740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–2148
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)
| Participants: | Mr. J. O. Reuchlin, Minister, Netherlands Embassy |
| Mr. W. W. Butterworth, Director, FE | |
| Mr. J. M. Allison, Chief, NA |
Mr. Reuchlin called this morning at his request to discuss problems related to United States attitude toward Japan and the FEC. He stated that for some time the FEC had not appeared to be serving constructive purpose and, in view of the fact that many matters were apparently being decided outside the FEC and that it did not appear possible to reach decisions on many of the matters now before the [Page 771] FEC, he was wondering whether or not it was necessary for the Netherlands Government to continue to maintain in Washington the three or four technicians whom they had here to work on FEC matters. Mr. Reuchlin said that he understood why in many cases it was not possible to make more progress in the FEC and he wished the opinion of the Department as to what the future prospects might be. Mr. Butterworth explained that, as time went on and it became increasingly apparent that there was to be no early peace treaty with Japan, this Government had been taking a new look at present and previous policies toward Japan to see whether or not they remained valid in light of world conditions. Many of these policies had been developed at a time when the situation in the Far East and elsewhere was considerably different from that now obtaining and many policies which might have been appropriate at that time would not necessarily be so today. In Mr. Butterworth’s opinion it was not possible without considerable danger to proceed with the peace treaty without the Soviet Union. In view of the Soviet domination of fishing areas and areas on the continent of Asia which could provide many necessary raw materials and other products for Japan, the USSR would be in a position to bring strong influence to bear on Japan and might well be able to undercut any peace treaty that the other nations might have concluded. It is therefore necessary to give very careful thought to all aspects of the problem before proceeding with the peace treaty without the Soviets. In these circumstances, with no treaty and with Japan continuing to be a drain on the US economy, it has become necessary for this Government to endeavor to determine how to bring about as many as possible of the beneficial conditions which would obtain under a peace treaty by other means, and it is because the various Departments of the US Government concerned are giving serious consideration to this problem that it has not been possible in recent weeks to take a more positive position with regard to problems now before the FEC. Mr. Reuchlin expressed general agreement with what had been said, but inquired what was the way out not only for the United States but for the other Governments concerned? He was asked with respect to his original inquiry whether or not, in view of the fact that a large portion of the Terms of Surrender had been carried out, the FEC could not in the future limit its activities to the determining of broad general policies and give much less attention to detail than in the past with the result that it would be possible to dispense with the services of at least some of the technicians now being maintained? Mr. Reuchlin replied that with the exception of questions of reparations and levels of industry, which are two parts of the same question, he would agree, but that these two remaining problems were of considerable [Page 772] importance. He admitted that he saw no prospect of an early settlement by the FEC of either of these matters as the paper now before the Commission was unsatisfactory to many members and as it was apparent that American conceptions of adequate levels of industry had been changing and would probably now be far apart from the ideas of many of the other FEC countries. Mr. Reuchlin mentioned specifically the problem of aluminum production in Japan, where in accordance with the FEC policy decision on interim levels Japan should have no aluminum industry1 and yet SCAP was importing 100,000 tons of bauxite in order to keep the aluminum industry busy. He readily admitted that the bauxite had been furnished by the Netherlands but maintained that the general principle was still valid. Mr. Butterworth said that he thought that aluminum was a good example of how policies which had been made several years ago were no longer valid, as the great technological changes which had occurred during the past year or two had made it evident that aluminum was to play a much larger part in the peacetime economy of a country than it had ever done before, and that it did not mean that the United States was providing a war industry in Japan when it desired that that country should have some aluminum industry.
With regard to the charge sometimes made that the United States was building up Japan’s war potential, Mr. Butterworth pointed out that even the most optimistic planners had not contemplated that Japan would reach a state of economic self-support prior to 1953, to say nothing of getting into a position where it would be a threat to other countries. Mr. Butterworth also pointed out that the curve of American public opinion with regard to aid to foreign Governments seemed to run in hills and valleys, and that at present it was at the top of a hill, but that there was no assurance how long this condition would prevail. The regaining by Japan of a position where she was economically self-supporting would take a large burden off the American taxpayer and by that much would delay the time when American public opinion began to slip into the valley where aid to needy foreign Governments would have to be checked.
Mr. Reuchlin expressed general agreement with much that had been said, but maintained that it was necessary that the United States take friendly powers more into its confidence and thus not give the appearance of acting unilaterally and without due regard for the interests of the other nations. Mr. Butterworth stated that this point was fully appreciated and that it was his intention as soon as present discussions within the American Government had reached a more advanced stage to call in Mr. Reuchlin and other representatives of friendly powers [Page 773] in order to talk over these problems in a more detailed way than was possible at present. He stated that Mr. Dening of the British Foreign Office had been making a trip throughout the Dominions and that he was expected to come to Washington toward the end of this month when it was hoped to be able to have talks of the desired nature with him as well as with representatives of the other interested powers. It was the US desire that these talks be on an informal basis and that no publicity of any sort be given them. While it might not be possible to talk in detail about all pending problems, it was hoped that it would be possible to discuss most of them. Mr. Reuchlin expressed his appreciation for this information and said he also wished to point out that it was not only in Washington that representatives of the other powers sometimes felt they were being kept in the dark but that this situation also pertained in Tokyo where in recent months it had been the experience of the Netherlands Mission at least, and he understood the same applied to others, that less and less information was being made available as to what was actually going on in Japan. He pointed out as an example the case of the setting up of the National Maritime Authority. According to Mr. Reuchlin none of the powers, with the possible exception of the Soviets, really felt that the setting up of this Japanese Coast Guard was either a real danger to them or that it actually violated any FEC decisions, but until the matter had come out in the press none of them had any detailed information. Had it been possible for the US Naval and other authorities in Japan to have quietly pointed out to the representatives of the powers concerned in Tokyo what they were planning to do and the necessity for it, Mr. Reuchlin is certain that most, if not all, of the trouble in the Allied Council in Tokyo as well as in the FEC in Washington could have been avoided. Mr. Butterworth said he had not heard before that the Missions in Japan were not receiving adequate information and that this would be looked into. He again stated that he hoped to be able to have a more detailed talk with Mr. Reuchlin within two or three weeks and assured him that it was not the desire of the US Government to ignore the legitimate interests of friendly Governments or to prevent the FEC from exercising its proper functions.
- See FEC–059, May 13, 1946, Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, report, pp. 68, 70.↩