856e.01/9–2348
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
| Participants: | The Honorable Norman J. O. Makin, Australian |
| Ambassador; Mr. R. L. Harry, First Secretary, Australian Embassy | |
| Mr. W. W. Butterworth, Director, FE | |
| Mr. Charles S. Reed, Chief, SEA | |
| Mr. W. S. B. Lacy, SEA | |
| Mr. J. Harold Shullaw, BC |
The Australian Ambassador called at his request. He said that he had been instructed by his government to represent to the United States its increasing concern that a settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute be achieved as soon as possible. In this connection, he referred to the Communist coup d’état in Java as the principal cause of his government’s concern. He said that his government hoped that the United States Government would impress upon the Government of the Netherlands the desirability of a generally conciliatory course and, in particular, an improvement in the atmosphere of negotiations which could be induced by the Netherlands revocation of its decree excluding the families of Republican officials from Batavia, the relaxation of the blockade against the Republic, and other acts which he described as provocative to the Republic. The Ambassador said that his government was most concerned that the Netherlands eschew any interference by force in the present struggle between the Communists and the Indonesian Republic through a police action, as his government felt [Page 366] that the reduction of the Communist threat in the Indonesian Republic could be achieved only by the Hatta Government.
I replied that in general my government was similarly minded in respect of the points raised by the Australian Ambassador. I observed that Communism in the Indonesian Republic had not been as energetically opposed in the past by the Republican Govt as it should have been; that this government had on several occasions pointed out that the Communists had no real concern for the emergence of genuine nationalism anywhere in the world; and that if proof were needed of this fact, the Kremlin’s characterization of Tito’s activities as embodying the high crime of nationalism would have provided it. I pointed out further that the Communists in Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia had continually masqueraded in sheep’s clothing of genuine nationalism. I added that it was indeed unfortunate that certain powers had in the recent past “patted those wolves in sheep’s clothing on the head”.
I told the Australian Ambassador that it seemed clear from the remarks of the Netherlands Foreign Minister at his Washington press conference that the Netherlands did not intend to intrude in the present difficulties within the Indonesian Republic through police action. The Australian Ambassador appeared unaware of Mr. Stikker’s statements. I also referred the Ambassador to the Department’s press release of September 161 as embodying the Department’s position in respect of Communism in Southeast Asia and Indonesia.
Mr. Harry said that the Australian Embassy had been informed by the Australian representative in Indonesia that the Republic had accepted the Cochran plan as a basis for negotiation. I told Mr. Harry that according to our information, the terms of the Republic’s acceptance were at least unclear and contained, in my opinion, “a strong Eastern flavor”. I said I felt that the Republic had a golden opportunity to accept these proposals in clear and unequivocal language as a basis for negotiations and that I was eager to know that it had done so. Mr. Harry suggested that the Republic could be expected to accept the proposals as a basis for negotiation in no more unreserved terms than they expected the Netherlands to attach. I replied that I saw no reason for the Republic’s following a course of excessive caution and distrust merely because they felt the Netherlands would hedge their acceptance with an unconscionable number of caveats.
Mr. Harry asked if the Department had been advised by the Netherlands Foreign Minister of the nature of the Dutch objections to the proposals. I replied that the Netherlands Foreign Minister had discussed their objections to the proposals with officers of the Department [Page 367] who had advised the Foreign Minister that the locus of negotiations was Batavia, not Washington.
I asked the Australian Ambassador if the Australian Government was supporting the Cochran proposals. Since replies from the Ambassador and Mr. Harry were vague, I told the Ambassador that I wished to advise Mr. Lovett as soon as possible as to what the position of the Australian Government was in the matter of supporting the proposals and I would appreciate being advised as soon as possible as to the degree of support which the Australian Government was prepared to accord them. The Australian Ambassador undertook to secure a definite expression from his government and to indicate it to me at the earliest possible moment.
[Later in the afternoon of September 23, Mr. Harry called Mr. Lacy to say that he believed the following language in a telegram already received from Canberra indicated in a definite manner the position of the Australian Government in respect of the Cochran proposals. This language read as follows:
“The Australian Government believes that the Government of the Netherlands should accept the proposals as soon as possible in their present form and hopes that the United States Government will resist any attempt to change the substance of these proposals.”
Mr. Harry asked if this language was considered as constituting a responsive reply to Mr. Butterworth’s question. Mr. Lacy indicated that he thought Mr. Butterworth hoped for a statement from the Australian Government to the effect that they would give the proposals their unalloyed support with the Republic as well as with the Netherlands.]
- Department of State Bulletin, September 26, 1948, p. 410.↩