856d.00/11–1648: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
niact
785. Stikker called at my residence tonight and told me in greatest confidence he had battle of his life on his hands, but was gaining ground; that he was hopeful and that Drees and Oud1 saw eye to eye [Page 487] with him. However, Catholic Party rightists and army were opposing his effort for peaceful settlement and he needs help.
Stikker stated that his exploratory talks with Hatta had produced basis for agreement on many points in near future, and possibilities in his opinion were greater now than they had been for long time. He emphasized importance of continuing talks and their conclusion at earliest. He said that results were obtained largely by Cochran’s help and his own new direct approach to Hatta and other Republic leaders. He appreciated United States desire to reach solution by negotiation, and he personally appealed now strongly for US support to induce Republic to meet Netherlands wishes on two following points: (1) Integration of Republic Army into federal forces; (2) Unified command.
On first point Stikker emphasized fact that Hatta had suggested in a personal letter to him that there were psychological reasons making it difficult to disband Republic forces. Netherlands Government, said Stikker, fully realizes this. Hatta apparently desires to have Republic forces gradually amalgamated into federal. It is impossible, said Stikker, to join together in one army forces which have been opposed and fighting for a considerable time or to create federal forces on a sound basis by incorporating therein units which have been opposed to a federal conception and a peaceful solution of the problem. Netherlands Government is agreeable to a gradual process being followed in this respect and Hatta indicated the same formula in his aide-mémoire. Stikker states that an unequivocal indication by Republican Government in which they will agree to a reorganization of TNI and Republican Government’s willingness to cooperate in the formation of federal armed forces is essential.
On second point, Hatta suggested that unified command would only exist in case of emergency. Stikker believes single command in transition period is absolutely necessary, especially in view of proposed reorganization. Netherlands Government has proposed that under normal circumstances federal forces would be at disposal of interim government and that at latter’s request Queen’s commissioner can place Netherlands forces at disposal of interim government for maintenance of law and order. It is therefore clearly not intention of Netherlands Government, Stikker states, to deprive interim government of authority over armed forces but there cannot be dual supreme command in view of ultimate responsibility of Netherlands Government during interim period. While anxious to bring about supreme command in a spirit of conciliation, Stikker says an explicit declaration of agreement from Republic that they concur in a single supreme command of all forces in the transition period is absolutely essential.
[Page 488]Stikker said he needs Cochran’s help urgently and hopes that Cochran, who has been so helpful in his conversations with Hatta, can see his way clear to convince Republic that success or failure of negotiation depends on satisfactory solution these two points.2
- P. J. Oud, vice chairman of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy of the Netherlands, of which Foreign Minister Stikker was chairman.↩
- This telegram was repeated in telegram 576, November 17, 3 p. m. (Usgoc 179), to Batavia, with the instruction to Mr. Cochran: “Exact nature proposals made by Stikker to Baruch not entirely clear to Dept. Assuming these proposals clear to you in light your conversations with Stikker, you are authorized take such action in the direction Stikker has requested as you think advisable.” The same was sent in telegram 585, November 17, 5 p. m., to The Hague. (501.BC Indonesia/11–1748 and 856d.00/11–1748)↩