740.0011 pw (Peace)/5–2848
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Marshall Green of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs
| Participants: | Mr. Dening, Asst. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, British Foreign Office |
| Mr. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy | |
| Mr. Kennan, Director, Policy Planning Staff | |
| Mr. Butterworth, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. Green, NA |
Mr. Kennan reviewed the prospects for an early Japanese peace settlement. Recalling the inter-Allied differences on the procedure and substance of a peace treaty and recalling the lengthy mechanics involved in the negotiation and ratification of a treaty, Mr. Kennan reasoned that the occupation would probably continue for many months, possibly several years more. Since the U.S. bears a primary responsibility for the conduct of the occupation, it is understandable that the U.S. would wish, at this time, to make a thorough reassessment of its position in Japan. Are, for instance, policies which the Allies [Page 789] adopted in the immediate post-war period applicable to the situation today?
Mr. Dening replied that it was true that these policies might be of increasing embarrassment to the U.S. inasmuch as they were drawn up at a time when it was generally supposed that there would be a treaty of peace as soon as Japan was demilitarized, as it is today. He admitted that the British Chiefs of Staff and the Imperial Defense Council had “not given detailed consideration” to the new strategic situation in Northeast Asia, resulting from the predatory character of Soviet policy; but he felt that it could be safely assumed that the British Commonwealth would not wish to see the U.S. strategic position in the Far East in any way weakened. He added that it was nevertheless an inescapable fact, as the Canberra Conference regretfully concluded, that, thanks to Yalta, Russia held a dominant position in East Asia. Mr. Dening felt that the U.S. should resign itself to this situation and get on with the treaty negotiations. He commented that there was a general impression in the British Commonwealth that no final effort had been made to resolve the divergent viewpoints on treaty procedures and that even Dr. Evatt might be willing to accept the Chinese proposal on the grounds that, no matter what procedure was adopted, the USSR would act toward Japan without any regard for treaty decisions not approved by her. Mr. Dening emphasized that in his opinion an early peace treaty was necessary and he suggested the possibility of an 11-nation conference to resolve Allied differences on procedure.
Mr. Kennan indicated some of the difficulties of an early treaty. If it was concluded without the Russians—as Mr. Bevin had recently suggested might be desirable—the Russians would have no respect for the treaty conditions and might be left in the advantageous position of independently offering the Japanese terms which were somewhat more favorable than ours. If the treaty was now concluded with: military and economic controls, the whole favorable psychological effect of a treaty would be lost on the Japanese people. If the treaty was now concluded without controls, Japan would be left militarily defenseless—an open invitation to Communist penetration; while any-Japanese efforts toward rearmament would not only be ineffective but would be, as General MacArthur has pointed out, at the expense of Japanese economic recovery. Mr. Kennan further argued that economically and politically, Japan was not prepared for a peace treaty at this time. The sweeping and abrupt character of the reforms, for example, have created a serious disequilibrium in Japanese life which must be adjusted before the treaty, if Japan is not to start forth on its period of renewed independence with handicaps of serious consequence.
[Page 790]Mr. Dening replied that this also represented the situation which we will have to face without a peace treaty. He agreed that extensive readjustments in the U.S. approach to Japanese problems is desirable, but he maintained that the period of readjustment would almost inevitably give rise to serious difficulties for the occupation. He ventured that as soon as the Japanese realized that they would not have a peace treaty for a long time, they might undertake passive resistance to the occupation on a large scale. In some cases it might even be necessary for SCAP to maintain order by forceful measures, which could only earn for the occupation widespread unpopularity, locally and abroad. The tendency for the Japanese to resist the occupation would increase, he thought, in measure as they recovered from the profound shock of defeat. Mr. Dening doubted that there were any good prospects for increased Japanese initiative or self-reliance so long as they are kept in subjection. He pointed out that almost no really outstanding Japanese have come forward in public life during the occupation through an understandable fear of risking their political futures. He thought it highly important that the Japanese be immediately placed in the position where they have no one to blame but themselves.
Mr. Butterworth and Mr. Kennan agreed that these were legitimate considerations and that the Japanese muscles might well become “flabby” if the character of the occupational mission continued unchanged. They indicated, however, that hereafter the Japanese would be encouraged to assume progressively greater responsibilities in the conduct of their own affairs, and that our Government would make it clear to them that their initiative and hard work would be a condition of continued U.S. credits. They questioned Mr. Dening’s assumption that the Japanese were necessarily anxious to have a treaty at this time; alarmed at the prospect of being left unarmed in a Soviet-dominated North Asia while the Soviets remained in an aggressive mood, the Japanese had come to appreciate that their best interests might well be served by a continued occupation. Mr. Butterworth made it clear that the U.S. does not wish to proceed in the matter of the timing of the treaty as if it were the only country concerned, and he inquired if it was Mr. Dening’s view that since the U.S. had made a sincere effort to get the other countries together at the peace table, the U.S. was not therefore in a morally tenable position.
Mr. Dening replied that there was a general feeling in the Dominions that the U.S. was “putting forth its proposals for a treaty insincerely”. It was fairly evident to him from what Secretary Marshall had said to Mr. Bevin and from other indications, that the U.S. would accept the Chinese proposal if it were genuinely desirous of now sitting down at a peace conference. An open admission of this fact, he thought, [Page 791] might well persuade the UK and then the other British Commonwealth countries to abandon the Canberra line.
Mr. Kennan replied that as one of the Far Eastern big-four he did not believe that it would be appropriate for the U.S. to advocate FEC voting procedure for the Peace Conference.
Turning to the demilitarization question, Mr. Dening agreed with Mr. Butterworth that, stripped of its overseas empire and with its industries smashed, Japan could not be realistically viewed as a potential military threat for the foreseeable future. He believed that controls against future Japanese aggression should be of the simplest nature—preferably through preventing sizeable stockpiling of raw materials—and that they should be administered in such a way as not to impinge upon the daily consciousness of the Japanese.
Mr. Butterworth observed that, as evidenced in the FEC discussions of Japanese travel abroad, the Australians and New Zealanders evidently do not share Mr. Dening’s view that Japan no longer constitutes an aggressive threat.
Mr. Dening allowed that Australia and New Zealand are taking an extreme view of the situation, not having recovered from the shock of the war. Thus, he noted, the Anzac powers are viewing with unreasoned alarm the prospect of Japanese emigration southward in the Pacific.
Turning to the question of our relations with the FEC, Mr. Kennan expressed the view that the U.S. Government bears an equal, if not greater, responsibility for having encouraged the FEC to pass on detailed matters which were properly within the administrative sphere of SCAP’s determination. Mr. Kennan saw great advantage in allowing SCAP to take greater initiative in these matters. Aside from the fact that it would enable us to settle up and remove from the area of disagreement many of the problems which would otherwise complicate the negotiation of a treaty, it would, he argued, reduce the degree to which the Allied community would have to interfere in Japanese life in the post-treaty period.
Mr. Graves did not believe that these matters could be settled up without a firm line being taken by the FEC on Japanese level of industry, which in his opinion is the basic, unresolved problem of the occupation, “from which everything else flows.” In this respect, he considered that the U.S. was under a direct obligation to take the initiative: The U.S. had immediate access to the facts of the situation, was not handicapped by telegraphic delays with its FEC representatives, and had the right to issue interim directives. To this Mr. Dening added that under positive U.S. leadership in the FEC the question of level of industries would be settled, although he doubted that there would “ever be an agreement on reparations”.
[Page 792]Mr. Butterworth questioned whether the two problems—level of industry and reparations—could be considered separately. Certainly in the minds of the Chinese and Filipinos the belief that reparations were an economic panacea had been partially responsible for the clamor of public opinion in those countries for setting low levels of Japanese industry.
On both issues, Mr. Kennan argued, there is a wide gap between prevalent theories and the realities of the situation. He pointed out that reparations from Japan’s obsolescent industries would be uneconomical and perhaps of no real benefit to recipient countries; that countries affected by the adverse [advance?] transfer program are already rejecting large proportions of available reparations equipment; that tremendous expense of effort is required of the Japanese Government—and of the U.S.—to maintain designated plants and to recondition, pack and ship reparations items, many of which are accepted by the claimant countries solely for their scrap value or for the packing materials involved. Mr. Butterworth alluded to further unrealities of the situation, citing the example of the Japanese aluminum industry, for which the FEC interim removals program envisaged the retention of no plant capacity. Technological advances had made it clear, he added, that aluminum had important, almost indispensable, peacetime uses which it would be an act of irresponsibility on our part to deny the Japanese.
Mr. Dening indicated that if acquainted with the so-called “realities of the situation” the British Cabinet might well change its views on the reparations–level of industry problem. He added that already there were widely divergent viewpoints in London on this subject and that even if the U.S. now came forward with a level of industry paper based on the OCI-Johnston recommendations, at least it would precipitate a fresh consideration of the problem and the issue could be put up squarely to his ministers. Mr. Dening admitted that he could not speak for the Anzac Powers “for they are in a fog over the whole matter”. He described their “pathological worry” over the level of Japanese industry as being in marked contrast to the attitude of Burma and Malaya, whose lack of interest in the problem had been of embarrassment to Britain, which represented them on the FEC and the ACJ.
In Mr. Graves’ opinion, it was fairly certain that London would firmly reject the OCI recommendations on Japanese shipbuilding. He thought that if the U.S. were genuinely seeking the support of the other countries to U.S. policies toward Japan, it should avoid references to Japan as “the workshop of Asia”. He felt that this phrase had done a lot of mischief in countries such as China and India, which had [Page 793] dreams, however unreal, of industrialization. The accent of our policy should rather be upon “restoring Japan’s solvency”.
Mr. Butterworth did not agree that wording should make this much difference. He expressed particular disappointment in the Filipino attitude to Japanese economic revival, which, he considered, bore no plausible relationship to reality.
According to Mr. Dening, it would be misleading to judge the attitude of the Dominions from the local press. From conversations he recently had with Mr. Nehru,1 Mr. Dening felt certain that despite the viewpoint of the Indian press, Mr. Nehru was fully aware of the benefit to India of Japan’s economic revival; and he further noted that in Australia and New Zealand it was the predominantly Opposition press which, for practical reasons, was responsible for the outbursts against policies being pursued in Japan.
Mr. Dening did not think that we could quietly drift into another phase of the occupation. A definitive and positive effort, he thought would have to be made by the U.S., perhaps by the issuance of circular notes or through FEC action, to place the facts and recommendations before the other countries. If put up to the FEC, it would have the healthy effect of reactivating the Commission and of preventing it from bogging down in weary discussion.
Mr. Butterworth replied that a circular note might well be used by the USSR for propaganda purposes. Regarding the FEC, he felt that the Commission’s tendency to involve itself in administrative matters was something definitely to be avoided if phase 2 of the occupation was to be carried out successfully.
Both Mr. Dening and Mr. Graves stressed that it was of the greatest importance that the U.S. assume real leadership in the FEC, through a leader who knows and represents U.S. policy. On the other hand, to by-pass the Commission would be inevitably to incur widespread resentment among our Allies.
Reverting to the peace treaty issue, Mr. Kennan emphasized that phase 2 of the occupation does not necessarily connote that there will be no peace treaty for a long time but rather is it partly designed to permit a treaty to take place. He pointed out that heretofore the trend of the occupation has been quite agreeable to the Russians—many of the occupational policies being almost indistinguishable from the “softening up” policies which Russia has pursued in Soviet occupied countries in Europe. Now, however, if we were to embark on a program of recovery as opposed to reform, of stability as opposed to uncertainty, nothing, said Mr. Kennan, could be better calculated to bring the Soviets to the peace table more swiftly and at our terms.
[Page 794]Mr. Dening seemed particularly impressed by this line of argument. The discussion then centered on steps which should be taken during the remainder of the occupation. It was firmly agreed that the purge and the war crimes trials were ill-conceived, psychologically unsound and should be wound up within the shortest practicable period of time. In this connection, Mr. Dening felt that the scope of the purge should be immediately narrowed to apply only to those few who were primarily responsible for Japan’s course of aggression. It was also agreed that it would be desirable to place greater responsibility in the hands of the Japanese, and that the occupational trend from now on should be one of detachment from the administration of Japan’s political and economic life. From Britain’s point of view, Mr. Dening did not consider that it would serve any useful purpose to permit Japanese to travel abroad for business or cultural purposes. UK–Japanese trade could, he remarked, be handled more effectively through British representatives in Japan than through Japanese representatives in the UK “who would get nowhere”. As for cultural purposes, the British universities are already overcrowded.
- Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.↩