740.00119 Control (Japan)/6–2648
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)
personal
Dear John: As you are no doubt aware, the Allied Council for Japan appears to be slowly dying from inanition. From the forty-seventh meeting, held on December 10, 1947, until the sixty-second meeting on June 23, 1948, three subjects have been placed on the Agenda, two by the Soviet Member and one by the British Commonwealth Member. Of the former, the discussion was limited in scope and, in fact, amounted more to a procedural squabble than to anything of a constructive nature. In summary, we have now had thirteen meetings (of the past sixteen) in which there was no item on the Agenda, and the meetings have variously lasted from nineteen seconds to less than one minute.
In view of General MacArthur’s attitude concerning our placing of items on the Agenda, it is, of course, impossible for me to evoke any discussion, and I am more or less at the mercy of the other Members’ subjects, should they place an item on the Agenda. In this connection, I might say that neither the British Commonwealth Member nor the Chinese Member are interested in placing any subject on the Agenda and will not do so unless they receive direct instructions from their respective Governments. The Soviet Member, on the other hand, is unpredictable and I am unable to anticipate when or what subject he might place on the Agenda.
While I assume, in the absence of instructions from the Department, that there is no objection to the course of action which is being [Page 826] followed by me as American Member, I realize that the “no discussion” tactics might well backfire, should the Soviet Member be building up a case to criticize General MacArthur, and inferentially the United States, for failure to utilize the Council for consultation and advice in so far as the Occupation is concerned. Conceivably, they might use the record of the past six months as ammunition, either in Japan or elsewhere, to “prove” failure by the United States to act in concert with other Powers, including Soviet Russia. Soviet ingenuity can, of course, find many ways to blame us for the passivity of the Allied Council for Japan, and perhaps use this argument to justify action elsewhere.
I feel certain that General MacArthur would be very loathe to revive the usefulness of the Council. It has always been a thorn in the side of SCAP, and other than acting as a sounding-board for national interests (in which we are probably ahead of the game), I doubt that the Council has accomplished much of a constructive nature in the Occupation of Japan. I am, of course, willing to accept the thesis that nothing can be done about changing the terms of reference of the Council, i.e., to abolish it, under present circumstances; but I hope that the Department is fully aware that we have in Tokyo a moribund body, international in structure, which meets in pro forma fashion every fortnight and accomplishes nothing.
I have thought long and earnestly regarding some solution to this dilemma, but have come to the conclusion that the problem is incapable of solution if the Council cannot be abolished. I shall, of course, continue to do what I can to protect American viewpoints and policy against occasional charges that are made in the Council, especially by the Soviet Member. The role which I play, however, is of necessity defensive in character. This makes the maintenance of the initiative most difficult.
Any comments or suggestions which you might have would be very helpful.
Sincerely yours,