740.0011 pw (Peace)/5–1148
The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Dickover) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
[Date of receipt not indicated.]
Dear Butterworth: The Embassy designated me as the officer who was to observe and participate in the discussions which Seymour Janow, of SCAP HQ, had with the British authorities in regard to trading arrangements between the sterling areas and Japan. This involved morning and afternoon discussions with officials of the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Bank of England, the Board of Trade, and the trading banks, and consequently for about two weeks I had [Page 753] no time to pursue my usual occupation of trying to ascertain British thought in regard to the various problems of the Far East. However, here are some notes on the general subject.
Japan. When I finally got around to the Foreign Office to see MacDermot1 about Dening’s trip to Australia, I found him (MacDermot) surprisingly frank. He said that some decisions should be made as soon as possible in regard to the future of Japan; that if the UK and the US could talk things over alone we could undoubtedly easily arrive at satisfactory conclusions, but that the UK had to consider the wishes of her obstreperous children, Australia and New Zealand; that it is hoped that agreement can be reached with the Australian and New Zealand representations in Canberra; and that then Dening would go to Canada and try to get Canada’s agreement. If those Dominions are fairly in accord, Dening would proceed to Washington. There he would present the British Commonwealth case; if we could prove that they are wrong, they would back down; if they could prove that we are wrong, they would expect us to back down. MacDermot said that there had been considerable talk about a difference of opinion between the US and the UK in regard to the level of industry to be permitted Japan in the post-treaty world, but that he thought that there was no real difference. The Foreign Office was of the opinion that there should be no restrictions upon Japanese industry except those necessary for reasons of security. I remarked that that was roughly the State Department view, but that it was my impression that British industrialists, especially the textile industrialists, wanted to place severe restrictions upon Japanese industry. McDermot said that the Foreign Office had reconciled itself to strong Japanese competition in the future and that British industrialists would have to do the same.
MacDermot then showed me the secret telegram which had been sent to the British Ambassador in Washington on April 24, instructing him to inform Mr. Lovett of Dening’s trip and the reasons therefor. He said that the reason for secrecy resided in the British desire not to appear to be organizing a bloc opposed to the U.S. He said that in the FEC the UK and the Dominions had 5 votes out of 11; that with Pakistan admitted to the FEC they will have 6 out of 12; that if Burma (where the British have still much influence) is admitted, they will have 7 out of 13; and that if Ceylon is admitted, they will have 8 out of 14. The Foreign Office does not wish to have such a bloc formed, and therefore is leaving the Asiatic dominions and ex-colonies out of the present conversations. But the Asiatic territories would greatly resent [Page 754] being ignored in this way, so the whole matter was kept secret, until it leaked out in a Sydney newspaper.
I asked if it was intended that the conversations would lead to a peace treaty with Japan. MacDermot said that they might or they might not. The present plan was simply to try to work out a program for the future of Japan, which could be presented to the FEC, or, if Dr. Evatt2 has his way, to a peace conference.
I referred to the fact that the UK and Australia, in Washington, London and other places, had from time to time expressed dissatisfaction over the failure of the US Government to keep the Allies adequately informed of the reasons behind the visits of various missions to Japan, including the two Strike missions, George Kennan’s, Draper’s and that of General Noce,3 and wondered if this dissatisfaction had anything to do with Dening’s visit to Australia. MacDermot promptly denied this, and said that Dening had no specific axes to grind—that his talks with the Australians and New Zealanders were only to be a continuation of the Canberra conference of last August and were to deal only with the general problem of the future of Japan. He added that the Foreign Office of course understood that the sending of the various missions to Japan presaged some sort of a change in U.S. policy toward Japan, but that the Foreign Office hoped that it would be consulted before this change in policy assumed definite form. The Foreign Office did not like to be presented with something on a “take it or leave it” basis; it preferred to be in on the formulation of policy.
Despite MacDermot’s protestations that the British discontent over not being consulted in any forthcoming change of policy toward Japan will have no part in Dening’s conversations with the Dominion representatives, I cannot but feel that discontent lies behind Dening’s trip. The British feel that something is going on of which they are not informed and in which they are not invited to participate; therefore their only recourse is to work out something themselves, which they can present in opposition to (or perhaps more or less in agreement with) the U.S. proposal.
A series of articles entitled “Japan’s Fatal Blunder” by Sir George Sansom, is being published in the Manchester Guardian. As my old friend George is now in the United States,4 I presume that the same series is being published in some American newspaper; if not, please let me know and I shall send the series on to you. It deals with Japan’s [Page 755] psychological, economic and military blunders in the prosecution of the war.
[Here follow paragraphs on China and Siam.]
Very sincerely yours,
- D. F. MacDermot, Head of Japan and Pacific Department, British Foreign Office.↩
- Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs.↩
- Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce, Chief, Civil Affairs Division, Special Staff, U.S. Army.↩
- Marginal notation by Hugh Borton: “Sir George left for England in April. He will not be back here until late September. H B”. He had retired as Minister at Washington in 1947.↩