501.BC Indonesia/1–948: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State

secret

29. From Graham No. 88. Indo delegation with Sjarifuddin, accompanied by Kirby, returned Batavia January 7 not yet prepared reply Dutch truce plan.

Graham and one adviser had several hours meeting with Sjarifuddin and Setiadjit to discuss truce plan. Indos, who pessimistic and depressed, believed effective truce impossible under plan offered, which they considered deficient in three respects:

1.
Regarding political principles, they stated these contained so little assurance any possibility Republic come back as to put them under impossible handicap in endeavoring win support and observance truce on part nationalist elements now being suppressed in Netherlands-controlled areas. We stated our opinion GOC would endeavor obtain Netherlands agreement to plebiscites which in time would give Republic authority over areas where it had support population and to provision whereby Republic would carry full weight in drafting USI constitution. We emphasized, however, no promises could be made and passed on info that Dutch until effectuation truce would not consider any change political parts truce plan. Indos seemed greatly favor plebiscites, though Setiadjit stated it inconceivable Dutch would permit free expression Republic view and Republic organization their areas.
2.
Indos stated that under military parts truce plan, no separation armed forces would take place, that their experience showed mere demarcation line wholly ineffective in preventing incidents, which they believed Dutch would instigate. Sjarifuddin noted present forward positions only 300 yards apart some areas. We replied we would continue efforts arrive at arrangement permitting true demilitarized zones, that meanwhile we hoped military observers by ascertaining facts any incidents could obviate annulment truce and their presence serve as deterrent incidents and that we believed this possible provided incidents could be contained and would not build up into general engagements.
3.
Indos inquired how they could be expected answer for maintenance law and order on Netherlands side zones. We expressed view Netherlands asked only maximum effort their part control their adherents and had offered assist every way dissemination info on truce, and that obviously Republic responsibility could not extend beyond its authority.

Indos apparently wished advice what reply they should make to Dutch plan, but Graham felt in no position take such responsibility. In reply direct question our opinion what course SC would take if Republic rejection caused SC review case, we offered frank but personal view that much talk and delay would result but that Republic could count on no action giving it better terms.

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Without concealing our realization difficulties Indo delegation position, we offered view first month truce would be hardest period, that once this hump satisfactorily passed although Dutch reassured re prospects increasing order, Netherlands Government should be in better position reconsider some of Republic’s proposal. We repeated Dutch promise proceed full speed with political settlement once truce effective. Setiadjit stated under such conditions, Dutch would have no interest proceed rapidly with any further settlement.

Sjarifuddin asked number questions concerning interim government USI. In particular inquired what role, if any, GOC would have if Republic entered interim government and whether GOC could assist settlement disputes between Republic and other states. This obviously crucial question since (1) Sjarifuddin gave impression Republic would not participate interim government if GOC thereby ended and (2) Dutch obviously intend acting in increasingly larger measure through government’s non-Republic states and through interim government. We reserved reply this question.

Sjarifuddin stated Indo delegation would consider Netherlands plan one more day. Our impression is Republic will not give unqualified acceptance.

USDel intends informing Indo delegation that USDel’s opinion (1) there no reason why GOC cannot continue until political agreement corresponding Linggadjati reached whether or not Republic agrees participate provisionally in interim government prior signing such agreement, unless Republic itself considers its agreement participate such government as equivalent full political agreement; (2) that both parties could properly request GOC remain to assist adjusting differences relating political agreement after it signed, (3) that GOC cannot under present terms reference assist settlement disputes between Republic and other states except insofar as such disputes are genuinely involved in dispute with Netherlands. [Graham.]

Livengood