truce without qualification, failing which Dutch would resume freedom of action. We did, however, emphasize position of Republic Govt undoubtedly most awkward of all and that statements in Republic press alleging Republic right to own army, finance and foreign representation were probably ascribable Republic anxiety put as good face as possible on Renville Agreement, tangible gains from which would nearly all accrue to Dutch. This connection, we noted indications that GOC stock had sunk low with Republic. We added that any significant future gains Republic might make through agreement could arise only from provision for plebiscites and that sudden announcement of Madura plebiscite January 25, by which 95 percent Madurese voters favored separate status, understandably gave Republic nasty jolt and seemed to us, under peculiar circumstances in which it apparently held, well calculated discredit principles of plebiscite and add enormously to difficulties of Republic supporters of Renville Agreement. We also asked what we supposed to think when, after having heard Van Mook state plebiscite here would require months preparation, even if possible at all, and Koets describe proposal as “mad”, we greeted by ostensibly full-blown plebiscite organized overnight. Riphagen clearly confused on this subject, admitted embarrassment, and stated that obviously long preparations must have been entailed while admitting he had not heard of project until result announced. He agreed Netherlands statement disassociating plebiscite from 6 principles would be helpful. (2 days later Aneta quoted NEI Govt spokesman as stating Madura plebiscite had nothing to do with plebiscite envisaged by GOC and parties.)
At conclusion, Riphagen requested suspension meetings for week owing exhaustion Netherlands Delegation. We agreed everyone in need rest.2