Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/11–1148: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret
us urgent

Batavia, November 11, 1948—3 p. m.

999. Gocus 442. Spoke with Stikker last night and again briefly this morning as he and Blom departed for Hague. He said there are “some possibilities”; that “outlook is promising”. He let me know that major differences with Repub are on TNI and command of armed forces. Had been in touch by phone with Hague since return his advisors from Jogja and thought it essential to clear personally with Cabinet before proceeding further. Did not know whether he would return Batavia, but said he hoped he would. I told him I had presented USDel plan to GOC yesterday but had given no publicity to this step lest press might interpret it as some complicating move on my part. Stikker thanked me generously for my help during his stay. He called me to his side during press conference at airport and spoke of “closest cooperation” between us. In estimating outlook to me, Blom said he thought it “just about in balance”, and outcome depended on settling crucial point which Stikker had mentioned.

It was to be expected, of course, that any agreement with Repub on fighting forces would meet with violent opposition on part such local figures as General Spoor and Vice Admiral Pinke. Former responsible largely for publicity campaign on infiltrations, incidents, et cetera. Latter harangued me two nights ago with usual arguments justifying his blockade of Repub by sea. Said after 18 years here he knew one could not take word of Indos and insisted I was wrong in thinking an agreement could work. Dept may have been informed from Singapore that when Van Mook gave press interview there en route Hague he made slighting reference to “too many amateurs meddling in Indo question.” I am dining with Beel at Palace tonight and may get some indication as to how old group feels toward Stikker’s mission and its prospects.

My present inclination is to adhere to recommendation made in ultimate paragraph Gocus 439.² I still feel greatest possibility of achieving settlement is through Stikker approach, to be coordinated with GOC. To file our aide-mémoire this juncture could indicate lack of US confidence in Stikker and would undoubtedly embarrass him and perhaps even ruin him with his govt. My thought is that we should do nothing now except to observe reaction here and in Repub following Stikker’s departure and in Hague upon his arrival.³ In meantime, GOC will have by November 15 completed its fourth interim report covering all events through November 10 including chronology of USDel informal approach to parties and finally introduction USDel plan into GOC as working paper. This report will be hurried to SC Paris and thus be available as background if SC should be called upon by Repub (see Usgoc 192⁴) or by GOC or otherwise to stop a threatened police action.

In event signs point alarmingly to failure Stikker get Hague support and toward imminent military action, it is my recommendation that our first move be informal and at top level, along following lines. SEA [Sec] might say to Prime Minister Drees that encouraging reports were received from Batavia upon progress understood to have been made by Stikker in direct talks with Hatta; gratified that this much accomplished and anxious help with achievement final peaceful solution. If some points may have arisen which appear insoluble through direct contact between parties then utilize third party, namely GOC, in trying to reach amicable accord. Middle of road USDel plan already introduced into GOC working paper, with advance agreement both parties to negotiate on this as basis. Understood further that conversations at Kaliurang actually centered around subjects dealt with specifically in USDel plan.

Emphasis could be made on obligation of Netherlands to pursue negotiations within GOC rather than permit rupture and resort to military operations. Aide-mémoire arguments on certain points could be used, particularly those about unfortunate American publicity likely to attend military action and possibility of Congress and ECA cutting off financial assistance to Indo and even to Netherlands. I feel our strongest argument against Netherlands group preferring military action is that of financial situation and would not hesitate use it in manner indicated.

To file our complete aide-mémoire formally at this time would, however, be quite different matter. Kaliurang talks have already begun process dovetailing Bandung legislation with USDel plan (Gocus 441⁵). As negotiations proceeded, either directly between parties (provided no breakdown follows from Stikker report at Hague) or within GOC, Repub will definitely adhere to determination use USDel plan as basis. Bandung group evincing much interest in Stikker-Hatta conversations. Prime Minister Adil Poeradiredja called on me yesterday. Reminded me of telegram he sent Hague early November indicating his state would not accept Bandung legislation unless Repub also included. Prime Minister [Adil] Poeradiredja has conferred twice with Stikker. Beel plans meeting several Bandung leaders here shortly. Bandung plan still in such formative state that common arrangement to include both Repub and Bandung can be accomplished if Stikker can pursue his plans as reported Gocus 439. USDel plan was submitted as medium to draw parties into negotiations. Concessions which Stikker is evidently willing concede Repub in direction USDel plan would undoubtedly be welcomed by Bandung group and hasten general move into Provisional Govt.

Whatever may be comparative theoretical merits USDel plan and composite plan which has been started by Stikker-Hatta talks, it is urgent that a working solution of Indo problem be achieved soonest. If Stikker-Hatta talks will lead in this direction I definitely favor letting them go their course with such formalizing and supplementary negotiations within GOC as may be required. Repub is so weak economically and faced with such danger from crumbling social structure and dissension within political parties heretofore backing Hatta that speed is essential in getting Repub into Provisional Govt on honorable terms. If this is not done police action appears inevitable, or GOC efforts will be so thwarted that US withdrawal therefrom would have to be considered.

I shall continue submit suggestion as situation develops or fluctuates. Signed Cochran.

Livengood

1. Repeated in telegram Gadel 493, November 16, 6 p. m., to Paris (for Rusk).
2. Telegram 995, November 9, p. 476.
3. In telegram Gadel 467, November 12, 7 p. m., to Paris, the Department stated: “Cochran reports considerable progress Stikker-Hatta talks. Stikker departed for Hague to report his Govt. Cochran recommends no démarche this time. Dept concurs.” (501.BC Indonesia/11–1048)
4. Telegram 565, November 8, 11 p. m., not printed.
5. Telegram 998, November 10, p. 479.