Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/12–2348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) at Paris¹

top secret
us urgent
niact

Washington, December 23, 1948—7 p. m.

4914. Eyes only for Jessup from Rusk: Following summary US attitude SC action Indonesia based on discussions here since my arrival Tues.² You should consider this telegram as authoritative background but not as substitute or modification specific instructions you have recd. Background is furnished assist you interpreting and applying specific instructions. Regret pressure of time and unfortunate interruption communications left our staff telecon with unsatisfactory conclusion.

I. General Considerations

(a) Dutch action Indonesia brings into sharp conflict number important US national interests. On one hand we are deeply interested in political and economic stability Western European countries and solidarity Western Europe as whole. On other hand we have long established policy favoring rapid development non-self-governing people toward self-govt and independence and estab in so-called colonial areas of govts based upon consent and agreement peoples concerned. In particular case Indonesian question latter interest is now reinforced by policy supporting peaceful settlement and by obligations all members UN to act in support both of Charter and of SC when latter is acting to maintain peace.

(b) Dutch action Indonesia appears to us as direct encouragement to spread of Communism in Southern Asia and as serious blow to prospect of development self-govt in that area under moderate national elements. Dutch handling Indonesian situation has been lamentable whether we consider effect on Dutch themselves, effect on their future relationships with Indonesia, jeopardy thereby presented to US cooperation Western Europe on such matters as ERP and Atlantic Pact, or on UN system for maintenance peace. We have no desire to condone or wink at Dutch action Indonesia.

(c) US must act in good faith as member UN and particularly as permanent member SC, in support UN action to maintain peace. This does not mean that US can or should assume responsibilities of SC itself if other leading members that body are unable or unwilling to act in concert. As for the other permanent members, Soviet Union will not act in support of Charter to speed genuine settlement of Indonesian question, whatever its short range attitude on specific issues or resolutions might be. China is under present circumstances totally incapable of sharing responsibility SC action and can contribute nothing but a voice and a vote at the Council table itself. Neither UK nor France is apparently willing to act jointly with other members with the speed and decision required to bring quick solution to Indonesian situation. US cannot accept role world policeman either in military or political sense if other permanent members refuse to join in SC action as envisaged by the Charter and SC therefore unable to act. Certainly US did not bargain for such unilateral role when it signed Charter. Assumption that permanent members acting in concert could maintain the peace in usual case by sheer weight of influence and pressure is one thing: assumption breaks down if US is only permanent member willing or able to act. For SC to move on basis of seven votes among which US is only one both able and willing to act would involve US national commitments which we have neither the inclination nor the resources to undertake.

(d) US has no intention bringing about general break with Dutch over Indonesian question. For us to insist upon full compliance with highest standard of conduct as price of our association with other govts and peoples would lead us quickly into position of not too splendid isolation. On that basis we might have already broken with Russia (Berlin, Korea, etc.), Albania (Greece), Yugoslavia (Greece), Bulgaria (Greece), France (Indo-China), UK (Palestine), Arab States (Palestine), India (Kashmir and Hyderabad), Pakistan (Kashmir), South Africa and so on down the list. In same way others might have in fact broken with us. We must pursue our basic objectives under whatever conditions we find, shaping such conditions to extent we can. We must avoid putting ourselves in such a position that any wrong committed anywhere in world and left unpunished constitutes diplomatic defeat and humiliation for US. For this reason we must make every possible effort to obtain concerted action in such situations, particularly among all permanent members SC.

II. Specific US Objectives re SC Action Indonesia

(a) US wishes to secure through SC action Indonesia a cessation of hostilities, a restoration of statics quo ante recent military action and a bona fide effort by Dutch and Indonesians to settle political future Indonesia by peaceful means.

(b) Unless Dutch are bluffing, they have made it clear that they will not accept SC action along above lines. It also seems clear that the SC will not undertake program of sanctions against Dutch in connection Indonesian question. In these circumstances in absence strong assistance from at least UK and France, Dept believes we should seek following secondary objectives from SC action:

(1) Clear and full exposition of course of events in Indonesia in order that full force of world public opinion can be thrown behind peaceful settlement.

(2) Creation of public pressures on Dutch which might lead now or later to modification their present attitude.

(3) Creation of pressure on other members SC especially UK and France to get them to exert maximum influence on behalf peaceful settlement to save themselves from direct embarrassment.

(4) Demonstration to Asiatic peoples of US interest in development self-government that area and disclosure of strenuous efforts already made by US to settle Indonesian question on peaceful and democratic lines.

(5) Specific assignment to Netherlands of full responsibility for undertaking fresh police action.

(6) Maintenance of SC interest in case in such way as to facilitate any useful action SC might be able to take as situation develops.

III. In seeking above primary and secondary objectives, you should bear in mind following specific factors:

(a) US does not intend to propose or support sanctions against the Netherlands in Europe.

(b) In principle US is prepared to support certain types of sanctions applicable to Dutch and Indonesia. There are serious practical difficulties, however, in devising measures which would affect the situation in Indonesia, by timely pressures on the Dutch. As minimum we must be certain that US is not supporting either directly or indirectly Dutch military action in Indonesia. This problem would be covered by specific instructions.

(c) If Dutch persist in police action in defiance SC resolution, US-believes that full responsibilities therefor should be assigned to Dutch. We do not exclude a condemnatory SC resolution following Dutch defiance of joint resolution introduced by you on Wed.

(d) For reasons indicated earlier, US must seek maximum degree joint action in SC.

(e) US should also use its influence to insure that SC action on Indonesia is directly related to factual situation as reflected in information available to the Council.

(f) Every possible effort should be made, consistent with our own basic objectives, to obtain Brit and Fr support and thereby three-power pressure on Neth.

IV. Specific comments on points your Niact 6412³ not already covered:

(a) Telecon referred to penalty action by states separately as alternative to SC action because we believe that certain states will in fact take penalty action and we do not believe that 7 votes in SC will support sanctions.

(b) Dept agrees unequivocably that Neth is at fault in resuming military action. That in itself does not decide what we do about a country which is at fault in such situations.

(c) Your analysis effect Dutch action in Far East and relationship to struggle against Communism is fully concurred in.

(d) We do not wish to “espouse” the Indonesian case as such, altho I realize you did not attach great importance to particular word “espousal”. We are pursuing our own interests and policies, as they appear both outside and inside framework UN. Today pursuit of our policy may make us critical of Dutch; tomorrow pursuit of same policy in different circumstances may make us equally critical of Indonesians.

(e) We agree we should be forthright and not evasive and believe that your excellent opening statement to SC qualifies as forthright statement. However, as a nation with very great responsibilities in all parts of the world, we must act with caution. Otherwise, we would have become involved in a series of armed actions on cases arising: before UN.

V. If this attempt to clarify general attitude here does not succeed in doing so, please come back at me because it is of the greatest importance that we keep together on this extremely complicated question.

Take care of yourself [etc.] [Rusk.]

Lovett

1. Repeated as 690 to Batavia (eyes only for Cochran) and 663 to The Hague (eyes only for Baruch).
2. December 21.
3. December 22, 5 p. m., from Paris, not printed.