501.BC Indonesia/12–248: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
1050. Gocus 465. Visited Stikker alone 9 this morning his request. He was disappointed final outcome Kaliurang talks. Said atmosphere cordial and considerable progress made on certain lines. Said practically no difficulty on financial, economic and trade subjects. Said trouble was on implementation truce, military setup and powers high representative of crown.
Stikker said Republicans would accept little of NethDel memo on implementation truce and submitted counter memo which did not satisfy NethDel. Following this Stikker talked directly with Hatta and said latter should come forward with something constructive. [Page 507] Joint communiqué then suggested by Hatta which might offer some possibilities if amended by NethDel.
Stikker said big disappointment came in final conversation between Sassen and Hatta. Sassen reported to Stikker that Hatta had gone back on promises made in original aide-mémoire. Stikker suggested Sassen may have misunderstood Hatta and recommended Sassen write letter to Hatta on points in question. Sassen wrote such letter Tuesday midnight. NethDel took plane Wednesday forenoon without further opportunity see Hatta. Darmasetiawan reported to Sassen and Stikker that Hatta upon seeing letter had said Sassen misunderstood him. Stikker said he was now in most difficult position. Said he had used Hatta’s aide-mémoire as basis for convincing The Hague Government there was opportunity for negotiation and that mission should come to Indonesia. Now Sassen, chairman of mission, reports Hatta has reneged on undertakings given Stikker. Palace crowd capitalizing on this. Stikker told me his group meeting Federalists today or tomorrow. Said if Hatta’s position not cleared up satisfactorily, he would have to return The Hague Sunday.
I let Stikker know three Republicans had come directly me yesterday afternoon (Gocus 4631). I said these were the three Republican officials working most loyally and helpfully with him to achieve peaceful settlement. I said their views were broader than some other leaders constantly within Republic. I said their account of Kaliurang conversations agreed almost entirely with his own. Said they felt strongly, however, that Sassen was pushing Hatta too far particularly on matter implementation truce, and Hatta would fall if he yields further and unless conversations come soon to successful conclusion under auspices GOC. Stikker agreed that Hatta was in perilous position and might even have to resign following Cabinet meeting yesterday and Working Committee meeting today. Said possible but he thought unlikely that Sukarno would resign if Hatta does. I told Stikker we must take cognizance of plea of dependable Republicans for way out of present impasse which will enable Hatta continue. Stikker agreed. He said capture Communist leaders most timely argument for Hatta regime.
I told Stikker I felt his group pressing too far in requesting Hatta give repeated broadcasts etc. on implementation truce. Stikker said if he could get basic matter of Hatta’s adherence to aide-mémoire straightened out, he would be willing oppose his colleagues on too strenuous demands on trade. Said he would to this end enlist Labor support at The Hague. I told him this morning’s Aneta reported from Netherlands considerable parliamentary argument on policy toward [Page 508] indonesia and obvious recognition that excessive zeal shown in trying make bad case against Republic on incidents etc.
I told Stikker I had received letter from Roem stressing difficulty of Hatta retaining support unless Netherlands mission relaxes on pressure and permits resumption full negotiation in GOC Stikker said he realized Roem attitude representative of considerable group. Said he had told Hatta personally he had no intention bypassing GOC. Furthermore, he suggested Hatta that when Hatta comes Batavia they both appear personally before GOC and state they intend resume negotiations within GOC, but both prefer for present to continue direct conversations outside GOC, feeling that through this method they will achieve better and quicker results in overcoming certain difficulties. Stikker said Hatta agreed to this.
Stikker stated he was so confident he was on firm ground in believing peaceful settlement could be negotiated that he is quietly having his own men Blom and Dupont work with Supomo here in Batavia on completing paragraphs of political and related nature for utilization in final accord. I said that for him to go The Hague now and be away for week or ten days or for Netherlands mission to fail to call Hatta and his group to Batavia in immediate future would probably be fatal to Hatta Government. He admitted this and still seeks settlement before fifteenth. Said he also realizes that if Hatta Government falls chaos may result and police action be recommended by those Netherlands elements which have constantly told him negotiations with Republican Government would be to no avail.
At this point I told him if there was any threat or imminent danger police action “my people would hit ceiling”. I told him he must have learned during his visit to Washington how strongly opposed US would be to second police action and what serious view my government would take of it, as would British and many others. I told him my Department had left entirely my discretion measures which I should take toward assisting in negotiations between his group and Republicans. Said I was as interested as ever in trying aid him and would continue either outside or inside GOC do everything possible to bring about peaceful settlement. I reminded him however there would be limit beyond which I could not risk going. Threatened collapse of Hatta under Netherlands pressure or imminence of resort to military action by Netherlands would necessitate my reporting frankly to my government and exploring another course. I said he understood this as well as I did and there was no need mention it further. I said my immediate job would be get desired letter from Hatta. I suggested I see Supomo, Darmasetiawan and Leimena and explain importance receiving required letter on Friday. He agreed to idea of their drafting [Page 509] communication which they would let me carry to him at 6:30 this evening for preview with understanding Darmasetiawan would take it to Hatta by plane Friday morning.
At 10:30 I told three Republicans of my talk with Stikker. They agreed draft letter for submission to Hatta although they said Hatta already planned write such letter with assistance Sjahrir now in Jogja. Darmasetiawan said Hatta insisted strongly Sassen had misunderstood him and would make this clear in his letter. I told Republicans that Stikker felt Republicans would have to confirm sovereignty of crown during interim period and not insist upon TNI entering federal army as separate unit. Supomo pointed out that paragraphs of original aide-mémoire which deal with security in interim period make required concession on powers of high representative of crown. Furthermore he said Republicans did not envisage TNI coming in as entity which will remain separate and would be quite willing work this out on basis Spoor plan.
Critchley called on me following Republicans. He feels situation critical and Hatta cannot give letter which will satisfy Sassen. Critchley thinks Netherlands should make concession to Republicans in not demanding authority for high representative of crown to send Netherlands troops into Republican territory without approval interim government. Critchley feels GOC should take immediate steps to draw two parties into it for negotiations and oblige NethDel show what concessions it is making to Republic. I replied I was quite conscious of present dangerous situation but would not interfere until and unless I thought Stikker had failed. I was still hopeful Stikker would succeed.
Have arranged GOC plane take Darmasetiawan Jogja tomorrow and bring back as soon as letter received. Signed Cochran.