501.BC Indonesia/1–748: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State

secret

25. From Graham No. 86. Graham saw Vredenburch night January 6, having asked for few minutes in order make Netherlands position clear. He emphasized importance Beel statement that Netherlands proposals for truce definitely represent Netherlands last word at present moment. He read letter Beel to Van Zeeland stating this was “take it or leave it” proposition, that political principles offered by Netherlands were not to be altered and that further discussion was useless. Vredenburch stressed that Republic must not believe slightest opportunity exists for bargaining over principles, otherwise vital time would be lost, and said Netherlands should know by end week whether truce to be obtained. He wished this information conveyed Djocja immediately, to which Graham replied IndoDel expected return Batavia next day and that he would inform his colleagues. Without referring domestic position Beel government this connection, Vredenburch did stress speed with which Ministers returning Hague.

Vredenburch then referred USDel January 5 principles (mytel 84 January 6) stating Netherlands believe paper contained good ideas and principles to which it not averse but that Netherlands could not commit itself present moment and would wish examine principles with extreme care, particularly with reference plebiscites. He quoted Beel as willing discuss these principles “with some hope” as part political discussions, with which Netherlands would be prepared go ahead full speed if truce carried out in reasonably accurate way and with improving implementation. He added that if principles disclosed to Republic, which he hoped would not be in writing, should be made very clear they not subject discussion until after truce. Ogburn1 who also present [Page 67] expressed personal view that principles along lines USDel paper should receive earliest possible attention owing likelihood highly unfortunate repercussion should Republic fail weather crisis resulting from truce plan which might appear very one-sided.

Vredenburch reported conversations now in progress between Republican leaders and leaders other Indo States with view effecting cooperation two groups in interim federal government and that Netherlands encouraging such talks. He added, however, that Republic had made proposal that Soekarno2 be given second highest office, which he termed fantastic. Dismissing Sjarifuddin3 and Setiadjit4 as weaklings, he stated Leimena5 was “decent” Republican who, for that reason, had no influence. He conceded Netherlands had been working too exclusively with Conservative Indos and must endeavor reach Moderate Labor leaders and socialists of Sjahrir6 type.

Vredenburch appeared more receptive than in conversation with Ogburn on January 5, before he had seen USDel paper. Ogburn had then stressed as personal opinion importance Netherlands considering concessions which would in future, without raising question present administration territories or current formation states, give Republic chance prove itself or fall by standards which could be regarded as objective and which would give GOC some hope success in endeavoring obtain full Republican cooperation in implementation truce. However, Vredenburch balked at plebiscites and discussion this subject got no further. Vredenburch chiefly interested in voicing suspicion Kirby had gone Djocja talk Republic into rejecting Netherlands truce plan, a suspicion Ogburn endeavored allay, and in urging necessity entire GOC attempt persuade Republic accept plan and then bend every effort carry it out. He promised full cooperation Netherlands in disseminating information on truce for Republic, including leaflet drops, pamphlet printing, etc. Vredenburch as usual expressed amazement at alleged shortcomings GOC and castigated Republican leaders as corrupt, unscrupulous, incapable of decision and of an incompetence matched only by incompetence of Indos on Netherlands side, from whom he believed Netherlands could expect nothing better in future than an inefficient dictatorship in Indonesia willing cooperate with Netherlands.

Conversation very pleasant but quite fruitless with regard concessions Netherlands willing make in long run. [Graham.]

Livengood
  1. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., adviser to U.S. delegation to GOC.
  2. President of the Indonesian Republic.
  3. Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic.
  4. Fourth Deputy Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic.
  5. Indonesian Republic Minister of Public Health and head of cease-fire committee.
  6. Former Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic.