856e.01/9–2248
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
| Participants: | R. K. Nehru, Minister of India |
| W. W. Butterworth, Director, FE | |
| C. W. Adair, SOA | |
| W. S. B. Lacy, SEA |
The Indian Minister called at his request. He said that his government’s long-standing concern that the Dutch-Indonesian dispute be resolved had increased as a result of the Communist insurrection in Java which had taken place during the last week. Referring to his government’s efforts to resist Communism in India and to the ominous “character of Communist activity throughout Southeast Asia, the Indian Minister said that his government considered that the dilatory tactics of the Netherlands in negotiations would increase the prospects of Communist success in Indonesia, and expressed the hope of his government that the United States Government would make every effort to impress upon the Netherlands the desirability of making such reasonable concessions as were requisite to the achievement of a settlement in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.
I replied that my government shared in full measure the concern of the Government of India that Communism in Asia be repressed; [Page 361] that it was the Department’s considered view that the Communist uprising in Java was due to several causes: dilatory tactics of the Netherlands negotiators, the high degree of coordination of Communist plans, and the failure on the part of the Indonesian Republic to recognize in the past the true character of the Communist danger. As an example of the latter cause, I cited the inclusion in the previous Indonesian cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin, who has recently revealed his membership in the Communist Party since 1935 and who is now reported to have joined Moeso in the Communist Indonesian Republican Government. The Indian Minister was apparently unaware of Mr. Sjarifuddin’s activities. I said that the Department had emphasized to the Dutch Foreign Minister, during his visit to Washington, the importance of reaching a settlement accommodating the legitimate national aspirations of the Indonesian people as soon as possible.
I continued to say that we had learned from our Consul General at Batavia that the Indian representative in the Indonesian Republic had, within the last few days, discussed the Indonesian situation with American representatives in Indonesia; that the United States Government welcomed the interest of the Indian Government in the situation; and that I hoped that when the Committee of Good Officer had succeeded in providing a basis for the resumption of negotiations and a basis for a final settlement of the dispute, the Indian Government would exert its influence as it had in the past to the end that both parties accept such settlement as the Committee of Good Offices might consider reasonable. The Indian Minister asked if such a basis was in immediate prospect; I replied that in the opinion of the Department, both the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands were disposed to resume negotiations but that we had at the moment no definite basis for a final settlement of the dispute upon which we pinned great faith.
I handed the Indian Minister the Associated Press summary of Mr. Lovett’s remarks at his press conference today concerning Indonesia which I identified as embodying the Department’s position.1
- For text of statements by the Acting Secretary of State at press and radio news conference, September 22, see memorandum 36, not printed here; for earlier statement on Communist strategy in Southeast Asia, see press release of September 16, Department of State Bulletin, September 26, 1948, p. 410.↩