501.BC Indonesia/11–2248: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 1
us urgent
586. Usgoc 182. Neth Amb called on Acting Secy Nov 21 to deliver memorandum quoted Usgoc 183.2
[Page 496]Van Kleffens spoke with feeling on desire Neth Govt reach negotiated settlement of practical character, citing as evidence conciliatory attitude willingness Stikker to return Jogja with Sassen, etc., leaving aside considerations of pride. Van Kleffens interpolated his personal view that Sassen, Neher and political leaders, now believing Stikker likely succeed achieving negotiated settlement, wish to climb on bandwagon. Van Kleffens said Hatta’s statement on penalties truce violations excellent and that it had in his opinion been made at critical moment in Stikker’s struggle with cabinet. Van Kleffens added he hoped Cochran could convince Hatta importance of continuing reduce infiltrations while conversations with Stikker and company in progress so as minimize opposition to Stikker from Batavia Dutch. This connection, Van Kleffens observed assassination Dutch nationals in Dutch territory (he named Admiral Helfrich’s son-in-law) had caused bitter feelings States General and Dutch public as families victims had brought great pressure bear on press and members parliament. Van Kleffens spoke in support his Govt’s appeal to US Govt (final para memorandum) dilating on impracticality maintenance in interim period of two military organizations who had so recently been adversaries in field.
Acting Secy said he was much encouraged by press release (Gocus 4513) and had noted optimism memorandum and Van Kleffens’ remarks; said he would consult Dept officers and Cochran on role US could play pursuant Neth request; that Cochran would continue in any case to make energetic and courageous efforts he had in past to resolve differences in just and practical manner; agreed Hatta should be reminded by Cochran of bad results infiltration during course of conversations and said Hatta would doubtless understand problem somewhat better if he were shown through reference to particularized examples, effect on Dutch press and parliament pressure by families of victims.
Van Kleffens touched briefly but solemnly on belief Stikker’s failure in Indonesia would result fall present Neth Govt and that it appeared to him almost impossible form another cabinet in present circumstances. He correlated this unhappy prospect with uneasy political situation Belgium and France.
Van Kleffens said he believed present effort Stikker and Hatta not only crucial but perhaps last opportunity to reach agreement. Praising Cochran’s efforts, he expressed hope that Cochran could be apprised of Dept position on substance of memorandum as soon as possible and in any case that Cochran effect early liaison with Stikker upon his arrival Batavia which is expected Wednesday. Acting Secy agreed desirability close collaboration Cochran and Stikker, assured Van [Page 497] Kleffens Cochran would as usual give Stikker every appropriate support and added that it appeared to him Cochran would be wise to make some similar friendly connection with Sassen. Van Kleffens agreed.
Van Kleffens was reminded that Repub would find this matter difficult, that Cochran would act within his authority as good officer and that Neth would persumably be prepared offer Repub guarantees of definite character that military powers Neth wishes to repose in High Commissioner would not be used to Repub disadvantage. Van Kleffens replied that he was entirely uninstructed this point but supposed his Govt was most certainly prepared to offer such guarantees. This connection, he emphasized the “nominal character” of powers over both Indo and Neth military which his Govt wished to lodge in High Commissioner observing that some such concession to prestige of Crown during interim period appeared necessary to internal consumption Neth. Van Kleffens was reminded that this prestigious consideration weighed with equal force against Hatta, which Van Kleffens freely admitted but suggested that Indo public opinion less aroused than Dutch and that military problem in Repub might be solved through appeal to individual military leaders such as Soedirman, whereas in Neth entire parliament, press, etc., were involved. Van Kleffens added that as a practical matter the High Commissioner, if enjoying command over both Neth and Indo federal forces, could not request Indo forces to do that which they did not wish to since they would refuse.
In brief conversation with Dept officer following conversation Acting Secy, Van Kleffens expressed his personal agreement with view that good sense required Neth to come to terms with Hatta since Hatta doubtless best man likely to rise to power in Repub.
As you will see from foregoing you are committed by Dept only to making earliest contact with Stikker and Sassen, giving Stikker every support in overcoming difficulties intransigent Dutch advisers and every appropriate support in conversations with Hatta. In all other respects, Dept relies with every confidence on your estimate of the situation and your good judgment.