There are two remaining points of disagreement between this
Department and the Department of the Army: (1) the timing of the
peace treaty and (2) reparations. These divergences should be
reconciled in the NSC.
Mr. Kennan and Mr. Butterworth feel that the underlying paper should
be introduced into the NSC on May 27
so that it will have the status of an NSC paper when, on May 28 Mr. Kennan begins
conversations with Mr. Dening of the British Foreign Office on the
subject of Japan, following which he will be touching on similar
subjects at Ottawa.
It is recommended that PPS/28/2, Recommendations with Respect, to
U.S. Policy toward Japan, should be submitted to the staff of the
[Page 776]
National Security
Council with a view to its approval by the Council members.
[Annex 2]
Draft Paper for the National Security
Council4
top secret
[Washington, May 26,
1948.]
Recommendations With Respect to U.S.
Policy Toward Japan
i. the peace treaty
1. Timing and Procedure
In view of the differences which have developed among the
interested countries regarding the procedure and substance of a
Japanese peace treaty and in view of the serious international
situation created by the Soviet Union’s policy of aggressive
Communist expansion, this Government should not press for a
treaty of peace at this time. It should remain prepared to
proceed with the negotiations, under some generally acceptable
voting procedure, if the Allied Powers can agree among
themselves on such a procedure. We should, before actually
entering into a peace conference, seek through the diplomatic
channel
[Page 777]
the
concurrence of a majority of the participating countries in the
principal points of content we desire to have in such a treaty.
Meanwhile, we should concentrate our attention on the
preparation of the Japanese for the eventual removal of the
regime of control.
2. The Nature of the Treaty
It should be our aim to have the treaty, when finally negotiated,
as brief, as general, and as nonpunitive as possible. To this
end we should try to clear away during this intervening period
as many as possible of the matters which might otherwise be
expected to enter into the treaty of peace. Our aim should be to
reduce as far as possible the number of questions to be treated
in the peace treaty. This applies particularly to such matters
as property rights, restitution, etc. Our policy for the coming
period should be shaped specifically with this in mind.
ii. security matters
1. Disposition of our Tactical Forces in the
Pre-Treaty Period
Tactical forces should be retained in Japan for the coming
period; but every effort, consistent with
military security and the proper performance of the occupational
mission as envisaged in this policy paper, should be made to
reduce to a minimum their numbers, their cost to the Japanese
economy, and the psychological impact of their presence on the
Japanese population. The arrangements for their location,
support and employment should be determined with this in
mind.
2. The Post-Treaty Arrangements
United States tactical forces should be retained in Japan until
the entrance into effect of a peace treaty. A final U.S.
position concerning the post-treaty arrangements for Japanese
military security should not be formulated until the peace
negotiations are upon us. It should then be formulated in the
light of the prevailing international situation and of the
degree of internal stability achieved in Japan.
3. The Ryukyu Islands
The United States Government should make up its mind at this
point that it intends to retain on a long-term basis the
facilities at Okinawa, and the base there should be developed
accordingly. The United States Government agencies responsible
for administering the islands should promptly formulate and
carry out a program on a long-term basis for the economic and
social well-being and, to the extent practicable, for the
eventual self-support of the natives, At the proper time,
international sanction should be obtained by the means then most
feasible for United States long-term strategic control of the
Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29 degrees N.
[Page 778]
4. Naval Bases
The United States Navy should shape its policy in the development
of the Yokosuka base in such a way as to favor the retention on
a commercial basis in the post-treaty period of as many as
possible of the facilities it now enjoys there. Meanwhile, it
should proceed to develop to the maximum the possibilities of
Okinawa as an advance naval base and increasingly employ the
facilities on Okinawa, on the assumption, that we will remain in
control there on a long-term basis.
5. The Japanese Police Establishment
The Japanese Police establishment should be strengthened by the
reenforcing and reequipping of the present forces, and by
expanding; the present centrally directed police
organization.
iii. the regime of control
1. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
This Government should not at this time propose or consent to any
major change in the regime of control. SCAP should accordingly be formally maintained in
all its existing rights and powers. However, responsibility
should be placed to a steadily increasing degree in the hands of
the Japanese Government. To this end the view of the United
States Government should be communicated to SCAP that the scope of its
operations should be reduced as rapidly as possible, with a
corresponding reduction in personnel, to a point where its
mission will consist largely of general supervisory observation
of the activities of the Japanese Government and of contact with
the latter at high levels on questions of broad governmental
policy.
2. Far Eastern Commission
The United States Government should ensure for its own part, and
urge upon other FEC member
Governments, that policy proposals considered by the FEC be confined to matters directly
related to the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the
Terms of Surrender, and be couched in broad terms leaving
questions of administration to SCAP. On such matters, coining within the
legitimate scope of authority of the FEC, the United States Government should seek to
establish as promptly as possible firm United States positions
and then adopt an aggressive and positive attitude, by direct
discussions with FEC member
Governments and by forceful backing in the FEC of policies desired by the
United States. In matters of urgency, where it has become
evident that, after efforts to achieve maximum international
support, agreement cannot be promptly reached, we should
[Page 779]
not hesitate to use
the interim directive. SCAP
should also he encouraged to make greater use of his authority
as sole executive for the Allied Powers, asking where necessary
for the United States Government’s views. On the other hand, the
United States Government should not hesitate to render
assistance to SCAP by
elucidating its interpretation of previous directives and
general policies, notably those appearing in the “Basic
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”.
3. Allied Council
The Allied Council should be continued, with its function
unchanged.
iv. occupational policy
1. Relations with the Japanese Government
(See Section III 1, above.)
2. The Reform Program
Henceforth emphasis should be given to Japanese assimilation of
the reform programs. To this end, while SCAP should not stand in the way of reform measures
initiated by the Japanese if he finds them consistent with the
overall objectives of the occupation, he should be advised not
to press upon the Japanese Government any further reform
legislation. As for reform measures already taken or in process
of preparation by the Japanese authorities, SCAP should be advised to relax
pressure steadily but unobtrusively on the Japanese Government
in connection with these reforms and should intervene—after
consultation with the United States Government whenever the
exigencies of the situation so permit—only if the Japanese
authorities revoke or compromise the fundamentals of the reforms
as they proceed in their own way with the process of
implementation and adjustment. Definite background guidance
embodying the above principles and indicating the United States
Government’s views as to the nature and extent of the
adjustments to be permitted should be provided SCAP in the case of certain
reforms.
3. The Purge
SCAP should be advised to
inform the Japanese Government that no further extension of the
purge is contemplated and that the purge should be modified
along the following lines: (1) Categories of persons who have
been purged or who are subject to the purge by virtue of their
having held relatively harmless positions should be made
reeligible for governmental, business and public media
positions; (2) certain others who have been barred or who are
subject to being barred from public life on the basis of
positions occupied should be
[Page 780]
allowed to have their cases re-examined
solely on the basis of personal actions; and (3) a minimum age
limit should be fixed, under which no screening for public
office would be required.
4. Occupation Costs
Measures should be taken to bring about a further reduction of a
drastic nature in the costs of the occupation borne by the
Japanese Government. The number and size of construction
projects ordered by SCAP
utilizing Japanese materials and labor should be held to an
absolute minimum.
5. Economic Recovery
Economic recovery should be made the prime objective of United
States policy in Japan for the coming period. It should be
sought through a combination of a long-term United States aid
program envisaging shipments and/or credits on a declining scale
over a number of years, and by a vigorous and concerted effort
by all interested agencies and departments of the United States
Government to cut away existing obstacles to the revival of
Japanese foreign trade, with provision for Japanese merchant
shipping, and to facilitate restoration and development of
Japan’s exports. In developing Japan’s internal and external
trade and industry, private enterprise should be encouraged.
Recommendations concerning the implementation of the above
points, formulated in the light of Japan’s economic relationship
with other Far Eastern countries, should be worked out between
the State and Army Departments after consultation with the other
interested departments and agencies of the Government. We should
make it clear to the Japanese Government that the success of the
recovery program will in large part depend on Japanese efforts
to raise production and to maintain high export levels through
hard work, a minimum of work-stoppages, internal austerity
measures and the stern combatting of inflationary trends
including efforts to achieve a balanced internal budget as
rapidly as possible.
6. Reparations
(Recommendations on reparations are to be submitted shortly.)
7. Property Matters
SCAP should be advised to
expedite the restoration or final disposal of property of United
Nations members and their nationals in such a way that the
process will be substantially completed by July 1, 1949. It
should be the objective of United States policy to have all
property matters straightened out as soon as possible and
certainly well in advance
[Page 781]
of a treaty of peace in order that they
may not hamper treaty negotiations.
8. Information and Education
- a.
-
Censorship. Censorship of literary
materials entering Japan should be conducted with the
minimum of delay and precensorship of the Japanese press
should cease. This should not operate, however, to prevent
SCAP from exercising a
broad post-censorship supervision and from engaging in
counter-intelligence spot-checking of the mails.
- b.
-
Radio. The United States Government
should immediately undertake a regular program of medium-
and long-wave broadcasts to Japan from a transmitter station
on Okinawa. These programs should be carefully prepared with
a view to developing an understanding and appreciation of
American ideas and at the same time to maintaining as wide a
Japanese radio audience as possible.
- c.
-
Interchange of Persons. The
interchange between Japan and the United States of scholars,
teachers, lecturers, scientists and technicians should be
strongly encouraged. SCAP
should continue the policy of permitting approved Japanese
to go abroad for cultural as well as economic purposes under
bilateral arrangements with the Allied nations willing to
receive them.
- d.
-
National Education Budget. The
Japanese should be permitted to allocate a higher proportion
of the national budget to educational purposes.
9. War Crimes Trials
We should press for an early conclusion of the war crimes trial
of “A” suspects. We should continue and push to an early
conclusion the screening of all “B” and “C” suspects with a view
to releasing those whose cases we do not intend to prosecute.
Trials of the others should be instituted and concluded at the
earliest possible date.
v. state department representation
At the appropriate stage as the character of the occupation
changes, the Secretary of State should recommend to the
President that he send to Tokyo a Political Representative with
the rank of Ambassador with attributes, powers and privileges
similar to those of the diplomatic representatives of other
countries in Tokyo. The Political Representative would advise
the Commander-in-Chief on political matters and would report to
the Secretary of State on matters concerning Japan. He would
not, at least in the initial period, deal officially with the
Japanese Government, although there would be no restrictions on
his informal contact with Japanese Government officials.
