740.00119 Control
(Japan)/12–2848
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of
Northeast Asian Affairs (Bishop) to
the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
(Butterworth)
top secret
[Washington,] December 28,
1948.
There is attached a copy of the personal message from Draper to
MacArthur1 which was the
subject of considerable discussion between State and Army before it
was dispatched. On December 24 Mr. Allison and I in telephone
conversation with Colonel Lincoln gave informal agreement to a draft
message.2 The
message as sent differs in important respects from that to which Mr.
Allison and I agreed. I have underscored those parts of the message
which are additions to the message as we last saw it.
There have been some omissions and changes in the order of the
thoughts expressed which, while not of great importance, change
somewhat the tone of the telegram. Especially important is the
change regarding the intention of the United States Government to
avoid as much as possible issuing interim directives. In the cable
sent this was handled as follows:
“Implementation should be accomplished to the greatest
possible extent through appropriate interpretations and
appropriate use of SCAP’s
executive discretion and when necessary or desirable through
issuance here of a specific US interim directive to SCAP through the JCS with a copy filed with the
FEC as already provided
for within the terms of reference of the FEC.”
In the agreed draft this was stated:
“… and accomplishing implementation through appropriate
interpretations and appropriate use of SCAP’s executive discretion
and when entirely unavoidable or otherwise desirable through
issuance hereof a specific US interim directive to SCAP through the JCS …”
General MacArthur has already replied3 to this telegram and has emphasized that
the United States in controlling policy of the occupation
“should do so formally and openly and as you point out within the
framework of the Moscow agreement. … the United States has no
[Page 939]
need to take
indirect action or an informal approach and should assume full
and open responsibility for her policy determinations.”
This is clear evidence that General MacArthur has not yet grasped the
sense of United States desire in this connection and would like us
to issue interim directives in each instance. This is perhaps
regrettably similar to the desire of the Japanese to have directives
in each instance from SCAP.
In view of our previous unhappy experience in clearing telegrams by
telephone with the Army, I recommend that in future we not give
State Department concurrence to a message of this importance except
on the basis of a written draft not subject to unilateral
alteration.
There are also attached a copy of the draft as finally agreed to by
Mr. Allison and me in our telephone conversation with Colonel
Lincoln and a copy of SCAP’s reply,
C 66597.
[Annex]
Draft Cable Informally Agreed to on
December 24
top secret
Personal to MacArthur from Draper[:] Your C 659974 has been
carefully considered. Part 2 of WAR 80454 may not have been
entirely clear. It was intended that you should implement the
policy decisions of NSC 13/2
within your field of responsibility which includes both the full
area of your jurisdiction and authority as CINCFE as well as your executive
discretion and authority as SCAP. SCAP’s
position as an international officer is fully understood but
there is still a considerable latitude in the interpretation and
execution of FEC directives
within which you as SCAP have
discretion and executive authority and within which you should
take into account US national policy. This policy does
contemplate exercise of U.S. control over the implementation of
policy in Japan to the extent practicable but still within the
framework of the Moscow Agreement. There is full international
recognition of primary US interest in the conduct of the
executive authority and responsibility in Japan. For example,
first and most important is the agreement that SCAP shall be appointed by the
President of the United States, second that the FEC should recognize the existing
chain of command, and third the unique right given the US to
issue unilateral directives to SCAP. It would be unreasonable that the US could
not advise SCAP in the exercise
of his executive authority limited only by existing policy
decisions of the FEC. The US
attitude toward the FEC is
clearly indicated in Paragraph
[Page 940]
9 of NSC
13/25 which
I understand you had not received when C 65997 was
dispatched.
The US directives mentioned in Par 3 of WAR 80454 were not
intended to refer to directives transmitting Far Eastern
Commission policy decisions or to US unilateral interim
directives as provided for in the terms of reference of the Far
Eastern Commission, but to pre-FEC US directives and to US directives and
instructions issued unilaterally to you as CINCFE.
Under the Moscow Agreement the FEC was set up to deal with post-surrender policies
in the period following surrender at a time when an early treaty
of peace was anticipated. Three years have passed and a peace
treaty is still not a practical probability in the near future.
The US alone has been bearing the cost of occupation and is
contemplating increased appropriations for recovery. The US
Government is not only furnishing all the funds but has the
principal responsibility for the success of the occupation. It
is our task here and yours there to find the ways and means to
implement US policy as it develops from time to time keeping
within the FEC framework and
directives, and accomplishing implementation to the greatest
possible extent through appropriate interpretations and
appropriate use of SCAP’s
executive discretion and when entirely unavoidable or otherwise
desirable through issuance here of a specific US interim
directive to SCAP through the
JCS, with a copy filed with
the FEC as already provided for
within the terms of reference to the FEC. This latter action was taken in issuing the
directive concerning economic stabilization.
I believe your conclusion is sound that informal action is
insufficient to accomplish the desired purge modifications. The
administrative and executive interpretation of FEC policies is a matter solely for
SCAP determination. The
original US directive to you which was filed with the Far
Eastern Advisory Commission was presented solely for information
of the FEAC and was later circulated, by the Far Eastern
Commission Secretariat, to the FEC again solely for information. FEC–015 has no force as a policy
directive of the FEC and may be
modified or rescinded unilaterally by the U.S. The U.S. would as
a matter of courtesy inform the other FEC members of its action with respect thereto. We
are reviewing with the State Department the most appropriate
method of handling this question and will inform you earliest.
In the meantime you are authorized to delay implementation of
Par 13 NSC 13/2.
It is important to emphasize that modification of the purge is
desirable to permit appeal and review in those cases, where
specific FEC policy would not be
contravened, in which assumption of guilt by reason of holding
key positions rather than proof of guilt resulted
[Page 941]
in the purge of
individuals. The action taken in November 1945 was to a degree
at least based on the assumption that certain individuals were
guilty unless proved innocent, and subject to purge simply
because they were in a particular category rather than because
of personal guilt. This is contrary to the universally accepted
American concept of justice and it is desirable to correct this
implication to the extent possible within FEC directives, and also to take
account that the purge was without age limit. You will be
advised when the appropriate method of implementing the purge
modifications has been agreed upon here.
Concerning your reference in urad C 66402 to ourad WAR 80599,
this matter can be handled separately and will be taken up in
another message.
Concerning your C 66456, the directive in ourad W 81395 seems to
have been drafted by the US over a year and a half ago and
presented to the FEC exactly one
year prior to its adoption by that body. The FEC action to the degree that it
requires extension of the purge to positions not already covered
is an extension of the purge and thereby inconsistent with
NSC 13/2. It is expected
that there will be no further action by FEC of this character. However, para 13 of that
FEC directive does recognize
that SCAP may issue subsequent
directives to the Japanese concerning the purge.
In preparing NSC 13/2 it was
recognized that, in many instances, in light of previous
policies and commitments, it posed no easy task for you. The
National Security Council felt, however, that you would find, in
the authority that you possess and in your wide background of
experience, means for seeing that progress is made, gradually
and smoothly and with a minimum of disturbance of public
opinion, in the direction of the goals outlined in the NSC paper.
I have shown this message to the Chief of Staff and Acting
Secretary of State who agree with it.
Request a reply at the earliest practicable date.
