Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

894.017/8–1348

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

confidential
No. 514

Tokyo, August 13, 1948.
[Received September 1.]

Sir:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary

General MacArthur’s letter recommending revision of the National Public Service Law has been interpreted by the Japanese Government as an order and a Cabinet Order issued.¹ In forthcoming revisions of the law, communications workers are not to be excepted from the regular civil service as are railway workers, because there are no privately owned communications facilities. It is planned to exempt diplomats and consuls from the provisions of the National Public Service Law.

In contrast to the generally favorable reaction on the part of the Japanese public, government workers feel that this Headquarters has betrayed their interests and that under the revisions of the law they will not be able to negotiate on equal terms with the Government, The government workers have no confidence in the National Personnel Authority.

Lack of an official release concerning Mr. Killen’s² resignation led to speculation that drastic changes are to be made in all labor legislation. Mr. Killen in a personal statement to the press and in a private conversation with the Acting Political Adviser stated that his resignation was not in protest against an anti-strike ban, but against the denial of all collective bargaining rights for government employees. He declared that the labor policies advocated by the Government Section of this Headquarters are ill-advised and will retard a healthy labor movement in Japan. The Government Section called Mr. Killen’s position “pure nonsense” and claimed that General MacArthur had to act in order to prevent a paralyzing strike of government workers. The Government Section further contended that Mr. Killen had been given the fullest opportunity to explain his viewpoints.

Labor unions, many of which are communist dominated, oppose the Government’s action in issuing a Cabinet Order as unconstitutional and undemocratic. Informed sources believe that the communists will resort to more direct methods of sabotage to impede rehabilitation.

On his own initiative, the Chairman of the All-Japan Communications Workers’ Union,³ accompanied by a prominent communist, arranged an interview with foreign press correspondents at which he stated that, in his belief, the workers will strike despite General MaC–Arthur’s order. He also questioned General MacArthur’s authority for his letter to the Prime Minister.

General MacArthur’s letter has given the Ashida Cabinet a new lease on life and will also allow time for leaders of the Democratic Party to strengthen their party. End of summary.

This Mission’s Comment

This Mission believes that the Supreme Commander’s letter is timely and will restore some sanity to the labor movement. It is to be regretted, however, as has been emphasized in editorials in the Japanese press (this Mission’s despatch No. 491 of August 3),⁴ that the Japanese Government could not have set its own house in order without intervention by the Occupation authorities. While the labor movement has made great strides since the beginning of the Occupation, its leaders, many of whom are communists, have goaded the unions into committing excesses which are interfering with the rehabilitation of Japan and orderly progress in the labor movement. While it is true that the Japanese Government has been considering taking steps to curb these excesses, and would probably on its own initiative have eventually revised the National Public Service Law, the “labor offensive” scheduled to begin in August was to a considerable degree predicated on the anticipated activities of government workers’ unions.

A large scale labor offensive, involving government workers, would have resulted in serious disruption of the Japanese economy and would have played directly into the hands of the communists. It is believed, therefore, that by banning further strike activity on the part of government workers, the Supreme Commander’s letter greatly reduces the possible effectiveness of any labor offensive which might be undertaken. An additional effect is that the letter undoubtedly will tend to strengthen the rather precarious position of the Ashida Cabinet.

We regard the letter from the Supreme Commander as a document of primary importance which will have far-reaching effects upon the political, social, and economic affairs of Japan.⁵

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

1. See despatch 465, July 24, from Tokyo, p. 834.
2. James S. Killen, Chief, Labor Division, Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, until August.
3. Kazuyoshi Dobashi.
4. See footnote 3, p. 834.
5. Despatch 531, August 18, from Tokyo, reported further on opinions concerning revision of the National Public Service Law and indicated the extent of Communist influence in Japan on this subject (894.017/8–1848).