740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–2548
Report by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan1
i. the peace treaty
1. Timing and Procedure.
This Government should not press for a treaty of peace at this time. It should remain prepared to proceed with the negotiations, under either the two-thirds rule or the FEC voting procedure, if at any time the other Allied powers can agree among themselves on one of these procedures. Meanwhile, we should concentrate our attention on the preparation of the Japanese for the eventual removal of the regime of control.
2. The Nature of the Treaty.
It should be our aim to have the treaty, when finally negotiated, as brief, as general, and as nonpunitive as possible. To this end we should try to clear away during this intervening period, by direct action, as many as possible of the matters which might otherwise be expected to enter into the treaty of peace. Our aim should be to reduce as far as possible the number of questions to be treated in the peace treaty. This applies particularly to such matters as property rights, restitution, etc. Our policy for the coming period should be shaped specifically with this in mind.[Page 692]
ii. security matters
1. Disposition of our Tactical Forces in the Pre-Treaty Period.
Tactical forces should be retained in Japan for the coming period; but every effort should be made to reduce to a minimum their numbers, their cost to the Japanese economy, and the psychological impact of their presence on the Japanese population. The arrangements for their location, support, and employment should be determined with this in mind.
2. The Post-Treaty Arrangements.
The United States tactical forces should be retained in Japan until the entrance into effect of a peace treaty. A final U.S. position concerning the post-treaty arrangements for Japanese military security should not be formulated until the peace negotiations are upon us. It should then be formulated in the light of the prevailing international situation and of the degree of internal stability achieved in Japan. If Russia has not been extensively weakened and sobered by that time or if Japanese society still seems excessively vulnerable in the political sense, we should either postpone the treaty or insist on a limited remilitarization of Japan, preferably under U.S. guidance and supervision. But if by that time the Russian situation should really have changed for the better and if we are reasonably confident of the internal stability of Japan, we should aim at a complete demilitarization, guaranteed by an international treaty of the most explicit and concrete nature, to which the Russians would be a party.
The United States Government should make up its mind at this point that it intends to retain permanently the facilities at Okinawa, and the base there should be developed accordingly. The problem of obtaining international sanction for our permanent strategic control of the islands should be studied at once in the Department of State.
4. The Navy.
The Navy should retain until the peace treaty its present facilities in Japan. It should shape its policy in the development of the Yokosuka base in such a way as to favor the retention on a commercial basis in the post-treaty period of as many as possible of the facilities it now enjoys there. Meanwhile, it should proceed to develop to the maximum the possibilities of Okinawa as an advance naval base, on the assumption that we will remain permanently in control there.
5. The Japanese Police Establishment.
The Japanese police establishment should be strengthened by the reinforcing and re-equipping of the present forces, by the creation of [Page 693] a strong and effective coast guard, and by the establishment of a central organization, under American expert supervision, along the lines of our FBI. SANACC should be directed to work out the detailed directives to SCAP for the implementation of this recommendation.
iii. the regime of control
This Government should not—at this time—propose or consent to any major change in the regime of control. SCAP should accordingly be formally maintained in all its existing rights and powers. However, the scope of its operations should be progressively reduced to a point where its mission will consist largely of general observation of the activities of the Japanese Government and of contact with the latter at high levels on questions of broad governmental policy.
No move should be made by this Government at this time to terminate the existence of the FEC. However, we should begin to discourage the consideration by the FEC of new papers which do not relate strictly to the execution of the terms of surrender. On matters not related to the execution of the terms of surrender, this Government should issue unilateral directives to the Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as CINCFE. These would not be called interim directives. However, in matters which do relate to the execution of the terms of surrender, we should not hesitate to use the interim directive wherever we fail to obtain prompt action in the FEC.
3. Allied Council.
The Allied Council should be continued, and its functions unchanged.
iv. occupational policy
1. Relations with the Japanese Government.
Instructions should be given to SCAP that in the coming period its various sections should take particular care not to interfere or participate directly in the work of the Japanese Government or to perform functions which would normally be the responsibilities of agencies or officials of the Japanese Government. Its functions should be reduced as rapidly as possible to those of general supervision; and it should deal with the Japanese Government, as a rule, only at a high level and on matters of broad policy. This would apply particularly to the activities of the Economic and Scientific Section.
2. The Reform Program.
While SCAP should not stand in the way of reform measures initiated by the Japanese if it finds them consistent with the overall [Page 694] objectives of the occupation, it should be authorized not to press upon the Japanese Government any further reform legislation. As for reform measures already taken or in process of preparation by the Japanese authorities, SCAP should be authorized steadily but unobtrusively to relax pressure on the Japanese Government in connection with these reforms, and to permit the Japanese authorities to proceed in their own way with the process of implementation.
3. The Purge.
SCAP should be directed gradually to permit the relaxation of the purge along the following lines: (1) Categories of persons who have been purged by virtue of their having held relatively harmless positions should be made re-eligible for governmental, business and public media positions; (2) certain others barred from public life should be allowed to have their cases re-examined on the basis of personal actions rather than on the basis of positions occupied; and (3) a lower age limit should be fixed, under which no screening for public office would be required.
4. Occupation Costs.
Measures should be taken to bring about a drastic reduction in the costs of the occupation borne by the Japanese Government. If this cannot be accomplished in any other way, then arrangements should be made to cover many of the costs of occupation, particularly those pertaining to personal services, by payment in dollars, which in turn should be used for financing of Japanese imports.
5. Economic Recovery.
Economic recovery should be made the prime objective of United States policy in Japan for the coming period. It should be sought through a combination of a long-term U.S. aid program envisaging shipments and/or credits on a declining scale over a number of years, and by a vigorous and concerted effort by all interested agencies and departments of the United States Government to cut away existing obstacles to the revival of Japanese foreign trade and to facilitate the restoration and development of Japan’s exports. Detailed recommendations concerning the implementation of the latter point should be worked out between War and State Departments following Under Secretary Draper’s return to Washington; and White House authority should be, if necessary, invoked to see that the cooperation of all agencies and departments of the Government is enlisted in the implementation of these recommendations.[Page 695]
We should announce that our Government is not prepared to permit the removal of reparations items from Japan in excess of the existing 30% project; that removals under this project will be restricted to such as do not materially prejudice the economic recovery of Japan; and that these removals will have to be completed by July 1, 1949; that no plants not earmarked for removal under this project will be retained on the reparations list; and that the United States will oppose the exaction of reparations from Japan under any future peace treaty unless a form can be found for such reparations payments which is practical, economical, favorable to the general economic development of the Far Eastern area and not burdensome to any single one of the Allied nations, directly or indirectly. SCAP should then be directed to make final determination of the facilities subject to removal under the 30% program, and to remove all other plants from the list of those earmarked for reparations. But it should be required to take care to see that primary war facilities thus removed from the list are disposed of in a manner consistent with the requirements of Japanese demilitarization. (The above recommendation should be checked and if possible correlated with the findings of the Draper mission, before implementation.)
7. Property Matters.
SCAP should be directed to force the pace of the restoration or final disposal of property of United Nations members and their nationals in such a way that the process will be substantially completed by July 1, 1949. It should be the objective of U.S. policy to have property matters straightened out in advance of a treaty of peace in order that they may not hamper treaty negotiations. Meanwhile we should continue our efforts to obtain an exact listing of Japanese external assets with a view to setting these off, eventually, against the reparations claims of FEC countries.
8. Information and Education.
Censorship restrictions and delays in the admission of literary materials to Japan should be removed. Pre-censorship of all matters printed in Japan should cease. This should not operate, however, to prevent SCAP from exercising broad post-censorship supervision and from engaging in counter-intelligence spot-checking of the mails.
b. Translation and Dissemination of U.S. Books and Magazines.
SCAP, in his capacity as CINCFE, should be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to permit the authorized translation and publication [Page 696] in Japan of U.S. copyrighted literary works. GARIOA FY 1950 budget should provide for the shipment of newsprint to Japan.
We should immediately undertake a regular program of medium-and long-wave broadcast to Japan from our transmitter station on Saipan. These programs should be carefully prepared with a view to developing an understanding and appreciation of American ideas and at the same time to maintaining as wide a Japanese radio audience as possible.
d. Interchange of Persons.
The interchange between Japan and the United States of scholars, teachers, lecturers, scientists and technicians should be strongly encouraged. We should press this matter in the FEC, and failing early action, an interim directive should be issued to SCAP authorizing bilateral agreements covering such interchange.
e. National Education Budget.
The Japanese should be permitted to allocate a higher proportion of the national budget to educational purposes.
9. War Crimes Trials.
We should press for early deadlines for the termination of the War Crimes Trials of “A” suspects. We should immediately undertake the screening of all “B” and “C” suspects with a view to releasing those whose cases we do not intend to prosecute. The others should be brought to swift justice.
v. state department representation
As soon as this is practically feasible, and desirable, the Department of State should send to Tokyo a permanent Political Representative, with the rank of Ambassador. The functions of this official would be to advise the Commander-in-Chief on political matters and to report to the Secretary of State on matters concerning Japan. The Political Representative would enjoy the normal facilities for independent communication with the Department of State. He would not, at least in the initial period, deal officially with the Japanese Government, although there would be no restrictions on his informal contact with Japanese government officials. The Diplomatic Section of GHQ, SCAP should remain in existence, but its functions should be restricted to those of a protocol and liaison section for GHQ, SCAP. All normal State Department functions now performed in the Diplomatic Section, together with the supervision of the consular establishments in Japan, should be placed under the Political Representative.[Page 697]
- A table of contents listed as follows: “I. Recommendations [;] II. Memoranda of Conversations with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (A) March 1, 1948 (B) March 5, 1948 (C) March 21, 1948 [;] III. Discussion”. II and III follow here as Annexes 1 and 2.↩
- Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- John William Powell, son of John Benjamin (J. B.) Powell, veteran newspaperman and editor at Shanghai until 1942.↩
- Brig. Gen. W. K. Harrison, Jr., Chief, Reparations Section, GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, and chairman of the Reparations Technical Advisory Committee there.↩