740.0011 PW (Peace)/5–1948
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison), to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Comments on Attached Memorandum of General McCoy1
There is attached a copy of a memorandum which General McCoy left with the Secretary at his interview the morning of May 18. The Secretary has requested Mr. Saltzman for answers to three specific questions:
- (1)
- Why have there been such long delays on the various papers before the Far Eastern Commission?
- (2)
- What comments can be made on the specific recommendations of General McCoy contained in his memorandum?
- (3)
- What is meant exactly by the quotation at the bottom of page 7 of General McCoy’s memorandum to the effect that the United States Government considers it increasingly advisable for SCAP to be encouraged to take independent action wherever possible?
Before attempting to answer these three questions I should like to make some general comments with regard to the attached memorandum. In Part II of the memorandum, General McCoy advances the thesis that the Far Eastern Commission has been of real advantage to the United States in that it has approved certain basic US occupation policies and that this approval by the other States on the FEC will cause them to support the Secretary of State at the peace conference when the subjects covered by the policy decisions are under discussion. General McCoy gives as examples The Basic Post-Surrender [Page 763] Policy for Japan2 and the demilitarization paper: Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment.3 Unfortunately there are parts of both these papers which it is quite possible the United States may wish to see changed and it is probable that our position at the peace conference with regard to matters covered by these two papers will be substantially different from what it was when the papers were passed. The fact that these papers have been passed, however, will make it much more difficult for the United States to take a position at the peace conference which in any degree is at variance with the papers. From this point of view it is evident that the FEC may be found to have been a distinct disadvantage to the prosecution of US policy. In the last paragraph of this same section General McCoy states that the FEC “is the only forum” in which this Government may maintain contact with other States interested in the Far East on matters of mutual concern with regard to policies in that area. While it is true that the FEC is the only “forum”, it is by no means the only method by which the United States may seek to obtain support for its policies. In fact Part IV of the Terms of Reference of the FEC specifically states:
“The establishment of the Commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of consultation on Far Eastern issues by the participating Governments.”
It is believed that a more frequent use of the diplomatic channel to obtain agreement to US policies will be of more immediate help than merely relying on presenting those policies in what has come to be most of the time a debating forum.
Many of the points raised by General McCoy with regard to the attitude of other States toward US actions in the FEC are pertinent and should be given careful consideration. This is believed to be particularly true with regard to the rigidity of positions taken by this Government as discussed at the bottom of page 8 of General McCoy’s memorandum. While I do not necessarily approve of the particular illustration General McCoy uses I have felt that in many cases the US Government could be somewhat more flexible and more willing to accept at least minor changes suggested by other countries without in fact giving up any substantive point of importance. Willingness to give in on a few minor points such as a provision that SCAP should keep either the FEC or Missions in Tokyo of its member Governments informed of action he takes permitting travel abroad of Japanese might produce favorable effects far in excess of any possible unfavorable result to the interests of this country.
[Page 764]It is apparent from a reading of this memorandum that General McCoy is not aware of the strong position which this Government is in in adopting the attitude it has toward Japan and the FEC. While it may be true that looking at the matter purely from the point of view of American policy in Japan, US action may appear somewhat arbitrary and not considerate enough of other countries’ viewpoints, nevertheless when our policy toward Japan is placed in perspective and viewed as part of our whole world policy a different picture emerges. It should not be forgotten that with the exception of Russia and possibly India all of the other nations represented on the FEC are either directly or indirectly recipients of American aid. It is also true that it is the desire of nearly all the nations on the Far Eastern Commission with the exception of Russia that the United States remain for the present in occupation of Japan and in a position where it will continue to be a stabilizing force in the Far East If the US Government is to be able to continue such a policy with the necessary backing of the American people it is absolutely necessary that Japan reach as soon as possible a position of economic self-support so that the present tremendous drain on the US taxpayer can be substantially reduced. It is therefore in the direct long-range interest of the other member nations of the FEC that they support US policy designed to achieve self-support for Japan. It is believed that General McCoy could make better use than he has in the past of the essentially strong position in which the US Government finds itself.
With regard to the first specific question asked by the Secretary, it can be stated that the delays in the FEC have been of two sorts. On the one hand there have been delays over the past year in reaching agreement among the various agencies and Departments of the US Government. It has been particularly difficult to get firm positions from the Department of the Army and in many cases when what were considered firm positions have been reached, these were later changed. The other sort of delays which have occurred over the past few months have been the result of a thorough-going re-assessment of our policy toward Japan with a view to determining whether or not papers and policies which have been in the main drafted a year or more ago are still valid in light of the changing world situation and the manifest necessity that, after almost three years, we do everything possible to lighten the financial burden on the US Government with regard to support of Japan. It was decided when Mr. Kennan departed on his trip to Japan that the US Government would not take final action on any pending matters of substantial political or economic significance until his return and until there had been an opportunity to consider his recommendations. The interested Divisions of the Department are now [Page 765] urgently considering Mr. Kennan’s recommendations in conjunction with officials of the Department of the Army and it is hoped that it will be possible in the near future to reach final conclusions on these matters. With regard to General McCoy’s specific recommendations nearly all of them are provided for either explicitly or by implication in the section on the FEC which has been drafted, as a result of Mr. Kennan’s report, in the Department’s recommendations on our Japan policy. It is only with regard to the third recommendation of General McCoy that there is any real objection and it is believed that this recommendation is based upon a misunderstanding. This recommendation is in regard to the statement made at the bottom of page 7 and is the subject of the Secretary’s third query. The two matters can therefore be taken together. The statement at the bottom of page 7 is based on recommendations made by Mr. Kennan and approved generally in both the Department of State and the Department of the Army. In view of the fact that there is no immediate prospect of obtaining a peace treaty for Japan it is felt that all proper steps should be taken to bring about as many of the beneficial results of a peace treaty as possible by other means. One of these means is to encourage SCAP to use his authority as an international officer to bring about through administrative measures wherever he may legitimately do so many of the conditions which would obtain under a peace treaty. It is not meant that he should usurp any of the functions of the FEC and it is felt that when this matter is properly expressed to General McCoy he will withdraw his objections.