Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC–Indonesia/1–548: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State ²

secret

Batavia, January 5, 1948—noon.

13. From Graham³ No. 81. Indo delegation memorandum dated December 31⁴ received accepting GOC Christmas program.⁵ Noting that Republic had accepted all previous GOC proposals, memorandum states (1) Christmas program involves considerable sacrifice on part Republic; (2) dispute is basically political in character and efforts bring about political agreement in few weeks are essential; (3) acceptance Van Mook Line⁶ as basis truce is unjust and disappointing in giving Netherlands control over large areas not occupied August 4; and (4) demilitarized zones should be strictly demilitarized. Memorandum then terms program “decisive step towards an equitable settlement” and promises that Indo delegate will do everything possible make program effective.

Since receipt memorandum, GOC has held continual meetings with Dutch and Indos in effort reduce areas disagreement. In particular has endeavored in talks with Dutch Ministers, Van Mook and Vredenburch,⁷ to salvage principles annex 2 which would give Republic status equality with Dutch in negotiating future of territories Java, Madura, Sumatra. In this effort, GOC drafting committee under direction Van Zeeland⁸ January 2 drafted new version annex two embodying principles Van Zeeland believed Dutch would accept. Vredenburch stated this version more objectionable than original. Dutch in meeting with GOC drafting committee then extracted principles to which they would subscribe as follows:

1. GOC to continue assist in reaching agreement for settlement political dispute Java, Madura, Sumatra based principles underlying Linggadjati.⁹

2. Neither party to have right prevent free expression popular movements for political organizations in accordance Linggadjati and both parties to guarantee freedom assembly, speech and publication provided advocacy violence and reprisals not included.

3. Decisions concerning changes in administration territories to be made only with consent populations and when security and freedom from coercion are insured.

4. Armed forces both parties to be gradually reduced after signing political agreement.

5. Soonest practicable after signing truce agreement, economic activity, trade, transportation and communications to be restored through cooperation parties taking into consideration interests all parts Indonesia.

6. Free discussion vital issues to proceed for 6 months to year after signing agreement, after which free elections to be held for self-determination by people of their relationship to USI.

7. Convention to be chosen accordance democratic procedure to draft constitution for USI.

8. If either party after signing political agreement should ask UN provide agency observe conditions any time up to transfer sovereignty from Netherlands to USI, other party to take request in serious consideration.

In connection number 2 above, GOC drafting committee paper had stated that pending political settlement, both parties should refrain from sponsoring or recognizing any movement relating organization new states or relationship states to federal organization. In connection number 3, GOC paper had stated that administration areas now under control NEI Government so far lacking political structure their own will be transferred to interim government which in accordance Linggadjati will be created through cooperation two parties on basis proportional representation and participation present leaders. In 6, GOC had also included “relationship to Republic”, while US delegate endeavored have plebiscites substituted for free elections. In 8, GOC paper had given either party right request UN agency observation. Dutch ruled out all these provisions.

Netherlands counter-proposals to Christmas program¹⁰ boil down to foregoing eight principles plus plan for truce drafted January 2 in presence GOC committee providing (1) issuance stand-fast and cease-fire order applicable troops along Van Mook Line to be fully effective within forty-eight hours after signing agreement; (2) establishment demilitarized zones between Van Mook Line and line Netherlands forward positions on one side and extending on other to line Republic forward position; (3) acceptance paragraphs 4 c, d, e, and f mytel 75, December 27;¹¹ (4) inclusion in truce agreement of all points relating cease-fire already agreed on by parties; (5) enquiry by military observers to establish whether elements Republican military forces continue offer resistance behind Netherlands forward positions and, if such elements found existing, evacuation to be completed within 3 weeks; (6) withdrawal with equipment of all forces each party from area other party and from demilitarized zones to party’s own side of demilitarized zone under observation military observers; and (7) truce agreement to be binding for fortnight and to be automatically extended for fortnightly periods unless terminated upon notifications to GOC by one party on grounds it considers regulations not being observed by other party. Dutch refuse absolutely consider any deviation demilitarized zones from Van Mook Line in West Java.

In presenting above counter-proposals, Dutch made clear this their final offer. Beel¹² stated that if rejected by Republic, Netherlands would “reserve liberty of action”. Vredenburch stated “this is July 15”. US delegate not sure whether intimations of resumption police action reflect considered Netherlands intention or are meant pressure GOC and Republic.

Indo delegate took Netherlands counter-proposals Djocja January 4, accompanied by Kirby,¹³ who had returned from Australia December 31. Critchley¹⁴ doubts any Republican Government could survive acceptance but is not sure what decision will be. US delegate stated to Critchley it noted Republic fully aware seriousness its present position and in making decision could not be guided by false hopes of what it might gain if matter referred SC owing inability parties agree. Critchley believed Republic under no illusions. He thinks Dutch will move on Djocja if Republic rejects proposals and that if Republic accepts, violations inevitable under circumstances will also give Dutch excuse take Djocja. Australian delegate, US delegate and Van Zeeland agree Vredenburch gives impression of hope Republic will reject counter-proposals. Truculence Vredenburch has apparently been too much even for Van Zeeland who believes Vredenburch keeps ministers stirred up against GOC.

Graham, Van Zeeland and Kirby agree Republic has no choice but accept counter-proposals. Critchley opposes. Van Zeeland expressed to Sastroamidjojo¹⁵ personal view that rejection by Republic or continuance sabotage would probably lead either resumption police action or strangulation Republic by Dutch. He feels concessions obtained from Netherlands were possible only owing presence ministers and is apparently much concerned by possibility further police action. US delegate believes he extremely eager have truce agreement signed and get away.

While GOC under leadership Van Zeeland is continuing effort induce Dutch reconsider certain terms Dutch truce proposal which GOC believes more likely encourage than prevent violations, GOC is largely powerless tender [temper?] approaching crisis, scope of which impossible forecast. Dutch appear completely confident and untroubled by any prospect international repercussions which might result should Republic collapse.

Unless Netherlands proposals accepted, Republic likely take form counter-proposals. Since Dutch have made clear their present proposals are final, this could only delay impasse for few days. US delegate believes that if final position parties are irreconcilable, GOC should send full factual report to SC of proposals and counter-proposals leading to break-down discussions. Christmas program would necessarily be included. While Van Zeeland has objected on grounds it without “formal status”, he will probably agree when he realizes Republican representative at SC would undoubtedly question its exclusion, putting GOC in untenable position. Obviously report to SC should be simple and allow facts speak for themselves without expression opinion by GOC, whose views will be manifest in proposals included in report. [Graham.]

Livengood

2. Repeated in telegram 9, January 9, noon, to The Hague.
3. Dr. Frank P. Graham, U.S. member of the United Nations Security Council Committee of Good Offices (GOC) in the Netherlands East Indies. He was President of the University of North Carolina.
4. For text of memorandum dated December 30, 1947, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Special Supplement No. 1, United Nations Security Council’s Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question, First Interim Report of the Committee to the Security Council, doc. S/649/Rev.1 (22 September 1950), p. 64. Hereafter cited as SC, 3rd yr., Spec. Suppl. No. 1.
5. For text of Christmas draft message addressed informally to the parties by the GOC, December 26, 1947, see ibid., p. 49; also, Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1948, p. 330.
6. Line proclaimed August 29, 1947, by Netherlands Lt. Gov. Gen. Hubertus J. van Mook.
7. Henri L. F. K. van Vredenburch, vice chairman of Netherlands delegation to GOC.
8. Paul Van Zeeland, Belgian member of GOC.
9. For text of agreement initialed November 15, 1946, and signed March 25, 1947, see Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1948, p. 325.
10. For text of Netherlands memorandum of December 28, see SC, 3rd yr., Spec Suppl. No. 1, p. 53.
11. Telegram 572, December 27, 1947, 1 p. m., Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vi, p. 1094.
12. Dr. Louis Joseph Maria Beel, Netherlands Prime Minister.
13. Richard C. Kirby, Australian member of GOC.
14. Thomas K. Critchley, acting Australian member of GOC.
15. Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Indonesian Minister of Education.