Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

740.00119 PW/5–1948

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Philander P. Claxton, Jr., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman)

confidential

[Washington,] May 19, 1948.

Participants:	The Chinese Ambassador, Wellington Koo
	O—Mr. Saltzman
	O—Mr. Claxton
	NA—Mr. Allison

Ambassador Koo began the conversation by recalling that on his last visit he had suggested that where there is a divergence of views between the United States and China on FEC matters, it would be useful to thresh them out outside of the FEC in order to avoid the unfortunate occurrence of opposition between our two countries within FEC, which of course does not facilitate the business of the Commission. In this connection, he said he had in mind two main questions; the first being the establishment of levels of industry for Japan, which included the question of the peacetime needs of Japan and the question of reparations, and the second one being the restitution of looted cultural objects which he had discussed formerly. He also had in mind the conclusions of the Draper mission. He recalled that at the time he was here before Mr. Saltzman had said that the report had not yet been completed. He has now seen a copy of the report and notes that it is referred to as the Johnston report.¹ Mr. Saltzman broke in to say that we make a point of this name because the report is the report of a private group invited by the Secretary of the Army to make an examination and submit recommendations to him. This Government will consider those recommendations in its general study of the Japanese situation.

Ambassador Koo asked whether the United States Government has had time to make up its mind regarding the recommendations in the report, which China finds of considerable interest and, in fact, concern. Mr. Saltzman replied that we are still considering the report and in fact the entire related subject matter. He said we are not yet at the point where we are ready to sit and talk, but we are in complete agreement with the idea of our two governments talking such matters over.

Ambassador Koo stated his hope that the United States would be in a position to talk this matter over with the Chinese before the United States has completely crystallized its own view. He referred to the fact that the Johnston report includes a statement that the economic recovery of Japan will depend upon friendly relations with neighboring countries, of which China is of course one. He reiterated his hope that such talks could take place before the United States reaches a firm position. Mr. Saltzman stated that we appreciated this suggestion and would consider carefully whether some useful procedure along these lines could be followed.

Ambassador Koo stated he was glad that the United States has not yet reached firm conclusions. He indicated that China was also maintaining an open mind. He asked whether Mr. Saltzman could let him know when we would be ready to discuss the matter. Mr. Saltzman replied affirmatively.

Ambassador Koo suggested that although he would be at our disposal it might be desirable to designate two or three representatives on each side to work out the technical details which would be involved. Mr. Saltzman suggested in reply that we take this thought into consideration in finding the procedure which would be most helpful.

Ambassador Koo said that he had received a cable from his Foreign Office indicating disappointment in the way in which the Allied Council functions. It is apparently unable to make much headway. Although the main reason for this is understood, it makes China feel all the more anxious that the FEC push along with its work. His government hopes the United States will find it possible to support as much as possible the viewpoint of the Chinese Delegation in the FEC. The Ambassador explained that he had been asked to make these points, and the fact that he anticipated this explains his earlier visit to discuss the same subjects. If and when the United States finds a way to iron out its problems in this matter, Koo would appreciate it if we would let him know in order that he could report to his government to alleviate its anxiety.

Mr. Saltzman asked Ambassador Koo what China’s views are regarding the reasons that the Allied Council does not make headway. Ambassador Koo replied that the telegram was not specific, but he gathers that the body as a whole is unable to function effectively.

Ambassador Koo stated his government has heard that the British Foreign Office has sent a man to visit the various FEC countries to urge the early convening of a peace conference for Japan. He inquired if we knew anything about this. Mr. Allison stated that we understand that Mr. Dening of the British Foreign Office is visiting various countries interested in the Far East, that he has not yet come here but is expected toward the end of the month. We understand that he is interested not only in the peace conference but in all Far Eastern matters.

Ambassador Koo asked if there had been any developments in the United States Government regarding the Japanese peace treaty. Mr. Saltzman replied that there have not been, and that Ambassador Koo would know about them anyway.

Ambassador Koo remarked it is noteworthy that USSR has recently showed increased interest in the Far East, as, for example, by sending such Far Eastern experts as Panyushkin to the United States as Ambassador and Malik to the UN. In addition, Stalin’s statement on the Wallace² open letter refers specifically to Japanese, Korean and Chinese matters. Ambassador Koo wondered if this portends any new attitude of the USSR on the Far East. Mr. Saltzman replied indicating that these developments were of course interesting and had been noted by us, but that no new broad attitude had yet become evident.

Ambassador Koo inquired whether Ambassador Panyushkin has yet given any indication to this government of a new attitude by the USSR toward the Far East. Mr. Saltzman said no.

Ambassador Koo inquired whether the news reports are correct which say that the United States does not contemplate entering into bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, as recently suggested by it. Mr. Saltzman pointed out that the press statements were in fact quotations from or references to statements actually made by the Secretary, and that they did express the intention of this government.

Ambassador Koo recalled his statement in his recent visit regarding the anxiety on the part of the Chinese people regarding United States proposals concerning a Japanese recovery program, and hoped that further developments might have the effect of quieting such anxiety.

Mr. Allison returned to the subject of the Japanese peace treaty and asked Ambassador Koo whether there had been any change in the Chinese attitude. Ambassador Koo pointed out that Chinese public opinion, as indicated in the recent meeting of the National Assembly and in the Chinese press, seemed to tend strongly toward a veto power for China. He said he himself did not feel this was necessary, because he felt sure that the friendly relations between the United States and China were a greater and sufficient protection for the Chinese. He pointed out that China had never had occasion to use its veto power in the Security Council or the FEC. He recalled that Foreign Minister Wong had suggested a compromise proposal for the treaty conference procedure which the Chinese regard as middle of the road. He said he understood the British were now leaning toward the acceptance of this position.

1. See O.C.I. letter of April 30, p. 970.
2. Henry A. Wallace, former Vice President and Secretary of Commerce of the united States. For Stalin’s reply, and reactions to it, see telegrams 936 from Moscow on May 18, and 951 and 955 from Moscow on May 20, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 870, p. 872, and p. 873.