501.BC Indonesia/11–648: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
983. Gocus 434. ReDeptel 5361 to Consulate General and USDel seeking opinions on ECA program for Indonesia totalling $84 million.
[Page 466]Reference Department’s confidential publication 3480.56, October 20, 19482 and particularly summary on page 1 and details given pages 6 to 12 of political implications of ECA aid to Indonesia. Department has herein analyzed much better than I could: utilization ECA funds for benefit Netherlands-controlled territory only; consequent disparity between economic conditions of Netherlands and Republic areas; deterioration of economy and crumbling of social structure in Republic resulting from lack of trade and financial support; strengthening of economic, political and military position Netherlands through ECA aid; reflection on US political neutrality when ECA helps one party only; encouragement Netherlands intransigeance toward GOC negotiations; and support for Netherlands military action.
In penultimate paragraph Gocus 423,3 I expressed fear police action and thought we might have to consider cutting off financial assistance to NEI in effort prevent this. Subsequent developments confirm basis for concern and increasingly lead to conclusion Netherlands Government may resort to important military action shortly. This might follow Stikker’s return to Hague and be based on alleged need cleanup situation attributed to Republic and beyond latter’s control. It might conceivably be deferred until USI set up without Republic therein, presumably by January 1. Action might then be attributed request of USI to line up rebellious Republic.
My conversation with Blom (Gocus 4304) evoked no denials of possibility of police action. I was also convinced by this talk that Netherlands Government had not weakened in its determination settle Indonesian question on its own terms as set forth when Blom visited Washington in July. He was obviously unhappy over policy I have pursued here and resented references I pointedly made to literary and statistical efforts Netherlands army. With Stikker coming here I did more than would ordinarily be expected to get him into conversations with Republic in best possible atmosphere, although I constantly realized his mission might be to issue ultimatum. When I learned Van Mook setup for party of advisors to accompany Stikker included such rabid anti-Republicans as Schuurman and Hoogstraten I prepared for worst. In Gocus 4325 I urged Department immediately intervene with Netherlands Government toward opposing police action any sort against Republic. First radio and press reports of visit Stikker party to Republic indicate mission may have aggravated situation rather than give hope for peaceful settlement.
Unless Netherlands Government gives Republic chance enter USI honorably and peacefully, I fear conflict inevitable with long period [Page 467] guerrilla warfare and scorched earth. This would work directly in opposition to ECA policy encouraging production and export important materials. Furthermore it would increase present heavy strain on Netherlands Government to maintain fighting and police forces in Indonesia. Continental Netherlands itself practically demilitarized with all fighting forces in Indonesia and thus constitutes weak link in Western Union.
No one could have come to Batavia with more friendly attitude toward Netherlands than I did. Any suggestion that failure to reach agreement here has resulted from clash of personalities, as suggested in Hague’s A–839 October 22,6 repeated Batavia as telegram 557, is completely misleading. While Netherlands Government has been represented in its negotiations here by difficult persons in Vredenburch and Schuurman, with Van Mook in background, there is no doubt but that they have acted strictly upon detailed instructions from responsible government officials in Hague. I have maintained cordial relations with Netherlands officials in spite vexatious situation and repeated opportunities afforded for misunderstanding. I have not failed, however, to be both frank and firm when I thought circumstances required. I do not attempt to explain what may be or cause differences in presentation Netherlands policy at Hague, Washington and Batavia. If, as Stikker indicated his personal letter November 3 to me,7 settlement Indonesian question rests with Netherlands Parliament, Embassy Hague will have advantageous opportunity use good offices there toward desired peaceful arrangement.
I am conscious Department reluctance take any action which might result charge improper pressure on Netherlands Government. I feel, however, we have responsibility not to put US funds into Netherlands colonial enterprise involving suppression militarily of truly nationalistic aspirations. Furthermore I am convinced moral suasion or mere threat sanctions by military would be less effective than simple procedure US Government telling Netherlands Government at high level that no more financial aid of any sort will be forthcoming if police action taken against Republic and as long as Netherlands fails consummate settlement through GOC permitting Republic enter USI honorably and peacefully.
Detailed report of Stikker’s visit to Republic will be cabled soonest after seeing Stikker or member party due Batavia this evening. Believe Department should, however, have foregoing for consideration in event it is confirmed that Stikker mission offers no favorable prospects for settlement Indonesian question. Signed Cochran.