Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/12–3148: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad ¹

confidential

Washington, December 31, 1948—1 a. m.

Following is guidance on Indonesian situation:

Renewal war Indonesia terminates fourteen months efforts by US to bring about through its membership SC’s Com Good Offices final peaceful settlement three-year-old conflict between Netherlands and Republic Indonesia. While US did not seek membership CGO and indeed accepted role only with reluctance, it has, within limitations imposed by character CGO, exerted itself to utmost achieve peaceful settlement this conflict, believing both sides and world in general had everything gain through such settlement which appeared not impossible achieve since parties already in apparent agreement on ultimate objective, namely creation sovereign United States Indonesia as partner in Neth-Indo Union.

Through assistance CGO, Neth and Repub concluded agreement aboard USS Renville Jan 17 establishing truce and principles to form basis for negotiation final political agreement. Owing fundamental disagreement parties on arrangements for administration Indonesia interim period prior transfer sovereignty by Neth, exacerbated by profound reciprocal mistrust, negotiations broke down in May. In June US and Australian reps CGO presented compromise plan as informal working paper, which Neth refused discuss. Hiatus in conversations then followed occasioned by Neth internal difficulties arising elections and delay in formation new govt. US rep in Sept presented second compromise plan to parties informally. Second plan like first provided for free elections, establishment of constituent assembly, representative government and early transfer of sovereignty to USI. It was designed safeguard legitimate Neth interests Indonesia, establish interim arrangements which then existing moderate Repub Govt could accept (since US considered its fall would have serious consequences) and afford basis future Neth-Indo cooperation.

Following submission second compromise plan and Communist revolt in Repub, Neth Fonmin visited Wash and was told Dept considered govt of Repub Primin Hatta, anti-Communist character of which by then demonstrated, should be strengthened, that failure negotiated settlement might have serious consequences unforeseeable dimensions and that US considered second US compromise plan, modified in such ways as parties might agree, offered constructive solution to dispute. (This connection, see Dept press release 749 Sept 16² on occasion Communist revolt against Repub noting sincere nationalist leaders southeast Asia who originally deceived by Communist pose as champion local nationalist forces now awakening to fact nationalism in Communist-controlled states outside USSR regarded as high crime.)

In Oct, Neth accepted compromise plan as basis negotiation but only with such amendments as transformed basic character of plan. Plan formally submitted CGO Nov 10.

Meanwhile, Neth Fonmin arrived Batavia Oct 31. Following his return Nov 13 after talks with Hatta, Neth Govt considered Neth and Repub much closer agreement. Accordingly Neth cabinet delegation flew Indonesia Nov 21. After further conversations Hatta, it returned Hague Dec 5, subsequently declaring publicly Repub position critical issues made it futile expect resumption negotiations could produce results.

Dept Dec 7 delivered aide-mémoire to Neth urging in strongest terms resumption negotiations with Repub, pointing out US compromise plan afforded ready basis, noting disaster likely result from attempt settle dispute by force and stating US would resume freedom action in event CGO failure. In reply Dec 10, Neth stressed necessity assurances from Repub of its willingness recognize Neth sovereignty interim period particularly with respect command armed forces.

Acting on Neth reply, US rep CGO was instrumental in obtaining from Hatta Dec 13 conciliatory letter setting forth concessions Repub prepared make. In US view, letter afforded basis renewal negotiations. However, Dutch considered letter insufficient and addressed communication to CGO at Repub capital evening Dec 17 for transmission Repub requiring further concessions and a reply by following morning. US rep characterized communication as calling for Repub surrender to Neth position on every material point and informed Neth rep he could not as member CGO press Hatta reply summarily, within impossible time limit, on conditions set forth by Neth since these called for non-negotiated blanket assent which would preclude possibility bona fide negotiations rather than effect resumption. Dutch then terminated truce night Dec 18 and attacked Repub capital, violating SC resolution of Aug 1, 1947 and Renville agreement which called for prior notification to CGO and other party by party denouncing truce.

Dept profoundly concerned by Dutch action, manner in which action taken, and implications and complications arising therefrom. By taking actions for which moral justification difficult find, Dutch have unquestionably hurt Western cause throughout Asia, extent of damage being as yet impossible assess, and have perhaps undone much of postwar efforts of US diplomacy southern Asia which has had as major objectives (1) prevention division world on lines Asia vs. West, and (2) winning confidence and support of political movements through which aspirations and convictions Asiatic peoples expressed. By attack on moderate Repub Govt of Sukarno and Hatta, which only govt in Far East to have met and crushed an all-out Communist offensive, Dutch may have destroyed last bridge between West and Indo nationalists and have given Communists everywhere weapon of unanswerable mass appeal.

It plain no action Dept could contemplate would effect withdrawal Neth army and reversal Neth plans. Outcome Neth action so far difficult predict. In conversation Neth reps prior renewal hostilities, Dept consistently urged Neth be guided by independent estimates situation which conceded Neth army had capacity take all centers population, which Repub would not contest, but foresaw that resort force by Neth would result guerilla war and scorched earth, perhaps eventually recapitulating Indonesia situation Indochina, where ruinous inconclusive war now entering third year with result Communists in firm control nationalist movement. Neth has maintained that elimination extremists irreconcilable factions Repub, which Neth army able quickly accomplish, would clear way for creation stable Indo Govt truly representative of characteristically peaceful Indo peoples and willing and able carry out their desire for close cooperation with Neth. Since in absence such desire, destruction on mounting scale probable in Indonesia, very likely with benefit only to Communists, Dept constrained hope Neth has appraised correctly both its own intentions and underlying sympathies Indo peoples and that rapprochement may be achieved with moderate Repub elements.

However, consensus info available Dept indicates Dutch action will at very least lead lasting bitterness and unforgiving resentment oil part politically conscious Indos seriously jeopardizing Neth and Western interests Indonesia. (May be noted this connection that even govts non-Repub Indo states, in whose behalf military action said to have been undertaken, have been most backward in endorsing Neth action and two most important have resigned in consequence thereof.) Hence Dept must adjust itself to probability prolonged period subversive conflict and endeavor with such means at its disposal accomplish difficult task regaining ground Dutch action has lost us in southern Asia.

You will appreciate following aspects situation:

1. Dutch armed action against Repub taken in manner reminiscent totalitarian technique.

2. In resorting force, Dutch defied best independent judgments, and since then have failed carry out resolutions adopted by SC in Paris.

3. Dutch had every reason realize they dealing serious blow at selves and friends in Indonesia and Asia generally.

4. However, damage done and status quo impossible restore. Little US can do at present but fix responsibility on Dutch and make own position clear for sake US standing in Asia. See Jessup’s speech in SC Dec 22³ for full statement US attitude, transmitted Wire Bulletin.

5. US must endeavor keep issues clear since in future may be required take measures unpleasant to Neth.

6. Notwithstanding Neth action Indonesia, Western Union is founded inescapable realities and must go forward.

You will make above available responsible officers your staff for their guidance in conversations Neth or other officials. You will understand US Govt has taken pains in SC to ensure general appreciation its attitude and you should therefore feel no hesitancy, in any discussions à deux with Neth colleagues or reps other govts, recite views this govt on above lines.

Lovett

1. Sent to 13 posts and by airgram to all Embassies and Consulates General in the Western Hemisphere, to the Legation in New Zealand, and through Paris, Cairo, Bangkok, and Shanghai to all other diplomatic and consular posts.
2. Department of State Bulletin, September 26, 1948, p. 410.
3. See footnote 2, p. 588.