890.0146/4–548
Memorandum by Mr. William I. Cargo, of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs, to the Chief of the Division (Gerig)
A meeting on the disposition of Okinawa was held on April 5, 1948 at 10:00 a.m. It was attended by the following officers in the Department: Mr. Rusk (UNA), Mr. Butterworth (FE), Mr. Maxwell Hamilton (FE), Mr. Hugh Borton (FE), Mr. John Allison (NA), Mr. John Davies (S/P), Mr. Robert Fearey (NA), Mr. Marshall Green (NA), and Mr. Cargo (DA).
The subjects before the meeting were the recommendation that the United States Government should now take a decision to remain on a long-term basis in Okinawa and the related questions of the nature of any public announcement which might be made to this effect, and the form of the regime which would be established to carry out this policy.
It was pointed out that the military branches favored a strategic trusteeship for Okinawa with the United States as the administering authority.
There was a general discussion of the difficulties of fixing the future status of Okinawa and of according the United States any permanent position there in advance of the peace settlement with Japan. Mr. Rusk referred to the probable legal doubts which would be held by many interested states with regard to trusteeship arrangements if sought prior to the peace conference. He recalled that difficulties had arisen in this connection with regard to the trusteeship agreement for the former Japanese Mandated Islands. In the case of Okinawa, the argument of the United States for a definitive settlement in advance of the peace negotiations would be on much weaker legal grounds. He added that it would be unfortunate to have opposition in the General Assembly to a trusteeship agreement on the part of states who had legal doubts in addition to the opposition which might be expected from the Soviet Bloc and possibly from China and other Far Eastern States.
In a discussion concerning possibilities of a strategic trusteeship, it was pointed out that this would give the Soviet Union a veto over the trusteeship arrangements and that the protection offered to the United [Page 723] States by its possible use of the veto was somewhat theoretical in view of United States policy on the veto question. Mr. Butterworth said that he thought the military people were under some misapprehensions as to the possible values of strategic trusteeship as opposed to ordinary trusteeship, and asked whether UNA would not set out the advantages of the normal trusteeship, indicating the safeguards on matters such as bases and inspection which would be available under an ordinary trusteeship.
Mr. Rusk inquired whether it was the view of the members present that Okinawa should be ultimately returned to Japan or that it should not be. He said that if return of Okinawa to Japan was not to be definitely decided upon, the future of Okinawa might be envisaged in the following steps:
- (a)
- The United States would remain in occupation of Okinawa until the peace settlement;
- (b)
- The United States would ask at the peace conference for an ordinary trusteeship over Okinawa;
- (c)
- The United States would seek approval of terms of trusteeship by the General Assembly; and
- (d)
- The terms of trusteeship would provide that the Okinawans would determine their own future status at some subsequent time. This status might be to return to Japan, but would not be limited to this choice.
Mr. Rusk felt that trusteeship would not be the most appropriate vehicle for a settlement if it were now determined that Okinawa should at a future date be returned to Japan. He felt that this decision would be somewhat incompatible with the policy objectives of the trusteeship system as stated in the Charter.
On the question of a public announcement of the United States policy at this stage, it was considered possible to indicate that the United States would request at the peace conference a trusteeship over Okinawa. Mr. Hamilton felt that it would be preferable to leave the form in which the United States would retain its measure of control unspecified.
The fundamental question was raised as to whether the military authorities could not achieve all that was necessary by a decision taken now by the United States Government to remain for an indefinite time in Okinawa and whether any considerable advantage would be gained by a public announcement at this time, either of a general nature or specified trusteeship. After further discussion it was agreed that what was necessary at this stage was a Presidential decision stating that the armed services should proceed on the assumption that the United States will remain in Okinawa for an indefinite period. It was further agreed that under this conception the status quo would be maintained until [Page 724] the peace treaty, that is, the United States forces would remain in occupation of Okinawa, but no attempt would be made to reach a definitive settlement prior to the peace conference.
It was suggested that UNA prepare a paper along the lines of the foregoing points of agreement and also listing the various types of international arrangements which the United States might make to establish its position in Okinawa on a long-term basis. This paper, after comments and approval by the group, would represent the recommendations of the group as to a State Department position regarding Okinawa.