501.BC Indonesia/11–448: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
976. Gocus 430. Australian Consul General called November 3 prior departure Australia on leave. Inquired status negotiations, I gave general background and particulars on Stikker’s visit Republic. I stressed importance these conversations removing impediments to resumption negotiations within GOC on US Delegation plan. Emphasized urgency of preventing military action in meantime. Favored strongly entrance Republic in USI on honorable basis and opposed [Page 454] encouraging Republic toward autonomy and resultant division Indonesia. In response Consul General’s confidential question as to what he should say if his government asks about Critchley remaining on GOC, I said I had refrained from making any suggestions thereon when question had arisen at Hague. Said our relations entirely cordial and I was sure Critchley with his background could be most helpful if negotiations actually come soon. I ventured thought, however, that if GOC’s stay in Indonesia promises extend over many more months, it might be well consider replacement principally because of fatigue. British Consul General also called. I brought him to date on above lines and also gave him substance Department’s memorandum of conversation October 18 between Lacy and Graves.1 Consul General repeated his desire be of assistance but revealed pessimism over outlook principally because of extensive powers Beel has under new Hague legislation and pressure being brought for strong action.
At noon met Beel on arrival and extended best wishes.
At 5:30 p. m. was received by Blom alone in palace. Said I was happy Stikker and he came to Java since I was sure they could help overcome tense situation. I was especially glad Stikker had volunteered go Jogja and hoped direct meeting between Stikker and Hatta would do much clear up problems reimplementation truce, et cetera, and permit real question of political settlement come before GOC for negotiation without conditions precedent thereto being placed in lap of GOC. I asked Blom pointedly if Netherlands still anticipated there be negotiations in GOC. I said official utterances from Hague and statements Batavia had not mentioned this procedure lately. I said impression gained that Hague Government was proceeding with Bandung plan and would soon close door to Republic or leave it so narrowly open Republic could not squeeze in. Furthermore, fear had arisen lest press campaign against Republic and Stikker coming to Java meant ultimatum would be issued Republic that would result police action unless certain requirements met. I said I realized Netherlands might easily ask proof implementation of assurances that could not possibly be achieved in few days but I hoped Netherlands would not accept this as justification for military action.
Blom insisted it was intention to negotiate within GOC. Said Cabinet was insistent upon conditions set forth in Netherlands Delegation note October 28 with respect to truce. Said Bandung door not being closed. Said legislation still in formulative state and could be revised to meet requirements for Republic.
Blom and I talked over documents discussed on his visit Washington July and my visit Hague. I told him why I went ahead with US Delegation [Page 455] plan in early September. I particularly stressed that helpful thinking we had expected from Hague had not come forward. On contrary, Hague failed accept my suggestion made to Schuurman that proposed legislation for Bandung be made available to Republic through GOC and Republic’s opinion thereon sought. I said progress since then had been slow principally because of adamant position taken by Netherlands Delegation. Expressed strong hope Stikker-Hatta conversations would permit quick undertaking of negotiations within GOC on US Delegation plan.
Blom asked whether I thought Hatta could get required support his government to permit him carry out any agreement he might make with Stikker. I was convinced Hatta would have required support for any agreement reached which will permit Republic enter honorably into USI. I said Sukarno and Hatta sincerely desirous entering USI soonest provided conditions they have set forth in speeches adequately met. I told him I encouraged Sukarno and Hatta agree enter negotiations on US Delegation plan toward that end. Had assured them of friendly forum where amendments from both sides could be submitted and discussed. Told them I would do my best see they received fair treatment but would not support any unreasonable position either party. While I was convinced Hatta and his government would react favorably to any propositions Stikker might advance looking toward peaceful and honorable entrance Republic into USI, I was equally convinced contrary reaction would result if Stikker applied direct threat police action or otherwise attempted force quick decision on unfavorable terms or posed unreasonable conditions for implementation truce. I told Blom I admired greatly attitude Stikker had shown and felt confident he himself would make as friendly approach to Republic as possible in present serious situation. Reminded Blom, however, that Stikker’s attitude is quite different from that of Netherlands Delegation and some advisors accompanying Stikker to Jogja.
I told Blom frankly that I became convinced recently that there was genuine threat police action on part Netherlands authorities and had telegraphed such fears to my government. Said part of this impression came from reports which I received from various capitals, some from Dutch press both in Netherlands and Indonesia, some from statements issued by local military authorities and some from information gained directly from local sources. I had thought until recently that any planned military action out of question and hoped that I was now wrong in fearing such action might be imminent.
Blom told me how seriously his Government looked upon recent reports of infiltration and incidents. I told him I saw considerable [Page 456] material on this situation and on Netherlands fears of Communism in Republic when I was in Hague, Said they had not seen fit to publish this at that time. Now they have accumulated more and have begun propaganda campaign there which might be used in attempt justify military action. I thought it unfair attribute all these incidents in Netherlands-controlled territory to Republic. Said Republic itself had done good job in crushing Muso-led Communist uprising without help from Netherlands. I said definitely two sides to question. GOC had just recently been obliged call attention both parties to violations of status quo line and to utilization of press in commenting upon conditions or developments in other’s area which were conducive to unrest. I referred to increased number hot pursuits into Republican territory without compliance with truce regulations thereon. I told what bad effect on Republic was caused by issuance Batavian Military authorities of detailed bulletins on military and political situation in Republic.
I urged Stikker and Blom obtain as full information as possible in Republic itself and not be guided too extensively by written material already submitted from Indonesia to Hague or which is fed them there by group of men, considerable number of whom definitely known to favor early military action. I said Hatta could give explanations about Communist groups fleeing across status quo line from Republic or Republican deserters crossing or West Java former soldiers returning to homes, or Lascar and other fighting groups roaming on both sides of border, et cetera. I said it was not my job pass on authenticity of documents taken from such men by Netherlands officials or otherwise judge where blame lies. My interest solely that of good officer who felt it had been urgently necessary for one or two cool officials of responsibility to come from Netherlands and review conditions, objectively and talk with Republican authorities frankly before situation got out of hand completely. I ended by saying I thought military action by Netherlands forces might quickly result in capture Republican territory in Java but would set off scorched earth and guerrilla war which would last indefinitely and be beyond power of any army which Netherlands can afford for purpose of stopping it. Pictured catastrophic results.
Again Blom reverted to question as to how far Hatta’s Government would support him and whether I thought fundamental Netherlands position could be maintained in GOC negotiations. I said I considered US Delegation plan a middle course; that Netherlands Delegation had submitted amendments which practically rewrote plan; and that amendments were being prepared by RepDel. I said negotiations would be difficult but I thought fair agreement could be reached provided [Page 457] neither side expected 100 percent of its demands. I made it clear, however, that I had not suggested compromise points to either party and thought that possibilities should await formal negotiations within GOC. My hope at this stage was that Stikker and Hatta would go as far as possible toward clearing up conditions considered precedent to undertaking negotiations before GOC on US Delegation plan. I told Blom that I hoped to see him when he returns from Republic and would be glad have Scott and Lisle with me whenever he desired discuss details of plan and GOC negotiations.
At 11 p. m. Stikker’s Secretary delivered personal letter from him transmitted in Gocus 431.2
Today 7 a. m. saw Van Mook depart for Netherlands and Stikker and party leave for Jogja. At airport had another talk with Stikker. Advised strongly concentrate on personal talks with Hatta alone since I feared latter would be reluctant in presence those advisors belonging to Batavia group. Stikker assured me he intended to do this and make every effort toward successful conference.
GOC issued communiqué published press today calling on Netherlands and Republic for strict observance of truce agreement, particularly in regard crossings status quo line by armed units and in regard broadcasts and press releases which might needlessly create misunderstanding and tension between parties.
Aneta bulletin today reports from Macassar that Premier East Indonesia says Republic has place in projected USI and his government is striving remove all obstacles. Signed Cochran.
Sent Department; Department pass The Hague.3