761.00/11–548
The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State
No. 195
[Received November 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s secret circular instruction of October 13, 1948,1 entitled “Pattern of Soviet Policy in Far East and Southeast Asia” and to submit certain comments, as requested by the Department.
Soviet policy in Indochina appears to follow in general the lines described in the final section of the instruction under acknowledgement but with certain minor variation. In general it may be said that Indochina presents an ideal picture from the point of view of Moscow. A small group of Moscow and Chinese trained Communists has firm control of the strong and deep seated native Nationalism. A native government under Communist direction controls considerable areas of the country and maintains an army sufficiently strong to pin down large French forces. The country has been kept in turmoil since the end of the war, making it a serious drain on the military and economic resources of France instead of a source of wealth. From the point of view of Moscow, prospects are excellent that Ho Chi Minh will eventually force the withdrawal of the French and set up the first “New Democratic Republic” in Southeast Asia. At the same time Communist control has been concealed and identified with Nationalism so successfully as to confuse and delude public opinion in France and the United States and thus gain the support of large Socialist and liberal groups in those countries.
In recent months particular emphasis has been placed on economic sabotage. This has included burning of rice mills and rubber warehouses in Saigon, and attacks on communications of all types, including railroads, road convoys and barge transport. This has been so successful that the movement of paddy and rice to Saigon-Cholon has practically ceased in recent weeks. Curiously enough there have been no serious attacks on the particularly vulnerable petroleum depots in Saigon and Haiphong nor have the larger rubber plantations been seriously disturbed.
The Communist led Vietminh has not yet adopted the violent anti-American line followed by most Communist parties throughout the world, although there are many indications that this is only on the surface and that the standard anti-American line is being distributed in directives to party leaders. No evidence has yet turned up that [Page 55] Ho Chi Minh is receiving current directives either from Moscow, China, or the Soviet Legation in Bangkok. It may be assumed that Moscow feels that Ho and his lieutenants have had sufficient training and experience and are sufficiently loyal to be trusted to determine their day-to-day policy without supervision.
Another factor peculiar to Indochina is the apparent quiescence of Communist elements among the resident Chinese colony. Not only are these believed by the Sureté to be relatively few in number, but any plans they may have had to emulate their comrades in Malaya have undoubtedly been hampered by the Sureté which has been quietly rounding up and deporting their leaders for several months. It may also be that Moscow feels that anti-Chinese feeling is so strong in the Vietnam that active cooperation of Chinese Communists with the Viet-minh would furnish too valuable a propaganda weapon to the French.
Respectfully yours,
- The circular instruction under reference here is included in the documentation on U.S. national security policy presented in volume i.↩