Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/11–548: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

secret
us urgent

Washington, November 5, 1948—7 p. m.

559. Usgoc 190. Following is aide-mémoire:

• “1. Agreement Neth and Repub Delegations resume negotiations basis draft agreement submitted informally Sep 10 by US Rep GOC provides occasion for statement views US Govt on situation now confronting parties to dispute.
• 2. In accepting US draft agreement as basis negotiation, NethDel not only reserved position respect underlying principles draft agreement but on behalf Neth Govt attached further qualifications its acceptance which in effect reject substance draft agreement.
• 3. View this Govt, decision by either party not accept fundamental pattern draft agreement as basis agreement with other will, if such decision final, call into serious question ability GOC perform any further useful function and entail consequences serious character.
• 4. US Govt accepted only with reluctance nomination as third member GOC, anticipating essential task endeavoring reconcile far-reaching differences between parties could not by very nature be performed to entire satisfaction either party.
• 5. Three Reps US who have successively served with GOC have contributed utmost to assisting Neth and Repub achieve mutually acceptable settlement. Should it develop that sum their efforts is insufficient bring about such settlement, US Govt will have no choice but reconsider position.
• 6. US Reps GOC together with other neutral observers whose opinions this Govt has reason respect have come to identical conclusions regarding Indo problem. These Dept State may venture recite as follows. (1) Welfare Indonesia vitally dependent continued availability to Indonesia experience and judgment and technical and administrative proficiency of Dutch. (2) In long run Neth influence and economic stake Indonesia will be proportional confidence and good will accorded Dutch by Indo people. Preponderant desire Indo peoples govern selves finds chief expression in Repub which must be considered not as geographical concept but as political force.
• 7. View this Govt, draft agreement offered by US Rep embodies in broad outline concessions which should be made to nationalist movement if peaceful settlement to be achieved Indonesia and nationalist movement not be deflected into direction inimical Neth and Western world in general. Within framework Renville principles, draft agreement takes account two outstanding realities. (1) It recognizes that commitment on part Neth transfer sovereignty Indonesia early date essential if nationalist movement to be satisfied and that any delay such transfer beyond that required in making practical arrangements for reconstituted governmental structure will imperil gains to be made by eventually affording such satisfaction. (2) It recognizes that if interim period to be harmonious one and future sovereign Indonesia not fall heir unresolved and dangerous conflicts, interim administration to which powers govt will be transferred as precedent to grant sovereignty must be nearly as possible truly representative Indo people and soon as possible be vested with complete governmental responsibility.
• 8. Connection foregoing, certain comments may not be out of place. (1) Draft agreement recognizes sovereignty is indivisible. Ultimate and final authority Indonesia must be exercised either by Neth Govt or by an Indo govt. Provisions Statute future Neth-Indo Union of advantage Neth interests, as incorporated US draft agreement, can be put into effect and maintained in effect only through supreme power exerted by Neth or through willing agreement future Indo govt. Retention by Neth of such supreme power, however indirectly and beneficially exerted, would mean sovereignty had not in fact been transferred and would merely postpone and probably exacerbate conditions of settlement with nationalist forces. It follows therefore that fulfillment provisions Union Statute must arise from free consent Indos. US Govt has shared conviction its Reps GOC that the greater the frustration of nationalist forces resulting from delay attainment final settlement, the less prone future independent Indonesia would be acknowledge and welcome relationship interdependence with Neth. (2) US draft agreement envisages creation representative Indo govt through instrumentality Indonesia-wide elections, which constitute only means yet suggested of determining who are in fact to be considered true reps Indo people. Manifestly, parties quite unable agree what body Indos should be considered representative. For parties each designate reps from areas they control at present would be inad-missable since Truce Agreement, under which Java-Madura-Sumatra divided between areas under control Neth and areas under control Repub, was accepted only on condition rights, claims and positions parties not prejudiced, which preserves unimpaired Repub’s claim speak for populations territories it lost under Truce Agreement. US Rep in putting forward draft agreement considered that through the guarantee absolute secrecy ballot, which he believes could be achieved with assistance observers under direction GOC, possibility effective intimidation electorate could be largely eliminated. This connection, must be stated that while Repub reluctant surrender powers it exercises to interim govt in which three-fifths delegates would be elected from areas under control Neth, as envisaged US draft agreement, successive US Reps convinced Repub willing abide results absolutely free election.
• 9. In Dept understanding, Neth objects US draft agreement mainly in that it calls for elections before establishment fully formed interim govt and transfer full powers self-govt to Indo people soon as interim govt organized receive them. Neth contention that no election can be held until law and order reestablished throughout Indonesia implies employment non-Repub forces for this purpose in territories now controlled by Repub has made clear it will fight before surrendering police functions it exercises to Neth controlled forces. In Neth concept, interim govt would assume exercise decisive powers over Repub, while in interim govt itself ultimate power critical issues would be reserved Neth rep. The Republic has again made clear it will fight rather than accept such arrangement.
• 10. Policies pursued by Neth have rightly or wrongly convinced Repub Neth intention is render powerless Repub elements which will not compromise on objective early attainment independence by Indonesia and create Indo state in which Neth would indefinitely retain determining voice. Openly expressed attitude Neth Govt and Neth press toward Repub Govt has given substance to fears Neth does not regard the Repub leadership as element upon whose good will Neth will have depend for preservation its interests Indonesia in future but that it considers future influence this leadership may safely be discounted. This consideration acquires added significance view fact that in consensus neutral observers Repub leadership would dominate in Indonesia if various political elements allowed find own equilibrium and that indeed an independent Indonesia could scarcely survive without participation Repub movement which includes most those able, experienced and politically forceful Indos who have so far actually borne full responsibilities govt.
• 11. It reported by US rep GOC that NethDel has questioned value any agreement with Repub Govt on grounds that Govt unable or unwilling carry out commitments, citing as evidence repeated violations Truce Agreement which charged against Repub and which constitute source natural concern Neth. It may however be of some value recall that following signing this Agreement and acceptance by both parties Renville principles adherents Repub were persuaded Neth intended expeditiously as possible set up self-governing Indo organism in which Repub would have full opportunity carry due weight and that at this time degree compliance with truce achieved which on whole surprisingly satisfactory, view all circumstances. In subsequent months, however, with establishment permanent states in territories given up by Repub under Truce Agreement, failure truce substantially better Repub’s trade position, and limitations Repub considered placed upon opportunities afforded its sympathizers assemble and organize politically in Neth-controlled territory, confidence Repub elements had initially felt became dissipated. It possible that restoration this confidence would bring return favorable conditions of March and April 1948.
• 12. It however by no means intention this Govt attempt pass judgment respective merits Neth and Repub cases. This Govt has in mind only pointing out what it believes will be practical consequences final Neth decision reject US draft agreement as basis settlement and proceed along course set in consultations Bandoeng group.
• 13. In default concrete progress political settlement it appears evident truce Indonesia cannot endure much longer. It abundantly plain present Repub Govt, which has been able offer supporters neither satisfactory settlement nationalist issue nor amelioration deteriorating economic condition Repub-controlled territories, already experiencing increasingly serious difficulties controlling extremist elements. Further weakening Repub Govt under stresses to which it subject can only further impair its ability hold adherents in line and result in intolerable conditions demilitarized zones which truce will scarcely be able withstand. Resumption hostilities, which is believed likely eventuate from present Neth position, cannot our opinion lead lasting settlement Indonesia.
• 14. In any general conflict it not doubted Neth military forces would be able capture all Repub centers Java and all but most remote Sumatra in matter few weeks or even days. It doubtful however any issue will be settled by such quick successes. Concurrent development will probably be destruction substantial proportion Neth properties Repub-controlled territory by retreating Repub forces as part general scorched earth strategy for which Repub has made preparations. Repub potential guerilla warfare cannot yet be known. At same time it believed that revolutionary groups however split up will long run be able utilize weapon sabotage decisive effect, that by destruction factories, plantations and transportation facilities, by assassination estate personnel and intimidation workers, revolutionary forces will be able cancel profits which might normally accrue from Dutch-owned and foreign-owned properties and transform Indonesia from economic asset Neth to ever more costly liability. Such outcome could seriously deplete resources Neth and tend nullify effect appropriations made Neth and Indonesia under ECA.
• 15. Physical assets Neth Indonesia, precious as they are to European recovery, would not be only assets lost. Good will Indo people must in course struggle be replaced by bitterness and enmity toward Europeans and nationalist movement become ever more uncompromising in program, perhaps turning Communist channels.
• 16. Present moderate and anti-Communist orientation Repub Govt would appear afford most promising basis upon which build future Neth-Indo amity. Developments since Communist uprising Madioen would seem emphasize great desirability strengthening this Govt and encouraging it pursue policy cooperation with Neth and West as whole. Any change leadership nationalist movement can be only in direction adverse Neth and Western interests. Hatta Govt, our opinion, may offer last opportunity settlement Indo dispute in which legitimate interests both sides could well be preserved and enhanced.
• 17. US draft agreement offered with view encouraging both sides take this opportunity. Should Neth Govt in absence any other solution agreed to with Repub reject substantive content, it must be supposed dispute will be referred SC. In such eventuality US will make clear in SC its position that draft agreement offered by US Eep fair and practical basis settlement fully consonant Renville principles.
• 18. Should US Govt this or any subsequent stage conclude it has made without avail full contribution of which it capable to settlement Indo dispute through agency GOC, it would perforce consider its resignation from GOC in order.
• 19. In event US Govt should dissociate itself from GOC, it would regard itself no longer bound by restraints heretofore imposed by membership GOC and would feel at liberty consider other possible and appropriate means preserving common interests Western nations in situation which threatens develop their detriment. However lest any doubt arise this score it should be made clear in any reorientation Dept thinking respect Indo situation there will of course remain as fixed point its recognition necessity safeguarding and furthering progress made toward economic recovery and unity Western Europe.
• 20. Further goes without saying consequences marked deterioration Indo situation would not be confined Indonesia or even Far East, although they would certainly tend that area intensify anti-Western trends. ERP presented Amer electorate with manifest warrant as means preserving ideal and reality freedom. In allocation funds under this program decisions Reps electorate in Congress final. What decision US Congress would be with regard allocation funds Indonesia should Indo situation develop such way as apparently preclude likelihood peaceful settlement cannot be known until question arises. However, this Govt would be lacking frankness if it failed point out that attempt on part Neth resolve issue Indonesia in manner which had appearance denying concerted aspirations Indo people for independence would come as profound shock Amer people.
• 21. Must not be forgotten that establishment ERP and analogous undertakings involving assumption large international commitments by Amer people represent signal departure from nation’s traditional policies. Decision embark this role made only after long consideration by Reps people and at cost many misgivings. The decision possible only when Amer people convinced cause human freedom and own security at stake. Would again be unfair not call attention fact certain aspects ERP currently being reviewed Congressional circles from standpoint relation between these aspects program and objectives program intended achieve and further that with recent increase tension Indonesia, basis upon which allocations made Indonesia in particular being critically examined. Should events Indonesia foreshadow large-scale disorders it more than possible disposition would arise not only suspend further allocations Indonesia but even question end gains to be made by allocations Netherlands present scale. Must be reemphasized final determination policy this field not within province Dept State.
• 22. For these reasons US Govt earnestly hopes Neth Govt will find itself able accept broad outlines US Rep’s draft agreement as pattern settlement with Repub and that negotiations may be continued on understanding their object is not substitute wholly different design but effect such alterations as may be agreeable both sides or as GOC may be convinced are reasonable and advantageous, and with assurance both sides mean carry out in cooperative spirit undertakings entered upon.
• 23. Neth Govt will understand that Dept State in presuming upon long and tested friendship in expression these frank views is seeking only dissuade Neth Govt from course action which while undertaken with most unexceptionable motives could result weakening newly emerging Western European structure to lasting disadvantage component nations.”

Lovett